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THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TAKINGS 
ClAUSE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
Wzlliam Michael Treanor* 
The original understanding of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment1 was clear on two points. The clause required compensation 
when the federal government physically took private property, but not 
when government regulations limited the ways in which property could 
be used. In 1922, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon2 established a new takings regime. In an opinion by Justice 
Holmes, the Court held that compensation must be provided when gov-
ernment regulation "goes too far"3 in diminishing the value of private 
property. Since that decision, the Supreme Court has been unable to 
define clearly what kind of regulations run afoul of Holmes's vague stan-
dard. Attempts to do so, including the Court's recent decisions in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council4 and Dolan v. City ofTigard,5 have created 
a body of law that more than one recent commentator has described as a 
"mess."6 
The Court and leading commentators have not seriously considered 
the possibility that there was an underlying rationale, worth reviving, that 
explains why the Takings Clause and its state counterparts originally pro-
tected property against physical seizures, but not against regulations af-
fecting value. This Article contends that the limited scope of the takings 
clauses reflected the fact that, for a variety of reasons, members of the 
framing generation believed that physical possession of property was par-
ticularly vulnerable to process failure. The Article then argues on both 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Gregory Alexander, 
Akhil Amar, Marc Arkin, Vicki Been, Richard Bernstein, Christine Desan, Christopher 
Eisgruber,Jill Ftsch, Martin Flaherty, James Fleming, Sarah Gordon, Abner Greene, Mark 
Hager, Tracy Higgins, Morton Horwitz, Robert Kaczorowski, James Kainen, Frank 
Michelman, William Nelson, Russell Pearce, Joseph Perillo, John Phillip Reid, Stephen 
Siegel and Steve The! for extremely valuable suggestions. I benefitted from generous 
financial support from Fordham Law School's summer research program. Michael 
Antinori, Thomas Giordano, and Richard Keenan provided superb research assistance. 
Very early versions of this paper were presented to the N.Y.U. Legal History Colloquium 
and to the annual conference of the Law and Society Association, and I am grateful to the 
participants in those sessions for their comments. My greatest debt is to Allison Treanor, 
for her support and encouragement. 
1. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
U.S. Const. amend. V. 
2. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
3. Id. at 415. 
4. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
5. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
6. Daniel A Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 Const. Commentary 279, 
279 (1992); Saul Levmore,Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 287 
(1990). 
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originalist and non-originalist grounds for a process-based theory of the 
Takings Clause that departs dramatically from current takings 
jurisprudence. 
Part I of this Article traces the history of the just compensation prin-
ciple through Pennsylvania Coal. It begins by looking at compensation 
practices prior to the enactment of the Takings Clause and shows that 
initially there was no rule requiring compensation when the government 
physically took property or regulated it. The decision whether or not to 
provide compensation was left entirely to the political process. The emer-
gence of the compensation principle represented a break with that tradi-
tion, but only a partial one. While the evidence of original intent is lim-
ited, it clearly indicates that the Takings Clause was intended to apply 
only to physical takings, and the early case law interpreted it and its state 
counterparts as not extending to government regulations. 
Part II discusses modern misunderstanding (or disregard) of the 
original understanding. It begins by looking at Pennsylvania Coal and 
then turns to the way in which original understanding of the clause 
figures-or, for the most part, does not figure-in current controversies. 
Focusing on the recent decisions in Dolan and Lucas, it discusses the 
Supreme Court's limited concern with the original understanding. This 
Part then surveys academic writing on takings, which typically interprets 
the initially narrow reach of the Takings Clause as a reflection of an out-
dated conception of property. Even Professor Joseph Sax's article 
"Takings and the Police Power"7 and Professor Richard Epstein's book 
Takings,8 works in part grounded in appeals to original intent, minimize 
the significance of the early limits on the compensation requirement. 
Their theories reflect instead broad applications of what each considers 
the animating concept behind the Takings Clause: a bar on arbitrary gov-
ernment action (for Sax); Lockean-liberalism (for Epstein). 
Part III provides the historical background for an alternative reading 
of the Takings Clause by analyzing why constitutional protection for 
property rights was initially so limited. The framers did not desire sub-
stantive protection of all property interests because, contrary to much 
legal scholarship, liberalism was not the dominant world view at the time 
of the framing. Rather, republicanism continued to exert substantial in-
fluence on political discourse. Many of the framers believed that govern-
ment could-and in the interests of society often should-limit individu-
als' free use of their property; balancing societal needs against individual 
property rights was left in large part to the political process. Mter exam-
ining the ideological background of the framing in order to show why 
the framers did not favor absolute protection of property rights, this Part 
then examines the history of the first takings clauses and the political 
7. Joseph L Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ. 36 (1964). 
8. Richard A Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(1985). 
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philosophy of James Madison, who initially proposed the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause, to determine why the right against physi-
cal seizure received special protection. It argues that these interests were 
protected because of the framers' concern with failures in the political 
process. At the same time, Madison desired that the clause have a 
broader educative function, embodying a national commitment against 
arbitrary interference with property interests. 
Updating original intent, Part IV develops a modern political process 
theory of the Takings Clause. Under this theory, courts should mandate 
compensation only in those classes of cases in which process failure is 
particularly likely today-when there has been singling out or in environ-
mental racism cases, where there has been discrimination against discrete 
and insular minorities. Outside of this realm, the Takings Clause should 
serve an educative function, but should not lead to court enforcement. 
Except where process failure is likely, the decision about whether to com-
pensate should be left to the political process, even in cases involving 
government seizure of property. The political process is certainly capable 
of handling that responsibility. A string of current legislation and legisla-
tive proposals, including the Contract with America, provide for compen-
sation in situations in which courts would not order it.9 
This Part · defends this political process approach on originalist 
grounds. The analytic approach used is derived from Professor Lawrence 
Lessig's recent elaboration of a translation modeP0 that was implicit in 
earlier constitutional scholarship.11 According to that model, the most 
faithful application of original intent interprets the constitutional text in 
a way that, rather than mechanically following the initial construction, is 
sensitive to changed circumstances. This Part also provides non-original-
ist justifications for a political process approach to the Takings Clause. 
The political process approach is consistent with constitutional structure 
in a way that current takings law is not, and, unlike current caselaw, it is 
consistent with a sensible reading of the language of the Takings Clause. 
In addition, because it reflects the presumption that majoritarian deci-
sionmakers should resolve property questions whenever their judgment is 
not suspect, this process-based approach accords appropriate deference 
to majoritarian decisionmaking. Recent scholarship regarding political 
and civil rights has argued that activist courts can skew the political pro-
cess in a way that, ironically, hampers the causes that the courts sought to 
help. This Article suggests that the same critique is equally applicable in 
the context of economic rights. Finally, while a process-based approach 
would depart from current caselaw, it would also return to an older tradi-
tion of judicial deference. 
9. See infra notes 436-440 and accompanying text. 
10. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993). 
11. See id. at 1171 n.31 (discussing precedents for his approach). 
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I. TAKINGS LAw THROUGH PENNsYLVANIA CoAL 
This Part looks at early takings law with the help of different histori-
cal guides to the interpretation of constitutional text: background prac-
tices, framers' intent, and early judicial interpretations. In colonial 
America, government routinely acted in ways that affected private prop-
erty, and the political process determined when compensation was due. 
No judicially enforceable compensation requirement existed during this 
period. Even after the establishment of a compensation requirement, it 
applied only to interference with physical ownership, and government 
routinely acted in ways that diminished the value of private property with-
out providing compensation. 
A. Takings Law Before the Fifth Amendment 
Precedents for the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause were relatively 
few in number and narrow in application. Even with respect to physical 
seizures of property by the government, the compensation requirement 
was -not generally recognized at the time of the framing of the Fifth 
Amendment. Moreover, no colonial charter or state constitution recog-
nized that regulations could give rise to a requirement of compensation. 
Majoritarian decisionmakers did not always provide compensation, and 
courts did not mandate compensation when they failed to do so. 
Only two fundamental documents of the colonial era provided even 
limited recognition of a right to compensation. A provision of the 
Massachusetts Body of Liberties, adopted in 1641, imposed a compensa-
tion requirement, but it was limited to the seizure of personal property: 
No mans Cattel or goods of what kinde soever shall be pressed 
or taken for any publique use or service, unlesse it be by warrant 
grounded upon some act of the generall Court, nor without 
such reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie rates of the 
Countrie do afford. And if his Cattle or goods shall perish or 
suffer damage in such service, the owner shall be suffitiently 
recompenced.12 
The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, drafted by John Locke 
and never fully implemented, provided compensation for the seizure of 
real property.13 They authorized the High Steward's Court to erect build-
12. Massachusetts Body of Liberties§ 8 (1641), reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties: 
Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in the United States Constitution and Bill of 
Rights 148, 149 (Richard L. Perry &John C. Cooper eds., 1952) [hereinafter Sources of 
Our Liberties]. This provision of the Body of Liberties appears to have been modelled on 
Article 28 of Magna Carta, which barred crown officials from "tak[ing] anyone's grain or 
other chattels, without immediately paying for them in money. n Magna Carta art. 28 
(1215), reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties, supra, at 11, 16; see also Fred Bosselman et 
al., The Takings Issue: A Study of the Constitutional Limits of Governmental Authority to 
Regulate the Use of Privately-Owned Land Without Paying Compensation to the Owners 
93 &: n.45 (1973) (suggesting this linkage). 
13. See Colonial Charters: Introduction, in 3 Foundations of Colonial America 1677 
(W. Keith Kavenagh ed., 1973); see also Wesley F. Craven, The Colonies in Transition, 
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ings and lay highways, adding: "The damage the owner of such lands (on 
or through which any such public things shall be made) shall receive 
thereby shall be valued, and satisfaction made by such ways as the grand 
council shall appoint."I4 
None of the other colonial charters recognized a compensation re-
quirement, either for personal or real property.15 Where they protected 
personal or real property, the colonial charters did so by imposing are-
quirement of procedural regularity, rather than by recognizing a substan-
tive right. For example, in a typical provision, the 1683 New York Charter 
of Libertyes and Priviledges provided that "Noe freeman shall ... be dis-
seized of his £freehold ... But by the Lawfull Judgment of his peers and 
1660-1713, at 99-101 (1968) ("The proprietors ... advised the colonists to look upon the 
Constitutions as a guide to the ultimate goal, rather than as an objective that could be 
immediately achieved."). 
14. Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina art. 44 (1669), reprinted in 1 Bernard 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 108, 115 (1971). Perhaps because 
the attempts to put the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina into operation were 
unsuccessful, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, leading accounts have considered 
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, with its protection of personal property, the only 
colonial precursor of the Takings Clause. See Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 92-94; 1 
Schwartz, supra, at 319. 
15. Although compensation requirements were not adopted in the colonies, they did 
have a great champion in the English legal world. William Blackstone argued in his 
Commentaries that compensation was due when real property was taken, although he did 
not provide a citation to support this assertion. He stated that, regardless of how beneficial 
the construction of a new road was, it could be built over private land without the owner's 
consent only if the legislature directed its confiscation, adding: "But how does [the 
legislature] interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property 
in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the 
injury thereby sustained." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *139. 
However, Blackstone's statement about compensation must be viewed in the larger 
context of parliamentary sovereignty, a doctrine of which he was the most prominent 
defender. See, e.g., id. at *147 (asserting that "the supreme and absolute authority of the 
state ... is vested by our constitution" in Parliament). As Professor Arthur Lenhoff has 
written, "The English Parliament, by virtue of its omnipotence and its freedom from any 
legal control, may wield any power of taking. Accordingly, the omission of a provision 
directing the payment of full compensation in a legislative act concerning expropriation 
has been construed as authorization to take without compensation." Arthur Lenhoff, 
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 596, 598 n.15 (1942). 
Thus, in Governor & Company of the British Cast Plate Mfrs. Co. v. Meredith, 100 Eng. 
Rep. 1306 (K.B. 1792), citation to Blackstone did not convince the court to award 
compensation for consequential damages in a road-building case: "If the Legislature think 
it necessary, as they do in many cases, they enable the [road] commissioners to award 
satisfaction to the individuals who happen to suffer; but if there be no such power, the 
parties are without remedy, provided the commissioners do not exceed their jurisdiction 
... ." Id. at 1307 (Kenyon, CJ.). Justice Buller added, "There are many cases in which 
individuals sustain an injury, for which the law gives no action .... " ld.; see also Boulton v. 
Crowther, 107 Eng. Rep. 544 (K.B. 1824) (njecting claim against trustees of roads for 
damages to private property caused by public road construction authorized by Act of 
Parliament). 
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by the Law of this province."16 Such provisions can be traced back to 
Article 39 of Magna Carta, which provided that "No free man shall be ... 
dispossessed ... except by the legal judgement of his peers or by the law 
of the land."17 
These provisions assigned to a majoritarian decisionmaking body-
either a jury or the state legislature-the responsibility for determining 
when to take property and when to compensate. In practice, compensa-
tion was the norm when the state took private property. For example, in 
the case of road-building, the most common occasion in colonial America 
for the exercise of the eminent domain power,18 the authorizing statutes 
typically provided for juries to award compensation for the land taken.I9 
At the same time, however, colonial governments often took private prop-
erty without providing compensation. In particular, all colonies except 
Massachusetts provided that undeveloped land could be taken for roads 
without compensation.20 Virginia apparently did not provide compensa-
tion even for developed land21 (although it did provide compensation 
when the colony executed slaves who had participated in rebellions or 
had been found guilty of crimes).22 Moreover, uncompensated takings 
occurred outside the context of physical takings of land. For example, a 
parliamentary statute aimed at obtaining masts for the navy assigned the 
crown rights to white pines growing on undeveloped land in the colo-
16. New York Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges (1683), reprinted in 1 Schwartz, 
supra note 14, at 163, 165. For other examples of provisions imposing a requirement of 
procedural regularity, see Pennsylvania Frame of Government (1682), reprinted in 1 
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 132, 140 (freeman cannot be dispossessed of freehold without 
due process of law); Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey ch. XVII (1677), 
reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra note 14, at 126, 127 (individual cannot be deprived of real 
or personal property "without a due tryal, and judgment passed by twelve good and lawful 
men of his neighbourhood"); Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People (1639), 
reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra note 14, at 68, 68 (Christian inhabitants of Maryland, other 
than slaves, shall not be "disseissed or dispossessed of their freehold goods or Chattels ... 
[except] according to the Laws of this province"); see also The Rights of the Colonists and 
a List of Infringements and Violations of Rights art. 3 (1772), reprinted in 1 Schwartz, 
supra note 14, at 200, 203 ("The supreme power cannot Justly take from any man, any part 
of his property without his consent, in person or by his Representative."). 
17. Magna Carta art. 39, reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties, supra note 12, at 17. 
18. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the 
Constitution 22 (1985). 
19. For examples of colonial statutes authorizing condemnation of land and building 
materials for roads, see William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 
Wash. L. Rev. 553, 579-83 & nn.88-94 (1972); William Michael Treanor, Note, The 
Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, 94 Yale LJ. 694, 695 n.6 (1985). 
20. See Treanor, supra note 19, at 695. 
21. See id. at 695 n.6 (citing Virginia statutes). 
22. See Morton J. Horwitz, Transfomiation of American Law: 1780-1860, at 63-64 
(1977). Virginia also provided compensation when privately owned land was taken for a 
port. See Act to Enlarge the Power of the Corporations of the City of Williams burgh and 
Borough of Norfolk and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned (1757), reprinted in 3 
Foundations of Colonial America, supra note 13, at 2363, 2364. 
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nies,28 and Virginia statutes climed at protecting the state's reputation as a 
producer of quality tobacco empowered the state to seize without com-
pensation processed tobacco ofless than premium quality.24 In addition, 
land could be taken with compensation that was less than full value, or, 
indeed, t:flat was anything more than nominal. Thus, in Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, highways for the postal service between 
New York and Boston were built over what had been privately owned 
roads; the new roads were narrower than the old privately owned roads, 
and the only "compensation" the owners received was the land produced 
by the narrowing.25 As historian Forrest McDonald has observed of this 
practice, "New England colonial governments compensated landowners 
for taking part of their land by letting them keep the remainder of their 
land. "26 Similarly, in Maryland, land for ironworks was condemned, and 
the former owners received only its value as uncultivated land, not its 
value as a mill site. Legal scholar John Hart has characterized the statute 
authorizing this minimal compensation as "consciously confiscatory."27 
There appears to be no case in which a court directed compensation 
from the government where a statute did not provided for it or in which a 
court increased the amount of compensation already provided by an-
other governmental body.2s 
Although colonies clearly limited the ways in which individuals could 
use property, no colonial charter mandated compensation when regula-
23. See 2 Geo. II, ch. 35, §§ 1-2 (1729); 8 Geo. I, ch. 12, §§ 1-2 (1721); 9 Anne, ch. 
22, §§ 1-2 (1710). 
24. See 1 DavidJ. Mays, Edmund Pendleton 1721-1803: A Biography 112-13 (1952). 
25. McDonald, supra note 18, at 23. 
26. Id. 
27. John Hart, Confiscatory Condemnation and the Founders' Conception of 
Eminent Domain: The Maryland Ironworks Act 1 (Oct. 22, 1993) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
28. For more detailed analyses of early compensation practices and takings law, see 
Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 82-104; Horwitz, supra note 22, at 63-66; McDonald, 
supra note 18, at 22-24; James W. Ely, Jr., "That due satisfaction may be made:" The Fifth 
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 
(1992); Stoebuck, supra note 14, at 572-88; Treanor, supra note 19, at 695-98 & nn.5-6. 
Based on my research in early records, I have previously argued that, while 
compensation was often given in the years before the Fifth Amendment, there were also 
numerous cases in which it was not given; the most frequent instances of uncompensated 
takings involved unimproved land taken for roads. See Treanor, supra note 19, at 695. 
Professors Horwitz and McDonald have reached similar conclusions. See Horwitz, supra 
note 22, at 63-65; McDonald, supra note 18, at 22-24. Professor Ely has recendy criticized 
what he labelled the "Horwitz/Treanor" thesis, stating, "Contrary to the opinion of 
Horwitz and Treanor, the common law principle of compensated takings was well 
established long before the framing of the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the usual practice 
was to compensate owners· for the appropriation of their property." Ely, supra, at 15 
(emphasis added). This criticism misses my point: Compensation was the usual practice; 
the fact that it was the norm, rather than the inviolable rule, demonstrates that the 
principle that the state necessarily owed compensation when it took physical property had 
not been established. The absence of judicial decisions requiring compensation was not a 
colonial aberration. English courts did not require compensation. See supra note 15. 
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tions affected the value of property. Furthermore, courts did not direct 
compensation for such regulations. Land use was subject to extensive 
regulations. 29 In colonial Virginia, for example, various statutes barred 
overplanting of tobacco and required the growing of crops other than 
tobacco. 30 Boston had zoning regulations governing the location of bak-
eries, slaughterhouses, stills, and tallowchandlers, and violators were sub-
ject to prosecution.31 New York City and Charlestown enacted ordi-
nances barring further operation of slaughterhouses within city limits.32 
Colonial governments regulated not only land use, but also business 
operations and economic decisionmaking. For example, fee schedules 
for ferries were imposed, 33 peddlers had to obtain licenses and pay du-
ties, 34 and pork, beef, flour, tar, pitch, and turpentine were subject to 
inspection for compliance with statutory standards prior to sale or ex-
port. 35 Taverns were licensed, based on need and a determination of 
whether the tavern would impair public morals, and licensing fees were 
charged.36 Bread prices were regulated.37 Various colonies experi-
mented with sumptuary legislation, restricting expenditures on clothing 
and jewelry. 38 Laws barred speculation in commodities, including such 
practices as forestalling (purchase of goods while in transit to the mar-
ket), engrossing (purchase of large quantities of commodities for resale), 
and regrating (purchase of goods in a market for resale in the same 
market).39 
The first state constitutions of the revolutionary era followed colonial 
precedent. None of the state constitutions adopted in 1776 had just com-
pensation requirements. The three that contained eminent domain 
clauses simply echoed Article 39 of Magna Carta, providing that the con-
sent of the owner or of the legislature was needed for the state to exercise 
its eminent domain power.4o 
29. See Bosselman eta!., supra note 12, at 84. 
30. See id. at 82-83; see also 1 Mays, supra note 24, at 60, 113 (noting planter requests 
for laws limiting tobacco production). 
31. See Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life 
in America 1625-1742, at 238 (1964); William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common 
Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830, at 52, 200 n.56 
(1975). 
32. See Bridenbaugh, supra note 31, at 239. 
33. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 52, 200 (Massachusetts). 
34. See Michael Kammen, Colonial New York: A History 189 (1975). 
35. See 1 Mays, supra note 24, at 56 (Virginia). 
36. See Bridenbaugh, supra note 31, at 266-73 (New York, Rhode Island, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Massachusetts); Nelson, supra note 31, at 52 
(Massachusetts). 
37. See McDonald, supra note 18, at 14. 
38. See id. at 15-17 & n.9. 
39. See id. at 14 & n.8. 
40. See Md. Const. of 1776, art. XXI, reprinted in 3 The Federal and State 
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and 
Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1686, 1688 (Francis N. 
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter The Federal and State Constitutions]; N.Y. Const. of 1777, 
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The Revolution increased governmental actions that challenged 
or destroyed property rights. The revolutionary army seized private 
goods without compensation.41 States passed statutes limiting wages and 
prices and barring forestalling and engrossing. 42 A variety of statutes un-
dercut the property interests of British citizens and American loyalists. 
Some states passed laws that allowed Americans to escape most of the 
debts owed to the English. For example, in 1777 Virginia passed a 
Sequestration Act that allowed Virginia debtors to pay money owed 
English subjects into the state treasury and provided that payments in 
paper money would be treated at face value. As paper money depreci-
ated to a value of sixty to one, Virginians were able to pay off their Eng-
lish debts at a small fraction of their cost.43 Even more dramatically, di-
vestment acts and bills of attainder effected the confiscation of loyalist 
property worth, by one historian's estimates, twenty million dollars at a 
time when the value of all improved real estate in the country was two 
hundred million dollars.44 Equally significant, revolutionary era govern-
mental actions also had the effect of redistributing wealth among Ameri-
cans. In order to avoid concentrations of property ownership, many of 
the states adopted legislation that explicitly required the sale of seized 
loyalist property only in small tracts.45 State legislators aided debtors, and 
. thus deprived creditors of property rights, by passing statutes that stayed 
execution of debts, that made valueless land legal tender, and that per-
mitted payment of debts in depreciated paper money.46 
The first state constitution to contain a compensation requirement 
was the Vermont Constitution of 1777, which declared that "when-
ever any particular man's property is taken for the use of the public, the 
owner ought to receive an equivalent in money."47 The Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 provided that "whenever the public exigencies re-
art. III, reprinted in 5 The Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2623, 2632; N.C. 
Const. of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 The Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2787, 
2788. 
41. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 363 (Pa. 1788) (upholding 
uncompensated seizure of provisions from private citizens during revolutionary war); 1 
William Blackstone, Commentaries with Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws, 
of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
305-06 (St. George Tuckered., 1803) [hereinafter Tucker]. 
42. See McDonald, supra note 18, at 15 n.8. 
43. See id. at 151. 
44. See id. at 91-92 & n.7l. 
45. See id. at 90-93; Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution 
335-41 (1929); Gia L. Cincone, Note, Land Reform and Corporate Redistribution: The 
Republican Legacy, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1229, 1236 (1987). 
46. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right 37-38 (1992); 
McDonald, supra note 18, at 156-57; Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union: 
1781-1789, at 154-59 (1987). 
47. Vt. Const. of 1777, ch. I, art. II, reprinted in 6 The Federal and State 
Constitutions, supra note 40, at 3737, 3740. In 1787, Vermont ratified a new constitution 
that had essentially the same compensation language. See Vt. Const. of 1786, ch. I, art. II, 
reprinted in 6 The Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 40, at 3749, 3752. 
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quire that the property of any individual should be appropriated to pub-
lic uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor."48 The fi-
nal revolutionary era document to contain a compensation requirement 
was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which the Continental Congress 
passed as the governance instrument for the Northwest Territories. It 
stated: "[S]hould the public exigencies make it necessary, for the com-
mon preservation, to take any person's property, or to demand his partic-
ular services, full compensation shall be made for the same. "49 In each 
case, a plain language reading of the text indicates that it protected prop-
erty only against physical confiscation, and the early judicial decisions 
construed them in this way.50 
B. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause 
Despite this precedent for a constitutional compensation require-
ment, states did not demand a similar limitation on the federal govern-
ment in the Bill of Rights. State ratifying conventions sought as amend-
ments to the Constitution every provision in the Bill of Rights except the 
Takings Clause.51 There are apparently no records of discussion about 
the meaning of the clause in either Congress or, after its proposal, in the 
states. Madison's statements thus provide unusually significant evidence 
about what the clause was originally understood to mean (and about why 
Madison thought this particular protection of property necessary). As 
will be discussed, those statements uniformly indicate that the clause only 
mandated compensation when the government physically took prop-
erty.52 Similarly, St. George Tucker, the first legal scholar to offer an 
interpretation of the clause, took the position that it was concerned with 
physical seizures. In his 1803 treatise, he wrote that the clause "was prob-
ably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining 
48. Mass. Const. of 1780, part I, art. X, reprinted in 3 The Federal and State 
Constitutions, supra note 40, at 1888, 1891. 
49. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties, supra 
note 12, at 392, 395. On the status of the ordinance as constitution, see Denis P. Duffey, 
Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 929 
(1995). 
50. For constructions of the Massachusetts Constitution, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846) (no compensation when statute barred owner 
from removing sand and gravel from beach); Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 
(1823) (no compensation for consequential damages); Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 (1811) 
(compensation required for logs taken for canal construction); Gedney v. Tewksbury, 3 
Mass. 306, 309 (1807) (Parsons, CJ.) (statutory provision of compensation for land taken 
for public road to be built "[i]n pursuance of" Takings Clause of Massachusetts 
Constitution). For a construction of the Northwest Ordinance, see Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 
Mart. 97, 132-33 (La. 1816) (Northwest Ordinance only required compensation when an 
individual's property or services were taken to aid war effort). There are no early Vermont 
cases construing the takings clause of its constitution. 
51. See Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 161-63 
(1957) (listing amendments proposed by states). 
52. See infra Part III.C. 
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supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too 
frequently practised during the revolutionary war."53 
C. Early Interpretations of the Takings Clause and Its State Counterparts 
Most of the early caselaw came from state courts. These courts held 
that compensation was required if government physically took property, 
but not if it merely regulated the owner's use of property. When the 
Supreme Court eventually began to resolve takings tssues under the fed-
eral Constitution, its holdings accorded with these earlier state decisions. 
1. State Courts. - In antebellum America, state courts usually re-
quired compensation only when the government physically took property 
or, at most, when governmental actions involved the physical invasion of 
property.54 Thus, the majority view was that consequential damages-
those from activities that did not involve physical invasions or appropria-
tions of property for a public use, but that nonetheless had physical con-
sequences, such as subsidence occasioned by a road-building project-
were not compensable takings.55 Indeed, treatise writer Theodore 
Sedgwick observed in 1857 with respect to the Takings Clause: "It seems 
to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection under this clause, the 
property must be actually taken in the physical sense of the word .... "56 
More significant, in states in which there was a takings clause or in 
which a takings requirement was judicially imposed in the absence of 
such a constitutional provision, antebellum courts nonetheless consist-
ently held that state regulation pursuant to the police power did not give 
53. 1 Tucker, supra note 41, at 305-06. 
54. It should be added that ratification of the Fifth Amendment did not immediately 
lead all the states to abandon uncompensated physical takings. See Horwitz, supra note 
22, at 64-65 (discussing Pennsylvania and South Carolina case law). 
55. See id. at 71-74; Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource 
Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 232, 236 
(1973). 
56. Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation 
and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law 519-20 (1857). Sedgwick's statement 
does not fully capture all antebellum case law. For example, judges repeatedly concluded 
that the revocation of a franchise gave rise to a compensable taking on the theory that the 
revocation was a seizure of intangible property. See, e.g., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 
U.S. (6 How.) 507, 533-34 (1848); id. at 543 (Woodbury,]., concurring); Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 571 (1837) (McLean,]., concurring); id. at 
638 (Story, J., dissenting); Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & New Haven R.R., 17 Conn. 
40, 59-61 (1845); Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 
360, 393 (1839); Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19, 24 (1840); Piscataqua Bridge v. New 
Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 66-67 (1834); 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American 
Law 400 n.a (8th ed. 1854). Nor did the proposition that consequential damages were not 
compensable command universal assent. See Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. 
Ch. 161, 167-68 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (Kent, C.) (compensating for consequential damages); 
Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 638 (attacking decisions holding consequential 
damages not compensable) (Story, J., dissenting); 2 Kent, supra, at 400 n.a (same). 
Nonetheless, the dominant early approach was " 'no taking without a touching.' " 
Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 601. 
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rise to a compensation requirement, regardless of how dramatically that 
regulation affected the value of property.57 These decisions sanctioned 
what one historian has called "a deluge of state and local legislation regu-
lating economic and social life. "58 Even Chancellor Kent believed regula-
tion of nuisances, without the provision of compensation, appropriate. 
In his treatise, he stated: "The government may; by general regulations, 
interdict such uses of property as would create nuisances, and become 
dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens. "59 
In early cases, courts approved regulations addressing common law nui-
sances, such as the location of cemeteries,60 the discharge of sewage,61 
fire hazards,62 the storage of gunpowder,63 and the operation of a bowl-
ing alley. 64 Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw was a pioneer in a broader con-
ception of the police power that gave the legislature the power to regu-
late activities that were not traditional nuisances, 65 and, under his 
57. See Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 106-10; Stephen A Siegel, Understanding 
the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction 
and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 76 (1986); Scott M. Remick, 
Note, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century America, 
40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 854, 862 (1973). 
58. William]. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America, 
45 Hastings LJ. 1061, 1076 (1994). In support of his claim that in late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century America public regulatory power was "omnipresent," id., Novak 
offers a dizzying list of state and municipal regulations. See id. at 1077-80. For example, 
he notes that between 1781 and 1801 the New York legislature 
passed special laws regulating lotteries; hawkers and peddlers; the firing of guns; 
usury; frauds; the buying and selling of offices; beggars and disorderly persons; 
rents and leases; firing woods; the destruction of deer; stray catde and sheep; 
mines; ferries; apprentices and servants; bastards; idiots and lunatics; counsellors, 
attorneys and solicitors; travel, labor, or play on Sunday; cursing and swearing; 
drunkenness; the exportation of flaxseed; gaming; the inspection of lumber; 
dogs; the culling of staves and heading; debtors and creditors; the quarantining 
of ships; sales by public auction; stock jobbing; fisheries; the inspection of flour 
and meal; the practice of physic and surgery; the packing and inspection of beef 
and pork; sole leather; strong liquors, inns, and taverns; pot and pearl ashes; poor 
relief; highways; and quit rents. 
Id. at 1076; see also William]. Novak, Public Economy and the Well-Ordered Market: Law 
and Economic Regulation in 19th-Century America, 18 L. & Soc. Inquiry 1, 18-31 (1993) 
(arguing that regulations were pervasive in antebellum America). 
59. 2 Kent, supra note 56, at 405. 
60. See Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538, 542 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1826); see also Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) 
(same); Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (upholding 
principle, but finding regulation invalid because of failure to comply with requirements of 
authorizing state statute). 
61. See Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 183 (1831). 
62. See Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799); Reznick, supra note 57, at 
862-63. 
63. See Mayor of New York v. Ordrenan, 12Johns. 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815). 
64. See Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
65. See Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw 
252-54 & n.91 (1957). 
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leadership, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a statute 
designed to prevent erosion by barring the removal of gravel and sand 
from certain beaches,66 and another that banned the construction of 
wharfs beyond a certain point in Boston Harbor.67 Thus, the scope of 
permissible police regulation was not fixed. As long as majoritarian deci-
sionmakers operated within an area in which they were permitted to reg-
ulate, no compensation was due. As one pre-Pennsylvania Coal treatise 
explained the relationship between the police power and compensation: 
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not be-
cause they may become useful or necessary to the public, or be-
cause some public advantage can be gained by disregarding 
them, but because their free exercise is believed to be detrimen-
tal to public interests; it may be said that the state takes property 
·by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under 
the police power because it is harmful. . . . From this results the 
difference between the power of eminent domain and the po-
lice power, that the former recognizes a right to compensation, 
while the latter on principle does not. 68 
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence. - Supreme Court decisions prior to 
1870 interpreting the Takings Clause are few in number.69 One of the 
66. See Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846). 
67. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). 
68. Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights 546-47 
(1904). 
69. See Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of 
Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 Persp. in Am. Hist. 329, 376 (1971) (commenting on 
small number of early Supreme Court cases). The dearth of early Supreme Court takings 
law reflects several factors. First, the Court held that the Takings Clause only applied to 
takings by the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 
(1833). Second, until after the Civil War, the federal government relied on the states to 
condemn the property that would be used by the federal government. See Kohl v. United 
States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1875); Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 559 n.18. Third, until the 
passage of the Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (1887), Congress retained sole 
responsibility for paying takings claims against the federal government; at that time, it gave 
the Court of Claims jurisdiction over such cases. See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 
341, 343 (1880) ("It is to be regretted that Congress has made no provision by any general 
law for ascertaining and paying this just compensation."); Floyd D. Shimomura, The 
History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative toward a 
Judicial Model of Payment, 45 La. L. Rev. 625, 627-64 (1985) (tracing evolution of 
jurisdiction over takings claims). 
That Congress initially retained control over takings claims does not undermine my 
claim that passage of the Fifth Amendment represented a departure from previous takings 
theory (although, given our court-centered views, this may not be immediately apparent). 
In a system, such as the British system, where Parliament is sovereign, the legislature has 
the ultimate power to decide whether to grant compensation. See supra note 15. By 
contrast, in a system in which the People are sovereign and the written constitution creates 
government and limits its powers, the legislature must provide compensation when the 
constitution mandates it. For a discussion of the Blackstonian conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty and "the peculiar American idea of a constitution," see Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 350, 600-02 (1969). While Congress 
was the forum for takings claims, it did not have discretion to deny takings claims 
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few exceptions was the 1857 case Smith v. CO'TjJoration ofWashington.'o The 
Court there found that the Takings Clause did not require compensation 
when the Washington, D.C. municipal government lowered the grade of 
a road adjoining a lot, thus rendering the entryway to a home unusable 
and obliging the homeowner to construct a new entryway. "The plaintiff 
may have suffered inconvenience and been put to expense in conse-
quence of such [regrading];" the Court acknowledged, but found that 
the harm was "what the law styles 'damnum absque injuria.' Private interests 
must yield to public accommodation .... "71 In 1879, in Transportation 
Company v. Chicago,72 and in 1897, in Gibson v. United States,73 the Court 
similarly found that compensation was not due when public works indi-
rectly caused harm to private property. In Transportation Company, access 
to the company's property was blocked during construction of a tunnel 
and improvement of the adjoining street. In Gibson, a dike altered the 
flow of water to the property-owner's landing. The result was the same in 
both cases. As the Court expansively stated in Transportation Company, 
"[A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not 
directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences 
may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the 
meaning of the constitutional provision. "'4 
mandated by the Takings Clause. See Christine Desan, Legal Immunity and Legislative 
Obligation: Institutional Understandings of Remedy in the Early Republic 3 (Oct. 8, 1993) 
· (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("Nor did the fact that recourse against the 
government was legislative rather than judicial in-and-of-itself vitiate the right of the citizen 
to relief or the responsibility of the government to make reparations."). Moreover, prior 
to the Tucker Act, claims under the Takings Clause were still brought, even though money 
could not be obtained from the federal government. For example, in the Legal Tender 
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), plaintiff sought a determination that the Legal 
Tender Act of 1862 was unconstitutional. Suits could also be brought against the 
Corporation of the District of Columbia. See Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 61 U.S. 
(20 How.) 135 ( 1858). Finally, even if the early practice was not to allow judicial resolution 
of takings claims, it is not clear that this was the original intent. In introducing the Bill of 
Rights, for example, Madison indicated that the rights were judicially enforceable. See 
infra text accompanying note 279; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original 
Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 
1660-61 & nn. 158-61 (1988) (discussing historical evidence concerning whether Takings 
Clause was intended to be self-executing). 
70. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 135 (1858). 
71. ld. at 148. 
72. 99 u.s. 635 (1879). 
73. 166 u.s. 269 (1897). 
74. Transportation Co., 99 U.S. at 642; see also Gibson, 166 U.S. at 275 (following 
Transportation Co.). The limit to this overall principle that no compensation was due in the 
absence of a physical taking was established by Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 166 (1872). In PumpeUy, the Green Bay Company erected a dam, pursuant to a state 
statute, that flooded Pumpelly's land, and Pumpelly sought compensation on the grounds 
that the flooding was a taking. Since the Green Bay Company was acting pursuant to state, 
rather than federal, authority and since the Takings Clause had not at that time been held 
applicable to the states, the claim was brought under the Takings Clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. See id. at 166-67. The Supreme Court, however, treated the state's 
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Smith, Transpartation Company, and Gibson all involved governmental 
actions that had physical consequences. The Court also consistently re-
fused to find takings where the claim was simply that government actions 
had lowered the value of property. The leading early decision was in the 
Legal Tender Cases, 75 in which the Court confronted the question whether 
the Legal Tender Act of 1862, by making all debts payable in govern-
ment-issued currency, violated the Just Compensation Clause by deval-
uing debts that had been payable only in gold. In finding that it did not, 
the Court observed: 
[The Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring 
only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries 
resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been 
supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indi-
rectly work harm and loss to individuals. A new tariff, an em-
bargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals 
great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost value-
less. They may destroy the worth of contracts. But whoever sup-
posed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or a 
non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be de-
clared? ... [I]t is not every hardship that is unjust, much less 
that is unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly 
for us to hold an act of Congress invalid merely because we 
might think its provisions harsh and unjust.76 
compensation requirement as equivalent to the national compensation requirement. See 
id. at 177. Drawing on precedent, the Green Bay Company responded that • [Pumpelly's] 
lands have not been taken or appropriated. They are only affected by the overflow 
occasioned by raising the water in Lake Winnebago." Id. at 174. The Court unanimously 
rejected this argument, stating: 
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of 
constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and 
security to the rights of the individual as against the government, . . . it shall be 
held that the if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real 
property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict 
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total 
destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of 
that word, it is not taken for the public use. 
Id. at 177-78. The decision thus contained the seeds of the reconceptualization of the 
Takings Clause that was to occur subsequently, since it explicitly recognized that the harm 
suffered by Pumpelly was a loss of "value." But the PumpeUy Court carefully limited its 
holding to cases "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, 
earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to 
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness." Id. at 181. In other words, the government 
action in PumpeUy gave rise to a compensation requirement because it was a de facto 
physical taking. Initially, the Court construed Pumpelly as limited to this very narrow 
category of cases. See Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 117-23 (discussing cases). For 
example, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667-68 (1887), distinguished PumpeUy on these 
grounds. 
75. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). 
76. Id. at 551-52. 
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Similarly, in a series of decisions, the Court found that police power 
regulations were not compensable takings. The principal Supreme Court 
decision in this line is Mugler v. Kansas,77 in which the Court upheld a 
Kansas prohibition statute that, among other things, declared places 
where liquor was manufactured to be common nuisances and directed 
that they be closed.78 Mugler, a beer-maker, claimed that the act repre-
sented an uncompensated taking. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Harlan rejected this claim. His opinion reflected the view that the judici-
ary had only a limited role in reviewing regulations. "It belongs," he 
stated, "to [the legislative department] to exert what are known as the 
police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures 
are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the 
public health or public safety. "79 Turning to the relationship between 
police power regulations and the compensation requirement, Justice 
Harlan observed: 
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that 
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, 
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be 
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public 
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the con-
trol or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his 
right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that 
its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial 
to the public interests. . . . The power which the States have of 
prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be 
prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, 
is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organ-
ized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the 
State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary 
losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, 
by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the 
community. 80 
Thus, if a regulation were constitutionally valid, compensation was not 
required, no matter how much the regulation affected the value of pri-
vate property. 81 
77. 123 u.s. 623 (1887). 
78. See id. at 662-63. 
79. Id. at 661. 
80. Id. at 668-69. 
81. For similar results, see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) 
(ordinance barring brickyard upheld, even though value of land diminished by over 90%); 
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906) (no compensation required when 
railroad forced to tear down and rebuild bridge for reasons of public safety); New Orleans 
Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453 (1905) (no compensation required when 
gas company ordered to change location of underground gas pipes to accomodate 
drainage system); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (expenses imposed 
on railway by public safety measures do not require compensation); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 
127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding statute banning sale of oleomargarine). 
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II. MISUNDERSTANDING (OR IGNORING) THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
The predecessor clauses to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 
the original understanding of the Takings Clause itself, and the weight of 
early judicial interpretations of the federal and state takings clauses all 
indicate that compensation was mandated only when the government 
physically took property. Despite this clear history, the Supreme Court in 
1922 in Pennsylvania Coal held that a government regulation could give 
rise to a requirement of compensation. Neither that decision, nor any 
subsequent Supreme Court decision, nor any of the leading takings schol-
ars, has seriously considered the possibility that there was a principle of 
relevance today that would explain why the requirement of compensation 
originally applied only to physical seizures of property. 
A. Pennsylvania Coal 
Pennsylvania Coal has repeatedly been described as the central case 
in modem takings law. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in 1987 that it 
"has for 65 years been the foundation of our 'regulatory takings' jurispru-
dence."82 Professor Ackerman called it "both the most important and 
most mysterious writing in takings law. "83 Professor Epstein has noted 
that "Pennsylvania Coal has long been regarded as perhaps the single most 
important decision in the takings literature, "84 adding: 
Its clear insistence that the just compensation requirement bites 
in at least some instances of general regulation has been the 
major reason why takings law has not been wholly swallowed up 
by an expansive construction of the twin exceptions to the 
takings clause-the police power and implicit in-kind compen-
sation-that are necessarily part of the overall development of 
takings doctrine.85 
Pm.nsylvania Coal represented the culmination of Justice Holmes's 
career-long critique of a physicalist view of property and the attendant 
view of the Takings Clause. As a young lawyer, Holmes criticized the use 
of the police power doctrine to justify governmental actions that affected 
property values without providing compensation. In an 1872 book re-
view, he suggested that the term police power was "invented to cover cer-
tain acts of the legislature which are seen to be unconstitutional, but 
82. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) 
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
83. Bruce A Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 156 (1977). 
84. Richard A Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 12. 
85. ld. For detailed discussions of the case, see Joseph F. DiMento, Mining the 
Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. Legal Hist. 396 
(1990); Lawrence M. Friedman, A Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 
Context, 4 L. & Hist. Rev. 1 (1986); E. F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 
Vand. L. Rev. 287 (1986); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is 
Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984). 
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which are believed to be necessary. "86 On the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, he wrote one of the first opinions to suggest that a govern-
mental regulation that undermined the value of property too greatly 
could be a taking. In Rideout v. Knox,87 the court upheld a statute that 
barred property owners from building fences more than six feet in 
height. Holmes stated that the statute did not give rise to an obligation to 
compensate, but that a greater restriction might have done so: 
It may be said that the difference is only one of degree. Most 
differences are, when nicely analyzed. At any rate, difference of 
degree is one of the distinctions by which the right of the legisla-
ture to exercise the police power is determined. Some small 
limitations of previously existing rights incident to property may 
be imposed for the sake of preventing manifest evil; larger ones 
could not be, except by exercise of the right of eminent 
domain.88 
Holmes was not alone in his critique of takings case law. As intangi-
ble property replaced land as the dominant form of property in the econ-
omy, other legal thinkers also concluded that the reach of takings law had 
to be expanded.89 For example, in his influential1888 Treatise on the Law 
of Eminent Domain in the United States, John Lewis attacked earlier judicial 
decisions holding that only physical seizures were takings.90 He declared, 
"We must ... look beyond the thing itself, beyond the mere corporeal 
object, for the true idea of property."91 For Lewis, this insight mandated 
a dramatic expansion of the reach of the Takings Clause beyond its ear-
lier limits: "If property, then, consists, not in tangible things themselves, 
but in certain rights in and appurtenant to those things, it follows that, 
when a person is deprived of any of those rights, he is to that extent 
deprived of his property ... though his title and possession remain undis-
turbed .... "92 
86. Book Review, 6 Am. L. Rev. 140, 141-42 (1871-1872) (reviewing Thomas M. 
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative 
Power of the States of the American Union (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1871)); see 
also Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 124 (ascribing anonymous book review to Holmes). 
87. 19 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1889). 
88. Id. at 392. 
89. The leading historical statement of this view is Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 146-48 
(1992), and the presentation in this section of the transformation in views of property 
follows his analysis. For an early treatment of this shift in the Supreme Court's conception 
of property, see John R. Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism 14 (photo. 
reprint 1974) (1924); see also Horwitz, supra, at 145-46 (discussing Commons's critique of 
Supreme Court cases); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth 
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325, 
333-35 (1980) (discussing "dephysicalization" of concepts of property in nineteenth 
century). 
90. See John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States 
§57 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888). 
91. Id. §54. 
92. ld. §56. 
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Similarly, beginning in the 1870s, state courts started to break from 
the view that takings clauses only protected physical possession and to 
embrace the idea that the clauses protected value. As Lewis observed, 
"The law as to what constitutes a taking has been undergoing radical 
changes in the last few years. "93 The case that began that shift was the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court's 1872 decision Eaton v. Boston, Concord 
& Montreal Railroad.94 The court criticized earlier caselaw holding that a 
taking of property meant " 'a total assumption of possession.' "95 Such a 
view was "founded on a misconception of the meaning of the term 'prop-
erty,' as used in the various State constitutions."96 The correct view was 
that" '[p]roperty is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and 
dispose of a thing. • "97 
As it confronted constitutional challenges to utility and railroad rate 
regulations, the Supreme Court also came to embrace the notion that the 
Takings Clause protected value, a view championed by Justice David 
Brewer, "one of the most conservative members of a notoriously conserva-
tive bench."98 Thus, in the 1894 railroad rate regulation case, Reagan v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 99 he wrote for the Court: "[T] he forms of law 
and the machinery of government, with all their reach and power, must 
in their actual workings stop on the hither side of the unnecessary and 
uncompensated taking or destruction of any private property, legally ac-
quired and legally held. "100 But these cases-in which the Court permit-
ted regulation so long as it was not found to be confiscatory-were of 
limited scope: They involved businesses clothed with a public interest-
like utilities or railroads or apartments in wartime.101 At the time of 
93. Id. at § 57. 
94. 51 N.H. 504 (1872). Lewis described it as "[t]he leading case upon the subject, 
and the one which has contributed more than any other towards bringing about the 
change [in takings law]." Lewis, supra note 90, § 58. The other critical case in the shift 
was the Supreme Court's decision in Pumpelly. But Pumpelly's significance lay more in the 
way it was subsequently interpreted, than in its actual holding or rationale, since, unlike 
Eaton, it did not explicitly reject the premises of earlier takings law. See supra note 74. 
95. 51 N.H. at 511. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. (quoting Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856) ). For a collection of 
post-Eaton cases adopting a similar approach, see Lewis, supra note 90, §59 & n.l. 
98. Stephen A Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy 
over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 Va. L. Rev. 187, 215-16 (1984). 
99. 154 u.s. 362 (1894). 
100. Id. at 399. For a discussion of Brewer's takings jurisprudence, see Siegel, supra 
note 98, at 215-23; see also Horwitz, supra note 89, at 160-64 (discussing rate regulation 
and dephysicalization of property); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the 
Takings Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1914-27 (1992) (discussing Supreme 
Court's review of regulations). 
101. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155-56 (1921); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North 
Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 596-96 (1915); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Central Stock Yards 
Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1909); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 
695-96 (1899). For an analysis of these cases along the lines indicated in the text, see 
Lunney, supra note 100, at 1909-21. For a discussion of the phrase "clothed with a public 
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Pennsylvania Coal, Supreme Court case law was still consistent with the 
position enunciated in Mugler: H something was so harmful as to justify 
regulation under the police power, it could be regulated without com-
pensation, regardless of the effect of the regulation on value. 1o2 
Pennsylvania Coal involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, 
which barred coal companies from removing coal when such removal 
would cause subsidence. An exception was recognized for lots on which 
the coal company owned the surface rights. The Court found that this 
regulation violated the Takings Clause. Writing for the majority, Holmes 
framed the decision in terms of first principles, and simply ignored the 
precedents in which the Court had held that regulations did not fall 
within the Takings Clause.108 In his opinion, Holmes stated: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some 
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to 
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must 
have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. 
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the ex-
tent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in 
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent 
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question 
depends upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is given 
to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to inter-
ested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its 
constitutional power.104 
The previous brightline test-regulations were never a taking-was re-
placed by a far more imprecise test: "The general rule at least is, that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking. "105 It was the role of the court to 
determine when a regulation "goes too far," and one factor that the court 
was to consider was the "extent of the diminution"106 of value caused by 
the regulation. Underlying this view was a suspicion of the legislature. 
"When this seemingly absolute protection [for property] is found to be 
interest" in the caselaw, see id. at 1914. For the origins of the doctrine that regulation of 
property affected with a public interest was valid, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. lUI, 126 
(1877); Scheiber, supra note 69 (placing Munn in context). 
102. For leading cases, see supra note 81. It should be added, however, that there was 
some foreshadowing in Supreme Court caselaw of the decision in Pennsylvania Coal. In 
particular, in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), Holmes, writing 
for the majority, in dicta advanced an approach to the constitutionality of police power 
regulations similar to that adopted in Pennsylvania Coal. He observed that a building 
height restriction might be a valid exercise of the police power, but if it rendered the lot 
"wholly useless ... the police power would fail . . . [requiring] compensation and the 
power of eminent domain." Id. at 355. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81 and note 81. 
104. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
105. Id. at 415. 
106. Id. at 413. 
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qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to 
extend the qualification more and more until at last private property 
disappears." 107 
That an overwhelmingly conservative Supreme Court would reach 
the Pennsylvania Coal result is not surprising. By extending the Takings 
Clause beyond physical takings, Pennsylvania Coal enabled the judiciary to 
review the full range of majoritarian decisionmaking concerning prop-
erty rights. The use of a balancing test-a regulation is invalid if it "goes 
too far" -paralleled the earlier rise of similar tests in the context of sub-
stantive due process, which also permitted the judiciary to scrutinize a 
broad range of majoritarian decisions. 108 
Given his strong support of active government intervention in the 
economy, it is similarly unsurprising that Justice Brandeis dissented. His 
opinion reflects the narrow reading of the Takings Clause established by 
precedent: "[R]estriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or 
morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in 
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use."109 In contrast, 
Holmes's decision puzzled contemporary commentators and has pro-
voked extensive academic commentary since then. As one Holmes biog-
rapher has observed, Holmes's approach in Pennsylvania Coal is "almost 
exactly the reverse" of his approach in his due process dissents, in which 
the police power took precedence over individual rights. 110 But his views 
in the takings area were consistent. Both Pennsylvania Coal and Rideout111 
reflect a belief that property is properly viewed as value, not physical pos-
session, and that the Takings Clause should therefore protect more than 
physical possession. Holmes's position seems to be the product not of his 
larger jurisprudential concerns, but of his embrace of a syllogism: The 
Takings Clause protects property. Property is value. Therefore, the 
Takings Clause protects value. 112 
107. Id. at 415. 
108. See James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional 
Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 123 (1993). 
109. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
110. See G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 
402 (1993). 
111. For further discussion of Rideout, see supra text accompanying notes 87-88. 
112. For a related suggestion concerning the underpinnings of Holmes's opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal, see Rose, supra not 85, at 565 n.22. Professor Rose speculates that 
Holmes may have treated the case as a takings case, rather than one involving the 
impairment of an obligation of contract, because he was influenced by Wesley Hohfeld's 
analysis of property rights. She notes: "Hohfeld's theory suggested that 'contract' or 
'property' rights were interchangeable nomenclature for legal relationships." Id; see also 
Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 124-26 (discussing consistency of Holmes's critique, 
throughout his career, of traditional distinction between police power and eminent 
domain power). For an alternative explanation of Holmes's takings jurisprudence, see 
Patrick]. Kelley, Holmes's Early Constitutional Law Theory and its Application in Takings 
Cases on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 18 S. Ill. U. LJ. 357, 413 (1994) 
1995] TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE POUT/CAL PROCESS 803 
Holmes's position has an intrinsic appeal. Why should one form 
of property receive strong protection under the Takings Clause and 
others none? There are, however, two problems with the Pennsylvania 
Coal approach. First, compared to the earlier approach, it makes the de-
cision about when courts should direct compensation a very difficult one. 
The text, original understanding, and early interpretations of the Takings 
Clause explain clearly when a court should order compensation-when 
the government physically takes private property.113 In contrast, the 
Pennsylvania Coal inquiry into when regulation "goes too far" is open-
ended and unconstrained. Second, the Pennsylvania Coal approach rests 
on the implicit premise that the question why the framers protected phys-
ical possession rather than other forms of property does not merit serious 
inquiry. In other words, Holmes assumes that, because anything of eco-
nomic value is property, anything of economic value also merits protec-
tion under the Takings Clause. Despite these problems, Pennsylvania Coal 
established the pattern that has dominated modern takings law. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that a regulation that "goes too far" 
can give rise to a compensable taking. 114 
B. The Modern Supreme Court, Original Understanding, and Takings Law 
In fashioning a modern takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
has essentially ignored the original understanding of the Takings 
Clause.I15 As Professor Richard Epstein has observed, "Historical argu-
(arguing that Holmes attempted to establish coherence between takings law and common 
law protection and policies). 
113. This is not to claim that the pre-Pennsylvania Coal test did not have any gray 
areas. The question of when and if government acts that physically invaded an individual's 
property were takings-as in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871)-was 
difficult, but this was a much smaller area of uncertainty than that created by Pennsylvania 
Coal. For a more detailed discussion of Pumpelly, see supra note 74. 
114. For recent examples of cases invoking the Pennsylvania Coal formulation that a 
regulation that "goes too far" is a taking, see, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 
S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 
718 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County ofYolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). 
115. The Court's oft-cited opinion in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373 ( 1945), is perhaps the classic example of this disregard. General Motors was a 1945 case 
in which the Court considered the appropriate measure of just compensation when the 
Government took over the unexpired term of a lease of a warehouse that had been 
equipped for GM's business. Construing the meaning of the word "property" in the Fifth 
Amendment, Justice Roberts observed: 
It is conceivable that the [word "property"] was used in its vulgar and untechnical 
sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights 
recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more 
accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to 
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, 
the construction given the phrase has been the latter. . . . The constitutional 
provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. 
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ments have played virtually no role in the actual interpretation of the 
clause. "116 This statement requires one caveat: To the extent that the 
original understanding was that physical possession by the government 
necessitated compensation, modern case law is true to that understand-
ing.117 In the realm of regulatory takings, however, the original under-
standing has been all but disregarded. The Court has not treated seri-
ously the possibility that there was some reason of relevance to modern 
jurisprudence why regulations did not originally fall within the ambit of 
the clause. Strikingly, even originalists do not use history to interpret the 
Takings Clause. "Even Justice Black," Professor Bruce Ackerman has ob-
Id. at 377-78 (foomote omitted) (citing John Lewis, Eminent Domain §§ 63, 64 (3d ed. 
1909)). In a brief span, the Court raises the possibility that property under the Takings 
Clause was originally conceived to mean physical possession, derides that conception-it is 
"vulgar and untechnical"-and then adds that the clause has never in fact been so 
interpreted. Rather than discussing (or even citing) the Supreme Court's early case law in 
which it was so interpreted, it merely cites the treatise of the early champion of the broad 
reading of the Takings Clause, John Lewis. Even the citation is misleading. The cited 
section ofl.ewis's treatment is devoted to his conception of the "true idea of property," not 
the actual case law. See I.ewis, supra note 90, § 54. A subsequent section of the treatise 
does cite case law supporting I.ewis's view that the takings clauses reach governmental 
actions other than physical takings. It begins, however, with the statement, "The law as to 
what constitutes a taking has been undergoing radical changes in the last few years." Id. 
§57. I.ewis observes that the earlier view had been that the Takings Clause only reached 
physical appropriations, and cautions that there continues to be modem case law to that 
effect. See id. §§ 57-58. In other words, the cited material from I.ewis's treatise supports 
the position that the Takings Clause was originally interpreted in a way directly contrary to 
that indicated in the opinion. For examples of cases citing General Motors, see Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA1V 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982); PruneYard Shopping Centerv. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,82 n.6 
(1980). 
116. Epstein, supra note 8, at 29. 
117. Loretto indicates the continuing power of the older notion that any physical 
invasion gives rise to a compensable taking. In that case, the Court found that the laying of 
a cable wire across an apartment building gave rise to a compensable taking, even though 
the invasion was trivial. Although it did not appeal to the original understanding per se, 
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court cited a series of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century cases involving either the permanent flooding of property or the laying 
of telegraph wires in which the Court held or indicated in dicta that such permanent 
physical invasions were takings. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427-30. At the same time, even in 
this realm, not all members of the Court have accepted the relevance of the early case law. 
Justice Blackmun caustically observed that the majority decision was "curiously 
anachronistic." Id. at 442 (Biackmun,J., dissenting). Dismissing the relevance of the early 
cases, Blackmun stated: 
The 19th-century precedents relied on by the Court lack any vitality outside the 
agrarian context in which they were decided. But if, by chance, they have any 
lingering vitality, then, in my view, those cases stand for a constitutional rule that 
is uniquely unsuited to the modem urban age. 
Id. at 446-47. He argued that "takings questions should be resolved through 'essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquiries,' into 'such factors as the character of the governmental action, its 
economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.' " 
Id. at 444 (citations omitted) (quoting Kaiser Aema v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 
(1979) and Pru.neYard, 447 U.S. at 83, respectively). 
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served, "lacked the courage of his convictions when it came to the takings 
clause."118 The Court's recent decisions in Lucas and Dolan illustrate the 
willingness of its members to disregard the original understanding of the 
Takings Clause. 
Mter David Lucas had paid almost $1,000,000 for two beachfront 
lots, the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act was passed, signifi-
cantly restricting the use of all beachfront property in the state. The state 
coastal commission, acting pursuant to the Act, subsequently barred 
Lucas from building any habitable structure on his lots. Lucas claimed 
that the commission's determination was a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas joined, the Court 
announced that when a regulation deprives property of all its value, com-
pensation is due. It accordingly found that, because Lucas's property had 
lost all economic value, the regulation blocking development of the prop-
erty was presumptively a taking. The Court, however, framed an excep-
tion to this general rule: Regulation that concerns a common law nui-
sance or is in accordance with background principles of property law 
does not give rise to a taking. The case therefore was remanded for a 
determination of the relevant South Carolina law. 119 
Justice Scalia offered two principal arguments in defense of the rule 
that deprivation of all economic value is a taking. First, "total deprivation 
of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point ofview, the equivalent of 
a physical appropriation. "120 While not appealing to original intent, in 
making this claim Scalia was implicitly starting from the premise that a 
requirement of compensation for physical appropriations lies at the core 
of the Takings Clause. From there, he analogized a total deprivation of 
economic value to a physical taking. Second, "regulations that leave the 
owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for 
its use ... carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being 
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating 
serious public harm. "121 
Justice Blackmun's dissent was in significant part a critique of the 
majority opinion on historical grounds. "[T]he Fifth Amendment's 
US. Ackerman, supra note 83, at 192 n.12; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of 
Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 25, 
61-62 (1994) (noting Black not an originalist in respect to interpretation of Takings 
Clause). For examples of Justice Black's ahistorical approach to the Takings Clause, see 
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) (discussing just 
compensation"); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(holding that compensation should not be awarded to farm owner over whose farm 
military planes passed at low levels; observing that " [ o] ld concepts of private ownership of 
land should not be introduced into the field of air regulation"); United States ex rei. 
T.V.A v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-54 (1946) (discussing "public use"). 
ll9. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, ll2 S. Ct. 2886, 2900-02 (1992). 
120. ld. at 2894. 
121. ld. at 2894-95. 
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Takings Clause," he wrote, "originally did not extend to regulations of 
property, whatever the effect. "122 In reaching this conclusion, he ac-
knowledged that Professor Joseph Sax had noted that" 'contemporane-
ous commentary upon the meaning of the compensation clause is in very 
short supply.' "123 Justice Blackmun, however, stated that "james 
Madison, author of the Takings Clause, apparently intended it to ap-
ply only to direct, physical takings of property by the Federal 
Government, "124 and he invoked Professor Sax's conclusion that the lim-
ited relevant evidence "indicate[d] that the clause was 'designed to pre-
vent arbitrary government action,' not to protect economic value. "125 
Justice Blackmun also argued that early decisions had typically inter-
preted the Takings Clause and its state constitutional analogues as requir-
ing compensation for physical takings, not for regulations that affected 
values.126 When courts eventually began to find that some regulations 
could give rise to a compensation requirement, they nonetheless permit-
ted government to regulate harmful activities without providing compen-
sation, even when the regulation deprived the property of all of its value 
and even though the regulated activity was not a common law nui-
sance.127 He concluded: 
[T]he Court seems to treat history as a grab-bag of principles, to 
be adopted where they support the Court's theory, and ignored 
where they do not. If the Court decided that the early common 
law provides the background principles for interpreting the 
Taking Clause, then regulation, as opposed to physical confisca-
tion, would not be compensable. If the Court decided that the 
law of a later period provides the background principles, then 
regulation might be compensable, but the Court would have to 
confront the fact that legislatures regularly determined which 
uses were prohibited, independent of the common law, and in-
dependent of whether the uses were lawful when the owner 
purchased. What makes the Court's analysis unworkable is its 
attempt to package the law of two incompatible eras and peddle 
it as historical fact.12s 
Justice Blackmun 's invocation of history is unusual in Supreme 
Court takings jurisprudence. Indeed, it is the judicial opinion that most 
seriously confronts the framers' vision of the clause and its original inter-
pretations. But, significantly, Blackmun uses history to criticize, rather 
than to construct an alternative theory based on original intent. 
122. Id. at 2915 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). My student Note, see Treanor, supra note 
19, is one of the secondary sources on which justice Blackmun relies. See id. at 2914-16, 
1215 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
123. ld. at 2915 n.23 (quoting Sax, supra note 7, at 58). 
124. ld. (citing Treanor, supra note 19, at 711). 
125. ld. (quoting Sax, supra note 7, at 58-60). 
126. See id. at 2915. 
127. See id. at 2915-17. 
128. ld. at 2917. 
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Blackmun in Lucas did not seek to return to the original position that 
only physical appropriations and invasions required compensation. As 
Justice Scalia observed in reponse to the dissent's attack: "[E]ven Qustice 
Blackmun] does not suggest (explicitly, at least) that we renounce the 
Court's ... conclusion in Mahon [that government regulations could fall 
within the Takings Clause]."129 Indeed, while his dissent does not set 
forth an alternative conception of the Takings Oause, it seems clear that 
Blackmun believes that some regulations can be takings. Significantly, he 
opened his takings analysis with the statement: "I first question the 
Court's rationale in creating a category that obviates a 'case-specific in-
quiry into the public interest advanced,' if all economic value has been 
lost. "130 The notion of a case-specific inquiry implies that some regula-
tions will be takings. Thus, even the one Justice to have made a serious 
invocation of original under&tanding in a takings case did not believe that 
original intent should be used to provide a rule of decision.131 
Justice Scalia offered relatively little response to Blackmun's histori-
cal critique. He acknowledged that "Justice Blackmun is correct that 
early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause em-
braced regulations of property at all. "132 With citation to relevant prece-
dent, he also recognized that before 1922 the Court took the same posi-
tion as the theorists: 
Prior to Justice Holmes' exposition in Pennsylvania Coal v. 
Mahon . . . it was generally thought that the Takings Clause 
reached only a "direct appropriation" of property, Legal Tender 
Cases, . . . or the functional equivalent of a "practical ouster of 
[the owner's] possession." Transportation Co. v. Chicago .. .. See 
also Gibson v. United States . . . .133 
Further, Justice Scalia observed that when James Madison originally pro-
posed the Bill of Rights to Congress, he drafted the Takings Clause lan-
guage too narrowly to reach regulatory takings. 134 
Justice Scalia briefly offered several points in support of his interpre-
tation. "(T]he text of the Clause," he wrote without elaboration, "can be 
read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations .... "135 He 
dismissed as "irrelevant" early state takings cases that preceded incorpora-
tion of the Takings Clause: "The practices of the States prior to incorpo-
ration of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses-which as Justice 
129. Id. at 2900 n.15 (Scalia, J.). 
130. Id. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 2893 
(Scalia, J.) ) . 
131. See supra note 117 (discussing Blackmun's rejection of majority's appeal to 
history in Loretto). 
132. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.15. 
133. Id. at 2892 (complete citations omitted). 
134. See id. at 2900 n.15 (commenting on Madison's proposal that "[n]o person shall 
be ... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without 
a just compensation" (citation omitted)). 
135. Id. at 2900 n.15. 
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Blackmun acknowledges, occasionally included outright physical appropria-
tion of land without compensation-were out of accord with any plausi-
ble interpretation of those provisions. "136 Moving to a broad level of gen-
erality, Justice Scalia concluded: "[W]e think the notion pressed by the 
[State] that title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that 
the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is in-
consistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause 
that has become part of our constitutional culture. "137 
The power of such historical arguments is limited. Justice Scalia's 
appeal to the text and his rejection of the early state case law do not rebut 
Justice Blackmun's historical claims; they indicate, at most, that the text 
and state case law do not preclude the result reached by the Court. More-
over, Justice Scalia's opinion does not even attempt to respond on 
originalist grounds to the fact that the pre-Pennsylvania Coal Supreme 
Court case law limited application of the clause to physical deprivations 
of property by the government. Thus, Justice Blackmun was able to offer 
the tellingly sarcastic comment: "I cannot imagine where the Court finds 
its 'historical compact,' if not in history. "138 
Justice Scalia's approach in Lucas is at odds with his announced com-
mitment to a doctrine of originalism and his explanation of what original-
ism means. For example, in "Originalism: The Lesser Evil," Justice Scalia 
contended that original meaning as revealed in the contemporaneous 
record should control constitutional adjudication.139 A constitutional 
clause should be treated as capable of evolution only "on the basis of 
some textual or historical evidence."140 Nonetheless, in Lucas, Justice 
Scalia seemed to be treating the Takings Clause as capable of evolution, 
without making a case for why it should be so treated. 
Lucas is an anomaly in that the original understanding is at least dis-
cussed. At the same time, the case neatly illustrates the irrelevance of the 
original understanding for modem takings jurisprudence. The Justice 
who invokes original understanding apparently does not actually believe 
that it should be used to decide the case. The Justice who is most closely 
136. Id. (citations omitted). For the relevant discussion injustice Blackmun's dissent, 
see id. at 2914-15 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at 2900. 
138. Id. at 2917 n.26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
139. See Antonio Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 862-64 
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism]. For other discussions of Justice Scalia's 
originalism, see Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 
1182-84 (1989) (discussing textualism and originalism); L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Justice 
Scalia's History and Tradition: The Chief Nightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 
78 Va. L. Rev. 581, 581-86, 589-96 (1992) (analyzing Justice Scalia's use of history and 
tradition in adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interests); Arthur 
Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 
1990 Duke L.J. 160, 177 ("Uustice Scalia] is an originalist who seeks to interpret the 
Constitution as the Framers would have understood it."). 
140. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 139, at 862. 
1995] TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 809 
associated with a jurisprudence of original intent essentially dismisses it as 
irrelevant. 
Dolan v. City of Tigard141 is a more typical example of the peripheral 
role of history in takings law. Florence Dolan wished to expand her hard-
ware store and applied for a permit to develop the site. The Tigard City 
Planning Commission approved her application, subject to the condi-
tions previously imposed by the municipality's Community Development 
Code for new developments in the central business area, where the store 
was located. In exchange for permission to expand, Dolan was required 
to dedicate to the city that part of her property lying within the I 00-year 
floodplain for use in a storm drainage system, and she was also required 
to dedicate a fifteen-foot strip of land adjoining the floodplain for use as 
a bikepath. Dolan sought a variance, and when it was denied by the 
Planning Commission and by the Land Use Board of Appeals, she 
brought suit, claiming a taking.I42 
The Supreme Court divided sharply in response to the case. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote for a five-member majority that found in Dolan's 
favor, while Justices Stevens and Souter dissented. The Court held that 
the Takings Clause required that, to avoid compensation, there had to be 
an "essential nexus"143 between a legitimate state interest and the permit 
condition and, in addition, that the government bore the burden of dem-
onstrating the existence of "rough proportionality" between the harm as-
sociated with the expansion-additional water run-off and additional car 
and bike trips to the larger store-and the burdens imposed on Dolan.144 
The Court concluded that the findings relied on by the municipality did 
not satisfy the rough proportionality test and that burdens imposed in the 
absence of such a showing were unconstitutional conditions.145 
None of the the opinions in the case contains any focused discussion 
of original intent. Only Justice Stevens touched on the issue, and he did 
so obliquely. ObserVing that the Takings Clause had been incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied against the states, he 
added: 
There was nothing problematic about that interpretation in 
cases enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against state action 
that involved the actual physical invasion of private property. 
Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when 
he opined that a state law making it "commercially impractica-
ble to mine certain coal" had "very nearly the same effect for 
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414, 43 S. Ct. 
158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922). The so-called "regulatory takings" 
141. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
142. See id. at 2313-15. 
143. ld. at 2317. 
144. Id. at 2319-20. 
145. See id. at 2320-22. 
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doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled has an obvious kinship 
with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner exem-
plified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are po-
tentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state 
economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise 
or unfair. 146 
Stevens thus criticized Pennsylvania Coal as akin to Lochner147 in vesting 
unconstrained power in the judiciary. He then contended that the 
Court's use in Dolan of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to evalu-
ate a "mutually beneficial transaction between a property owner and a 
city" was, like Holmes's decision, a "judicial innovation,"148 and suggested 
that this doctrine may provide the grounds for "a reassertion of the kind 
of superlegislative power the Court exercised during the Lochner era."149 
Despite these criticisms, Stevens did not suggest that the Court reevaluate 
the central tenets of that decision: that regulations can be compensable 
takings and that the Court, in evaluating regulations, should balance pub-
lic benefit against private harm. Indeed, Stevens's position in the case-
that the property-owner bore "[t]he burden of demonstrating that [the 
challenged] conditions have unreasonably impaired the economic value 
of the proposed improvement"150-embraces these views. In other 
words, Stevens implicitly criticized the majority for again expanding the 
realm of judicial discretion, as it had previously done in Pennsylvania Coal, 
but he did not call for a return to the original understanding, nor did he 
suggest that the original understanding had any lesson to offer for con-
temporary jurisprudence. 
C. Academic Commentary and Original Intent 
As the above discussion indicates, the original understanding has 
played at most a marginal role in modern Supreme Court takings juris-
prudence. Like the Court, scholars have not seriously considered the 
possibility that the framers' requirement of compensation for physical 
seizures but not for regulations might be based on a principle relevant to 
modern constitutional discourse. This section discusses the academic dis-
regard of original intent and what are probably the two most prominent 
exceptions to this trend: Joseph SaX's "Takings and the Police Power"151 
and Richard Epstein's Tokings. 152 Both Sax and Epstein use original in-
tent to support their conceptions of takings law, yet dismiss the signifi-
cance of the fact that the Takings Clause was originally limited in scope. 
146. ld. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations, except to 
Pennsylvania Coal, omitted). 
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum employment 
hours state legislation as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). 
148. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2327. 
149. Id. at 2329. 
150. Id. at 2330. 
151. Sax, supra note 7. 
152. Epstein, supra note 8. 
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In doing so, they fail to grasp the full significance of the Takings 
Clause.153 
1. Disregard of Original Intent. - Typically, in proposing how the 
Takings Clause should be understood, modem theorists have devoted rel-
atively little attention to the original understanding. Scholars have gener-
ally focused more on philosophy and economics than they have on his-
tory, 154 partly because of the paucity of historical evidence of the framers' 
intent.155 In addition, some takings scholars do not rely on original in-
tent because they are not originalists.156 Holmes's reason for departing 
from established precedent suggests another reason why the original un-
153. Epstein and Sax, it should be added, are not the only prominent scholars to 
develop takings theories that draw in significant ways on original understanding. See, e.g., 
Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 238-53 (discussing overruling Pennsylvania Coal as 
inconsistent with original intent); Kmiec, supra note 69, at 1639--47 (urging on originalist 
grounds various elements of takings doctrine, such as harm/benefit analysis and provision 
of remedy); Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in 
Liberty, Property, and the Future of Constitutional Development 127, 129-35 (Ellen F. 
Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990) (proposing existence of historically grounded 
republican and liberal approaches to takings doctrine). But, like Sax and Epstein, none of 
these writers shares the project of this Article. They do not try to recapture why the 
framers protected only physical possession in order to use that underlying rationale as a 
basis for modem takings theory. 
One article, however, that is similar in nature to this Article is Michael W. McConnell, 
Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship between Individual 
Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 267 (1988). Professor McConnell 
asks why the Contract Clause was intended to limit actions of the states, but not the 
national government, while the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was intended to do the 
reverse. He argues, in part, that the Contract Clause applied only to the states because 
factions were seen as a greater problem at the state level than at the national level. See id. 
at 288-93. This argument is correct, and I have drawn on it, see infra text accompanying 
note 308. He is less certain of why the Takings Clause did not apply to the states, but 
suggests that the clause "applies to the level of government most needful of restraint." 
McConnell, supra, at 293. In contrast, I do not think that the framers were particularly 
fearful that the national, as opposed to the state government, would seize private property. 
I suggest infra, see note 308, that Madison limited the reach of the clause for political 
reasons. But Professor McConnell's argument that the Takings Clause was in part a 
response to the high costs associated with monitoring the military impresses me as correct, 
and I rely on it. See infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
154. For examples of leading studies of takings law that advance theories in which the 
original understanding plays little or no role, see Ackerman, supra note 83; Farber, supra 
note 6; Levmore, supra note 6; Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts and Special Interests, 77 Va. 
L. Rev. 1333 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967);Jeremy 
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393 (1991); Andrea L. 
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part 1-A Critique of 
Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1299 (1989) [hereinafter Peterson I]; 
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part 11-
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral justification, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 
53 (1990) [hereinafter Peterson II]; joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public 
Rights, 81 Yale LJ. 149 (1971). 
155. See Ackerman, supra note 83, at 7-8; Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 97-104. 
156. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 83, at 7, 192 n.ll. 
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derstanding has had only a limited influence on modern scholarship. 
Scholars have concluded that the early view of the Takings Clause re-
flected a physicalist view of property that is either incoherent or outdated 
in the modern economy. At best, this physicalist conception is merely 
one of the contemporary understandings of property and, as a contested 
definition, no longer establishes the correct reading of the clause. 
For example, in "The Malthusian Constitution,"157 Professor Thomas 
Grey highlighted changes in the conception of property: 
Under the classical conception, actual dispossession was re-
quired before ownership rights were violated and property was 
taken. 
By contrast, modern lawyers-or at least modern legal 
scholars-are nominalists about "ownership"; they see property 
in resources as consisting of the infinitely divisible claims to pos-
session, use, disposition, and profit that people might have with 
respect to those things. There is, on this conception, no essen-
tial core of those rights that naturally constitutes ownership. 
But the other side of the modern conception that sees 
property rights everywhere is a greatly enhanced toleration of 
their infringement. Iss 
Similarly, in Private Property and the Constitution,159 Bruce Ackerman wrote: 
"Unlike our ancestors, we no longer count our wealth by looking first to 
our social property of land, farms, buildings. Instead, our principle 
means of support consist of legal property: stocks, bonds, pensions, an 
assortment of rights granted by the activist welfare state."160 Frank 
Michelman in "Property, Utility, and Fairness"161 focused on the logical 
weakness of the earlier view. "At one time," he wrote, "it was commonly 
held that, in the absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable 'tak-
ing' could occur only through physical encroachment and occupa-
tion."162 But such a position could not withstand analytic scrutiny: 
"Wordplay-in short dogged adherence to the constitutional formulas of 
'taking' and 'property' -cannot justify any sharp line of distinction be-
tween governmental encroachments which take the different forms of af-
firmative occupancy and negative restraint. "163 
157. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 21 (1986). 
158. Id. at 30. 
159. Ackerman, supra note 83. 
160. Id. at 166. 
161. Michelman, supra note 154. 
162. Id. at 1184. 
163. ld. at 1186-87. The works of Ackerman and Michelman referred to suggest 
reasons why it may be particularly appropriate to find a taking when a governmental action 
interferes with physical possession (as opposed to when it simply diminishes value). The 
reasons advanced are, however, cultural, not originalist, and they also apply to certain 
governmental actions other than physical takings. In addition, the two authors reveal the 
weaknesses of these reasons. See Ackerman, supra note 88, at 113-167 (analyzing takings 
law as reflecting protection for "Layman's things"); Michelman, supra note 154, at 1234 
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Such critiques rest on the notion that the initial scope of the Takings 
Clause can be explained as reflecting a physicalist conception of prop-
erty. As the next Part will discuss, the scope of the clause cannot be so 
simply explained. However, lack of concern with the question of why sub-
stantive constitutional protection of property rights was limited is charac-
teristic not only of non-originalist theories of the Takings Clause. 
Originalists Sax and Epstein both present theories that fail to confront 
adequately the limitations of the Takings Clause. 
2. Joseph Sax.- In his 1964 article, "Takings and the Police Power," 
Professor Sax argued that compensation was due only when the govern-
ment, to advance its ends as an enterpriser, curtailed legitimate individ-
ual economic interests.164 In support of this theory, Sax provided a path-
breaking survey of the early history of eminent domain law that included 
discussions of both the writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
civil law thinkers and English and American authorities writing at roughly 
the time of the Fifth Amendment's ratification.165 Sax argued that this 
early history rebutted "the notion, so commonly held, that the taking 
clause [sic] was to be a bulwark for the maintenance of the established 
distribution of wealth. "166 Thus, the Holmesian vision that the clause 
protected value was inconsistent with early understandings. 
Sax acknowledged that there were relatively few historical sources, 
but he suggested that these sources reflected a concern with preventing 
governmental arbitrariness, particularly the "appropriation of property by 
the state for its own account to finance its own enterprise."167 Thus, in his 
treatment of America and England, Sax highlighted Tucker's statement 
that the clause was meant to be a remedy against military impressment 
and observed that Blackstone's paradigmatic case for compensation con-
(discussing belief "that one thinks of himself not just as owning a total amount of wealth or 
income, but also as owning several discrete 'things' whose destinies he controls"). 
164. Sax formulated the test as follows: 
[W]hen an individual or limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally 
acquired existing economic values as a consequence of government activity which 
enhances the economic value of some governmental enterprise, then the act is a 
taking, and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the challenged 
act is an improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict 
within the private sector of the society, compensation is not constitutionally 
required. 
Sax, supra note 7, at 67. 
165. See id. at 54-60. Justice Blackmun relied heavily on Sax's account in Lucas. See 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2915-16 (1992) (Blackmun,J., 
dissenting). 
166. Sax, supra note 7, at 53. 
167. ld. at 59. 
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cerned the taking of land for a highway.168 Sax also found support for his 
view in Chief justice Marshall's statement in Fletcher v. Peck:169 
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of 
government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative 
power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if 
the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may 
be seized without compensation.170 
While the language of Fletcher would seem to suggest a broad conception 
of the rights of private property, Sax argued that the case supported his 
thesis since it concerned the legitimacy of Georgia's invalidation of land 
grants for which it had already received money. 171 "[E]xamples of 
takings given by the early writers all fit quite clearly into the enterprise 
capacity,"172 Sax concluded. 
At the same time, however, Sax's enterprise theory was broader in its 
reach than early understandings of the Takings Clause. "[A] finding of 
enhancement of the resource position of a government enterprise," he 
wrote, "does not necessarily require a physical invasion, or an acquistion 
of a formal proprietary interest. "173 Sax contended that the distinction in 
the early case law between police power regulations, which were never 
compensable, and physical seizures, which always were, no longer made 
sense and that some regulations should therefore now give rise to a com-
pensation requirement: 
As the scope of government regulations grew ... the economic 
impact of government regulation undermined the rationality of 
[the distinction between the police power and the eminent do-
main power]. Particularly with the growth of zoning, conserva-
tion legislation, and pervasive business regulation, the impact of 
the police power, however defined as qualitatively distinct, upon 
the traditional perquisites of private ownership could hardly be 
ignored.174 
Sax is unquestionably correct that the economy has changed and 
that the nature of government intervention in the economy has dramati-
cally expanded. Nonetheless, significant government regulation was 
common even in the world of the framers. 175 Thus, given such regula-
tion and the fact that the Takings Clause was not originally understood to 
bar it, the question is raised: Was there a limiting principle shaping the 
168. See id. at 58-59: see also supra note 15 (Blackstone's statement); supra text 
accompanying note 53 (quoting Tucker's statement concerning the original 
understanding of the Takings Clause). 
169. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
170. Id. at 135. 
171. See Sax, supra note 7, at 59-60. 
172. ld. at 63. 
173. ld. 
174. Id. at 40. 
175. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. 
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Takings Clause that merits serious regard today? And it is a question that 
Sax does not resolve. 
3. Richard Epstein. - Almost certainly, in recent years Professor 
Richard Epstein has influenced political discourse about the Takings 
Clause more than any other academic. In Takings, his chief work on 
takings doctrine, Professor Epstein invoked original intent-and specifi-
cally his claim that the framers were Lockeans-to support his expansive 
conception of the Takings Clause. Under that view, "[a]ll regulations, all 
taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are takings of private proJr 
erty prima facie compensable by the state."176 Like Sax, however, Epstein 
fails to account for the fact that the Bill of Rights initially provided such 
limited protection for property rights. 
Epstein's invocation of history rests on his understanding of the gen-
eral principles animating the Takings Clause and the Constitution, rather 
than on the specific construction that the framers gave the clause. Ac-
cording to Epstein, "The Lockean system was dominant at the time when 
the Constitution was adopted,"177 and "the founders shared Locke's and 
Blackstone's affection for private property, which is why they inserted the 
eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights."178 The Takings Clause, 
176. Epstein, supra note 8, at 95. 
177. Id. at 16. 
178. Id. at 29. One problem with this claim is that, in his brief discussion of the 
takings issue in the Two Treatises of Government, Locke did not assert that the state had an 
obligation to compensate the affected individual; his concern was only with procedure. He 
wrote, "[T]he Prince, or Senate, however, it may have power to make Laws for the 
regulating of Property between the Subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a 
Power to take to themselves the whole or any part of the Subject's [sic] Property, without 
their own consent." John Locke, Two Treatises of Government§ 407 (Peter Laslett ed., 
1960) (1698). Epstein's response to this problem is that "the takings clause should be read 
as being inspired by Locke's treatise but not as following its language, or its logic, to the 
end." Epstein, supra note 84, at 2 n.5 (discussing argument in Takings). A contrary 
reading of Locke is that the consent to taking of property occurs when individuals 
surrender their natural rights and enter the social contract; according to this view, when 
the social contract is formed, individuals consent to subsequent legislation aimed at 
advancing the common good, even when that legislation is redistributive. See Note, 
Richard Epstein on the Foundation of Takings Jurisprudence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 791, 804-05 
(1986) [written by Deborah Goldberg]. The best evidence linking Locke to a 
compensation requirement does not figure in Epstein's account: Locke's authorship of 
compensation requirement in the Fundamental Constitution of the Carolinas. See supra 
text accompanying note 13. The varying readings in Takings and the Harvard Note are a 
manifestation of a larger debate about whether Locke's thought was purely liberal. 
Compare C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke 203, 211 (1962) (Locke's theory legitimizes unlimited appropriation) with James 
Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries 152-54, 165 (1980) 
(unlimited appropriation sanctioned only if proviso of "enough and as good left in 
common for others" is satisfied). 
To the extent that scholarly writings influenced the eventual rise of the just 
compensation principle, the most important authors may have been, not Locke, but civil 
law scholars. See J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent 
Domain, 6 Wis. L. Rev. 67, 69-81 (1931) (discussing role of natural law in early state 
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according to Epstein, mirrors Locke's philosophy about property, whose 
central premise is antiredistributivism. Thus, the Takings Clause embod-
ies the following principle, which Epstein ascribes to Locke: 
whenever any portion of [his property] is taken from [the prop-
erty-owner], he must receive from the state ... some equivalent 
or greater benefit as part of the same transaction. The categori-
cal command that property shall not be taken without tacit con-
sent must therefore be rewritten to provide that property may 
be taken upon provision ofjust compensation.I79 
The obvious problem with this approach to the historical meaning of 
the clause is that the clause was initially read to have a limited scope. 
Epstein offers two reasons for why there is no need "to take into account 
the actual historical intention of any of the parties who drafted or signed 
the document."18° First, examination of contemporaneous statements 
about the meaning of constitutional clauses "may well increase confu-
sion. "181 In this regard, Epstein stresses the diversity of meaning which 
different framers could have attached to a constitutional provision and 
the range of intent that animated their public statements (although he 
does not offer specific examples of different understandings of the 
Takings Clause) .182 
Epstein's second rationale for ignoring the specific constructions 
that historical actors gave the clause is that the framers did not realize the 
clause's implications. Thus, to use an example offered by Epstein, gov-
ernmental regulation of wages and prices are a taking, even if the framers 
did not view them as such: 
[The framers] may have meant to endorse both the takings 
clause and wages and price controls without knowing the im-
plicit tension between them. If they cannot have both, then 
their explicit choice takes precedence over their silent one. 
takings cases and noting appeals to Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynershoek); Scheiber, supra 
note 69, at 362. At the same time, even these scholars did not recognize a legal right to 
compensation. As Professor Lenhoff wrote, "[T] he references of [civil law scholars] to a 
right of an individual to receive compensation were in the nature of moral suggestions, 
rather than statements of law." Lenhoff, supra note 15, at 596. For example, Grotius, the 
seventeenth century civil-law scholar who has been dubbed "the father of the 
compensation clause," Sax, supra note 7, at 54, recognized that compelling state needs 
could legitimate a decision not to award compensation: 
[T]hrough the agency of the king even a right gained by subjects can be taken 
from them in two ways, either as a penalty, or by the force of eminent domain. 
But in order that this may be done by the power of eminent domain the first 
requisite is public advantage; then, that compensation from the public funds be 
made, if possihle, to the one who has lost its right. 
Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Bk. II, ch. XIV, § VII (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
1925) (1625) (emphasis added). For further discussion of Grotius, see Sax, supra note 7, 
at 54. 
179. Epstein, supra note 8, at 15. 
180. Id. at 26. 
181. Id. at 27. 
182. See id. 
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Suppose the framers believed both A and X, when A entails not-
X. If A is the constitutional text, then X is not allowed. 183 
817 
Epstein does not specifically confront the broader issue of why regula-
tions should now be treated as takings when they were not so treated until 
the twentieth century. However, the answer he would offer is clear from 
his discussion of historical intention and, specifically, from his treatment 
ofwage and price controls. Although the framers' passage of the Takings. 
Clause testifies to their opposition to the redistribution of wealth, they 
did not grasp the fact that regulation could run afoul of that principle; 
they did not see the "implicit tension."184 Now that it is apparent, the 
principle should triumph over the concrete application because the prin-
ciple received constitutional recognition.185 
Epstein's presentation of original intent and the Takings Clause is 
particularly worthy of analysis because his view reflects a widely shared 
understanding of the ideology underlying the Takings Clause. For exam-
ple, Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf have offered a similar 
reading of the historical record: 
Undoubtedly, one of the most influential thinkers for American 
statesmen of [the late eighteenth century] was the seventeenth-
century English political philosopher John Locke. . . . Whether 
or not a modern reader thinks that Locke's theory [of property] 
is a sensible one, something like it is necessary to make sense of, 
and therefore give content to, the Takings Clause. 186 
Despite its broad acceptance, consideration of Epstein's argument forces 
us to confront the question: If the framers opposed government acts with 
183. Id. at 28. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. However, Epstein does not believe that every government regulation that 
diminishes the value of private property gives rise to a compensable taking. Thus the state 
can prevent common law wrongs without providing compensation. Here, again, Epstein's 
argument draws on his reading of Locke, rather than on any concrete historical 
understanding of what the Takings Clause meant to the framers. Because, in Lockean 
theory, the state stands in place of the individual and because the individual could take 
action against any person who engages in wrongful conduct against her, it follows that the 
state can act against any individual who is engaging in wrongful conduct against another. 
See id. at 111-12. 
186. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 70-71 
(1991); see also Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come: 
Harbingers of a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 Or. L. Rev. 603,608 (1993) ("Heeding 
their own unhappy history of government appropriation, the framers of the United States 
Constitution integrated Lockean notions into their new republic."); John A. Humbach, 
"Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial 
Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 771, 776-77 (1993) (Locke was one 
of the "philosophical forerunners of the clause's ideology"); Kmiec, supra note 69, at 1635 
("Significantly, the drafter of the taking clause [sic], James Madison, incorporated the 
Blackstonian definition in his writing on property ... ."). In an earlier work, I also treated 
the original intent animating the Takings Clause as a reflection ofLockean liberalism. See 
Treanor, supra note 19, at 704-05, 709-713; see also infra note 226 (discussing shift in my 
thought on the ideological background of the Takings Clause). 
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redistributive consequences as strongly as Epstein asserts, why did they 
craft a Takings Clause that required compensation only for physical 
seizure? Epstein's suggestion-that they did not fully realize the clause's 
implications-is unsatisfying in light of the obvious thoughtfulness of 
framers like Madison, and thus another explanation is needed.I87 The 
answer lies, not in some shortsightedness in their thinking, but rather in 
the fact that they were not committed to absolute, liberal protection of 
property rights. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
If we are to take seriously the original understanding of the Takings 
Clause, we cannot focus only on its animating principle, but must also 
focus on the clause's limiting principle. As Professor James Ely has writ-
ten, "For all their devotion to property rights, the framers were content to 
rely primarily on institutional and political arrangements to safeguard 
property owners. "188 Why did the people who drafted and enacted the 
Takings Clause and its state counterparts decide that the interest in physi-
cal possession of property needed substantive protection, but that other 
property interests did not? To put the question in what is perhaps its 
simplest and most striking form: Why does the Bill of Rights contain a 
Takings Clause, but not a Contract Clause? This Part examines both why 
the compensation requirement emerged and why other property rights 
did not receive similar constitutional protection. 
This Part begins by considering why the framers did not require 
compensation for any government act that affected the value of property. 
To this end, it examines the prevalent views of property during the fram-
ing period. Drawing on recent historical scholarship about the ideologies 
of republicanism and liberalism at the time of the framing, it suggests-
contrary to Epstein-that Lockean liberalism, which treats the right to 
property as prepolitical, was not the single dominant ideology of the 
time. Rather, republicanism, which values the right to property but sub-
jects it to majoritarian delineation, was also extremely influential. The 
power of the republican view of property during this period shows that 
there was no consensus among the framers that majoritarian deci-
sionmakers could not be trusted to determine the appropriate level of 
protection for property interests. 
Mter advancing this explanation for the initially limited scope of the 
Takings Clause, this Part then considers why possessory property interests 
in particular received substantive protection. It rejects the explanation 
that the limited scope of the Takings Clause resulted from the framers' 
187. For a critical analysis of Epstein's use of history in the context of the Takings 
Clause and the Contract Clause, see Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523, 556-67 (1995). Epstein's response can be found 
in Richard A Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private Property and 
Representative Government, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 591 (1995). 
188. Ely, supra note 46, at 47. 
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limited conception of property and regulation. Instead, it examines the 
rise of the just compensation requirement in various state constitutions 
and in the Bill of Rights and concludes that in each case it was produced 
by the fear of process failure. 
Finally, this Part turns to Madison, whose sophisticated conception 
of the clause and its purpose accords with the general reasons for which 
others sought special protection for physical possession of property. His 
conception of the clause reflected the synthesis of republicanism and lib-
eralism in his political philosophy. At one level, Madison saw the clause 
as serving a hortatory function; it stood for the broad principle, which 
could be appealed to in political discourse, that governmental acts should 
not diminish the value of private property. The clause thus provided a 
broad recognition of a republican property right. At the same time, it 
put certain interests above mcyoritarian determination: when the federal 
government physically took property, compensation was necessarily owed. 
In other words, physical possession was protected as a liberal right. Physi-
cal possession received such heightened protection because of Madison's 
concern that the political process would not fairly consider certain posses-
sory interests, specifically the ownership of land and slaves. 
A. Revolutionary Ideology and the Protection of Property 
Epstein's view that the Takings Clause should be understood as em-
bodying the framers' Lockean liberalism accords with the dominant view 
among historians in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At that time, the 
conventional wisdom among historians was that the Revolution, the 
Constitution, and, indeed, all of American history reflected the broad ac-
ceptance in this country of Lockean liberalism.189 Thus Louis Hartz, the 
leading proponent of this school of thought, concluded, "Locke domi-
nates American political thought, as no thinker anywhere dominates the 
political thought of a nation. He is a massive national cliche."190 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, this consensus came under attack, 
largely because of three works. Bernard Bailyn in his Ideological Origins of 
the American Revolution argued that the dominant intellectual influence 
on the revolutionary generation was not Locke, but early eighteenth-cen-
tury English opposition writers such as John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon, who subsequently had been largely forgotten. 191 In Creation of 
189. For other accounts of early American ideology in which the central philosophical 
influence is Lockean, see, e.g., Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics 78 
(1953); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 140 (1955); Clinton Rossiter, 
Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty 357 
(1953) (stating that Locke "stand[s] out as [a] thinker[] whom the colonists seem to have 
read and pondered with special care"); see generally Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: 
The Career of a Concept, 79 J. Am. Hist. 11, 13-14 (1992) (discussing liberal consensus 
among historians). 
190. Hartz, supra note 189, at 140. 
191. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 35-36 
(1967). Although Bailyn's non-Lockean explanation of the American Revolution and 
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the American Republic, Gordon Wood contended that republican ideology 
inspired the Revolution, although he also concluded that the 
Constitution represented a rejection of that ideology.192 In his 1975 The 
Machiavellian Moment, J.G.A Pocock also powerfully advanced the thesis 
that revolutionary ideology was republican, although he believed that the 
primary sources of republican thought were not the English writers on 
whom Bailyn and Wood had focused, but rather Renaissance writers, such 
as Niccolo Machiavelli. 193 Historians Eric McKitrick and Stanley Elkins 
have recently observed that these three works "represent an extraordinary 
effort of rescue, a retrieval of something which in the course of time had 
become all but lost," and what had been lost was "the mind and sensibility 
of the founding generation."194 
While historians disagree on precise terminology and meaning,195 
republicanism can be differentiated from liberalism in a number of criti-
cal ways. 196 In particular, they differed in their conceptions of the nature 
rediscovery of the importance of eighteenth-century English writers such as Trenchard and 
Gordon substantially influenced subsequent historical writings that advanced the 
republican thesis, Ideolcgical Origins does not use the term "republicanism" and Professor 
Bailyn has subsequently argued that republicanism did not occasion the American 
Revolution. See Bernard Bailyn, Faces of Revolution 227 (1990). 
192. See Wood, supra note 69, at 467. 
193. SeeJ.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 506 (1975). 
194. Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 5 (1993). 
195. Wood and Pocock generated two different schools of thought about the meaning 
of republicanism. For a discussion of the two, see Rodgers, supra note 189, at 19-21. 
Rodgers notes that one critical difference concerns the meaning of virtue. As Wood uses 
the term, virtue primarily means self-abnegation, sacrifice of individual interest to the 
common good. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 69, at 53. For Pocock, virtue consists largely of 
public-spirited participation in the life of the polity; virtue is civic virtue. See Pocock, supra 
note 193, at 73-76, 86-87. This distinction has been generally ignored in the legal 
literature. However, it is significant since the aspect of republicanism that many legal 
scholars have found attractive-its celebration of political participation-is largely absent 
from Wood's account. The second critical difference between Creation of the American 
Republic and The MachiaveUian Moment concerns the timing of liberalism's triumph over 
republicanism. Wood indicates that republicanism had collapsed as an ideological 
influence by the time of the Constitution, and that the Constitution represented a 
rejection of republican politics. See Wood, supra note 69, at 135-36. In contrast, Pocock 
makes clear that republicanism continued to influence American politics even after the 
founding. See Pocock, supra note 193, at 462. 
More recently, in The Radicalism of the American Revolution, Wood departed from his 
earlier position and indicated that republicanism continued to influence American politics 
in a significant way at least through the War of 1812, although he continues to see the 
Constitution as a response to the perceived problems of republicanism. See Gordon S. 
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 230-32, 327 (1993). 
196. For reasons of clarity, it should be stressed that historians most commonly define 
the term liberal differently than philosophers and scholars of jurisprudence. In particular, 
the latter typically posit a fair distribution of societal resources as a precondition to rights 
assertion. In addition, the liberal, as historians generally use the term, fully accepts the 
legitimacy of the pursuit of self-interest, while the same is not necessarily true of the liberal, 
as philosophers and scholars of jurisprudence generally use the term. See Linda C. 
McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feministjurisprudence, 
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of rights and the role of property in the polity. Liberalism begins with 
the belief that individuals are motivated primarily, if not wholly, by self-
interest and with the belief that rights are prepolitical. Government ex-
ists to protect those rights and the private pursuit of goals determined by 
self-interest. Republican thinkers, in contrast, see the end of the state as 
the promotion of the common good and of virtue. Rights, rather than 
being prepolitical, are created by the polity and subject to limitation by 
the polity when necessitated by the common interest. Whereas liberals 
are comfortable with economic self-interest, republicans have a pro-
foundly ambivalent stance toward private property. Believing that the 
purpose of the state was to promote virtue, they saw sources of corruption 
in luxury and in commerce, and they campaigned against the pursuit of 
self-interest and were suspicious of the worlds of finance and manufactur-
ing. For example, at the Constitutional Convention, John Dickinson 
stated that he "doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican con-
stitution a veneration for wealth [and] had always understood that a 
veneration for poverty & virtue, were the objects of republican 
encouragement. "197 
At the same time, republicans treasured private property, and land in 
particular, as providing the individual with the autonomy that was a pre-
requisite for full participation in the polity. Thus, Professor Drew McCoy 
has written of the republican view of property: 
The personal independence that resulted from the ownership of 
land permitted a citizen to participate responsibly in the polit-
ical process, for it allowed him to pursue spontaneously the 
common or public good, rather than the narrow interest of the 
men-or the government-on whom he depended for his sup-
port. Thus the Revolutionaries did not intend to provide men 
with property so that they might flee from public responsibility 
into a selfish privatism; property was rather the necessary basis 
for a committed republican citizenry. 198 
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1171, 1203-28 ( 1992) (discussing Rawls and Dworkin and arguing that the 
thought of neither is atomistic). 
197. Remarks of John Dickinson (debate of July 26, 1787), in 2 The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787, at 118, 123 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
The definitions set forth in this and the following paragraphs are derived from Michelman, 
supra note 153, at 131-32; William Michael Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1016, 1029-30 (1988) (reviewing Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution 
Seriously ( 1987)); Treanor, supra note 19, at 699-700, 704-05. 
198. Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian 
America 68 (1980). Professor Pocock has more recendy offered a similar summary of why 
republicans believed private property important 
The citizen possessed property in order to be autonomous and autonomy was 
necessary for him to develop virtue or goodness as an actor within the political, 
social and natural realm or order. He did not possess it in order to engage in 
trade, exchange or profit; indeed, these activities were hardly compatible with the 
activity of citizenship. 
J.GA. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History 103 (1985). 
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The relationship between property (particularly land) and citizenship was 
critical. Property led to independence. Jefferson observed that "depen-
dence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and 
prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition,"199 and thus sought to in-
clude in the Virginia Constitution a provision granting fifty acres of prop-
erty to every man who did not have any.200 Similarly, John Adams in 1776 
noted that "power always follows property" and urged that government 
"make the acquisition of land easy to every member of society" or that it 
"make a division of ... land into small quantities, so that the multitude 
may be possessed of landed estates. "201 
The converse was that republican thought indicated either that the 
propertyless should be excluded from the full rights of citizenship or, at 
least, that there were significant dangers associated with granting them 
such rights.202 That is why Jefferson, while he celebrated yeoman farm-
ers, distrusted urban workers. 203 
Influenced by the work of sociologist Clifford Geertz, 204 the method-
ological assumption behind Wood's and Pocock's treatments of ideology 
was that political discourse during a particular era is dominated by a sin-
gle ideological paradigm.205 Pocock thus wholly excluded liberalism 
from his account of the Revolution: "Not all Americans were schooled in 
[the republican] tradition, but there was (it would almost appear) no 
alternative tradition in which to be schooled."206 For Pocock, not only 
did liberalism play no role in fostering the revolution, it was simply absent 
from the political discourse of the period. 
Wood's Creation also reflected the conception that there are domi-
nant paradigms, though his account was one of a paradigm shift. With its 
stress on the common good and sacrifice to the community, republican-
ism was the reigning ideology of the Revolution. The ideology, however, 
lost its intellectual coherence during the revolutionary era. As state legis-
latures took actions that aided some segments of society at the expense of 
others-such as paper money legislation and debtor stay laws, both of 
which aided debtors at the expense of creditors-political leaders began 
to reject the core republican ideas that there was a common good animat-
ing society and that the legislature could discern that good. 207 
199. Thomas jefferson, Notes on the State ofVirginia 165 (William Peden ed., 1954) 
200. See Wood, supra note 195, at 179. 
201. Letter from john Adams to james Sullivan (May 26, 1776}, in 9 The Works of 
John Adams 375, 376-77 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1854). 
202. See Wood, supra note 195, at 178-79. 
203. See id. at 178. 
204. See Rodgers, supra note 189, at 21. 
205. See Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political 
Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America 261 (1990) (criticizing view of 
dominance). 
206. Pocock, supra note 193, at 507. 
207. See Wood, supra note 69, at 396-403. 
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More recent work on political discourse during the revolutionary era 
and the early republic-including Wood's and Pocock's2os_is more 
nuanced and, at least with respect to the time of the Constitution's ratifi-
cation, breaks from the assumption of a dominant ideological paradigm. 
While historians are sharply divided on a host of interpretive matters con-
cerning republicanism and liberalism in the revolutionary era and the 
first years of the early republic, there is now a near consensus that both 
republican and liberal ideas powerfully influenced American politics dur-
ing the 1780s and 1790s. 209 As historian Robert Shalhope has observed, 
"America did not make a neat or smooth march into modernity. Instead, 
liberal and classical [republican] ideas existed in constant tension."210 
Equally important, much recent historical work has contended that, at 
the time of the framing, relatively few, if any, politicians of note were 
purely liberal or purely republican. Rather, the framers typically drew on 
both paradigms. As the writings of historians such as Wood, McCoy,211 
Jennifer Nedelsky,212 Lance Banning,213 and Michael Lienisch214 show, 
most of the framers continued to accept the quintessentially republican 
belief in the importance of (and the possibility of) the promotion of vir-
tue by the state. As Professor Kramnick has observed: 
208. Pocock observed, for example, in 1977: "[I]t is notorious that classical 
republicanism was ... transformed in the making of the Federal Constitution and the 
Federalist and Republican minds." J.GA Pocock, Historical Introduction, in The Political 
Works of James Harrington 1, 147 (J.GA Pocock ed., 1977). On Wood, see supra note 
195. 
209. For example, both Professor Joyce Appleby, the leading proponent of the view 
that the Jeffersonians championed a liberal economic order, and Professor Lance 
Banning, the most prominent advocate of the view that republicanism powerfully 
influenced the Jeffersonians, agree that neither ideology was dominant at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights. See Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and 
Republicanism in the Historical Imagination 322-39 (1992); Lance Banning, Jeffersonian 
Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 Wm. & 
Mary Q. 3, 12 (1986) [hereinafter Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited]; Lance 
Banning, Quid Transit? Paradigms and Process in the Transformation of Republican 
Ideas, 17 Revs. in Am. Hist. 199, 199-200 ( 1989) (reviewing Michael Lienesch, New Order 
of the Ages (1988)) [hereinafter Banning, Quid Transit?]. Other important recent works 
that recognize the influence of both ideologies include Michael Lienesch, New Order of 
the Ages 7-8 (1988); Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American 
Constitutionalism 177-83 (1990); Wood, supra note 195, at 253-70; Isaac Kramnick, The 
"Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3, 32 
(1988);J.GA Pocock, Communications, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 817, 817 (1988) (responding 
to Kramnick). 
210. Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. 
& Mary Q. 334, 350 (1982). 
211. See Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican 
Legacy 41-44 (1989); McCoy, supra note 198. 
212. See Nedelsky, supra note 209. 
213. See Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited, supra note 209; Banning, Quid 
Transit?, supra note 209. 
214. See Lienesch, supra note 209. 
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Federalists and Antifederalists ... tapped several languages of 
politics. . . . None dominated the field, and the use of one was 
compatible with the use of another by the same writer or 
speaker. There was a profusion and confusion of political 
tongues among the founders. They lived easily with that clatter; 
it is we, two hundred and more years later, who chafe at their 
inconsistency. 215 
This scholarship indicates that Epstein's equation of Lockean ideol-
ogy with the political thought behind the Takings Clause is incorrect. 
While it would be wrong to say that Locke had no influence on the 
founding generation, it is equally incorrect to describe Lockean liber-
alism as the ideology of the framing. 
Revolutionary and early national era cases upholding uncompen-
sated takings also suggest the continuing power of republican attitudes. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, denied a claim for reim-
bursement for goods seized as part of the war effort with the observation 
that "it is better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconven-
ience."216 In M'Clenachan v. CuroJin,217 that court rejected a claim for 
compensation on the grounds that citizens "were bound to contribute as 
much [land], as by the laws of the country, were deemed necessary for 
the public convenience."218 In Commonwealth v. Fisher,219 it observed that 
compensation was "a bounty given ... by the state" for reasons of "kind-
ness."220 In Lindsay v. Commissioners,22I the South Carolina Attorney 
General proclaimed that the uncompensated taking of unimproved land 
was "one of the inherent prerogatives of the majesty of the people, and a 
power which the supreme authority of the state had a right to exercise, 
for the general good and convenience of the whole, and that it resulted 
from the very nature and ends of civil society. "222 An evenly divided court 
upheld the uncompensated taking as justified by "ancient rights and 
principles."223 
Such comments and early compensation practices reflect a distinctly 
republican attitude towards property. It was a state creation and its scope 
was appropriately set by the state. As Benjamin Franklin put it, "Private 
Property ... is a Creature of Society, and is subject to the Calls of that 
Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it, even to its last Farthing 
215. Kramnick, supra note 205, at 261. 
216. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 362 (Pa. 1788). 
217. 3 Yeates 362 (Pa. 1802). 
218. Id. at 373. 
219. 1 Pen.&: W. 462 (Pa. 1830). 
220. Id. at 465. 
221. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (1796). 
222. Id. at 50. 
223. Id. at 57. 
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•••• " 224 Yet the fact that individual property claims could be curtailed 
did not evidence hostility to private property. As already discussed, re-
publican ideology accorded the institution of private property a high de-
gree of respect and protection because it provided the autonomy neces-
sary for citizenship. In practice, republican attitudes toward property and 
rights meant that when property was taken, compensation was usuaUy 
paid. The relevant republican decisionmaking body, normally a jury or 
the legislature, weighing the facts of the case would decide that compen-
sation was consistent with the public good. But a resolution in favor of 
compensation was not inevitable. Thus, it could be decided (as it gener-
ally was) that in view of the community's need for cheap roads and the 
minimal burden imposed on an individual by building a road across that 
individual's unimproved property, no compensation would be paid. Be-
cause of faith in majoritarian decisionmakers, the early state constitutions 
did not contain substantive protections of property rights. They simply 
contained procedural protections-land could be taken only with the 
consent of the individual or of the legislature. 
B. The Rise of the Just Compensation Requirement 
The constitutionalization of the compensation requirement in the 
Massachusetts and Vermont constitutions and in the federal Bill of Rights 
and its incorporation in the Northwest Ordinance reflects a break from 
this republican tradition. In certain circumstances, compensation was 
now mandated and no longer a matter to be determined by majoritarian 
deliberations. It was, to use the terms set forth earlier, now a liberal right, 
existing outside of-and trumping-ongoing majoritarian deliberations. 
Thus, the story of the rise of the compensation requirement accords with 
historical accounts of revolutionary era ideology. As the revolutionary era 
progressed, people lost faith in legislatures and liberal ideas became in-
creasingly prevalent. 
At the same time, as previously discussed, the earliest clauses were 
narrow in scope: They applied only to physical takings.225 Thus, the 
early taking clauses did not represent a complete triumph for liberal atti-
tudes. Again, the fact that the clauses applied only to physical takings 
squares with current historical accounts of the the ideology of the period. 
Just as revolutionary era ideology in general reflected both liberal and 
republican elements, there were now liberal and republican spheres with 
respect to property rights. The liberal sphere concerned physical takings, 
and here the obligation to compensate was absolute. The republican 
sphere concerned all other governmental actions affecting private prop-
224. Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the 
Constitution of Pennsylvania ( 1789), in 10 The Writings of Benjamin Franklin 54, 59 
(Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907). 
225. See supra Part lA 
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erty: Here, the majority decided to what degree it wished to limit prop-
erty claims and, if so, whether it wished to compensate.226 
The foregoing discussion leads to certain crucial questions: Why was 
the line separating property interests that received substantive constitu-
tional protections from those that did not drawn where it was? In other 
words, if there was a sphere in which majoritarian decisionmakers could 
limit property interests and a sphere in which they could not, why did 
possessory interests fall in the latter sphere? One possible explanation 
might be that the framing generation was limited to thinking of property 
in physicalist terms and thus saw only possessory interests as property. 
Their conception of property was not, however, so limited. As Professor 
Forrest McDonald has observed, "[T]he framers of the Constitution ... 
understood that the word property had more meaning than one. "227 
While one such meaning equated property with physical possession (or, 
even more narrowly, land),22s in its traditional (and Lockean) sense, 
property meant "particular to, or appropriate to, an individual per-
son."229 Blackstone's conception, while narrower than Locke's, was still 
226. One wrinkle to this account should be added. The Northwest Ordinance of 
1787 had a contract clause. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in Sources 
of Our Liberties, supra note 12, at 392, 395. Thus, it, unlike the Massachusetts and 
Vermont constitutions, contained a second substantive limitation on governmental control 
over private property. 
One final definitional point should be made: Republican and liberal attitudes towards 
compensation should not be viewed as polar opposites. Under both schools of thought, 
compensation was considered the norm. The republican school, however, believed that 
the ultimate decision of whether to compensate the affected individual was to be resolved 
by the ordinary political process; the liberal believed that the obligation to compensate 
existed outside of that process and could not be compromised by it. See Gregory S. 
Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 273, 276 (1991) (noting "interdependency" of republican and liberal attitudes). 
I have previously explained the rise of the compensation principle in revolutionary 
America and in the early republic as a product of the rise of liberalism. See Treanor, supra 
note 19, at 704-05. My treatment of the topic here is significandy different in a number of 
respects. Influenced by then-current historical scholarship, in the earlier piece, I saw 
republicanism and liberalism as polar opposites and the takings clauses, as well as 
Madison's thought, as purely liberal. As indicated in the previous section, subsequent 
historical scholarship has shown that the relationship between republicanism and 
liberalism was more subde and that the thought of leading politicians, including Madison, 
reflected the influence of both schools of thought. This Article attempts to apply those 
insights to the takings context. In particular, the new historical work has led me to focus 
on why the takings clauses were limited to physical possession, and I argue that those 
limitations can best be understood as reflecting the republican idea that in a certain 
sphere the state should continue to control the definition of property interests. 
227. McDonald, supra note 18, at 10. 
228. See Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right of Property in 
Revolutionary America, 19J.L. & Econ. 467, 473 (1976) ("'Property,' to Jefferson, meant 
'land.'"); Vandevelde, supra note 89, at 325 (arguing that Blackstonian conception of 
property was physicalist and "prevalent at the founding of the nation"). 
229. McDonald, supra note 18, at 10; see also Locke, supra note 14, § 27 ("[E]very 
man has a property in his own person . ... ");see also David Schultz, Political Theory and 
Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 
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broad, as well as remarkably modern: The individual's right of property 
"consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, 
without any control of diminution, save only by the laws of the land. "2!10 
The capacious quality of Blackstone's conception of property is suggested 
by the fact that Epstein warmly embraces it, hailing the "completeness, 
universality, and relevance" of Blackstone's definition.2!11 In part because 
of the Financial Revolution of the early eighteenth century and the rise of 
marketable shares of thepublic debt,232 well before the time of the 
American Revolution, intangible assets played a significant economic role 
and assets, whether tangible or intangible, were described as property.2!1!1 
During the course of the debates about the Constitution, the word prop-
erty was used in all these different senses by Madison and other 
Federalists.234 In sum, the narrow protections of the first takings clauses 
were not the product of the fact that people could only conceive of prop-
erty as physical possession. To explain the narrow scope, the following 
subsections examine the first constitutions that mandated compensation. 
In each case, it appears that the just compensation requirement was in-
spired by the fear that the political process could not adequately protect 
physical possession of property. 
I. The Vermont Constitution. - In the case of Vermont, whose 1777 
constitution contained the first compensation requirement, it seems obvi-
ous why physical possession of property received special protection: 
Vermonters' experience had taught them that title to land needed sub-
stantive constitutional protection because the political process would not 
Am.J. Leg. Hist. 464, 472 (1993) ("[In Locke's theory], '[p]roperty' was a general political 
term referring to all the personal and political rights of individuals."); Laura S. 
Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 Yale LJ. 127, 132 (1990) (discussing Locke's 
conception of property and its influence on early Americanjurisprudence). 
230. 1 Blackstone, supra note 15, at 134. 
231. Epstein, supra note 8, at 23. In making this statement, Epstein is referring to the 
language quoted in the text, see text accompanying note 230, and to Blackstone's 
statement that the "right of property" is "that sole and despotic and dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe." See 2 Blackstone, supra note 15, at *2; 
Epstein, supra note 8, at 22. 
232. See Alexander, supra note 226, at 31~17. 
233. See id. at 334. 
234. Thus, Professor Nedelsky has observed: 
Like most of their fellow Federalists, Madison and [Gouvenor] Morris rarely 
spelled out what they meant by "property;" the meaning varied according to 
context. Sometimes the word referred to the rights of property (as in the modern 
sense of a bundle of rights) .... Sometimes the word meant literally concrete 
property. . . . Sometimes it meant men of property. . . . But very often the word 
carried all these meanings. . . . When property was used in this sense, it connoted 
the intrinsic significance of the fundamental rights of man and his basic needs, 
the importance of security, of independence, and of superior power and 
influence. 
Nedelsky, supra note 215, at 150-51; see also infra text accompanying notes 298-300 & 
note 298 (discussing Madison's conception of property). 
828 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:782 
always respect legitimate land titles. Indeed, the preamble to the 
Vermont Constitution-in which Vermonters declared their indepen-
dence from New York, as well as Great Britain-reads like an apologia for 
the state's takings clause, for the principal theme of the preamble is that 
the New York government had unjustly invalidated the land grants held 
by Vermonters. 
The land that subsequently became Vermont was originally part of 
the colony of New Hampshire and was primarily settled by individuals 
whose grants had issued from the New Hampshire government.2S5 In 
1764, however, the English government transferred control of these terri-
tories to the New York colonial government, which subsequently refused 
to acknowledge the New Hampshire land grants. The preamble of the 
Vermont constitution of 1777 recounted the tale in detail. It stated: 
[T]he late Lieutenant Governor Colden, of New-York, with 
others, did ... covet those very lands; and by a false representa-
tion made to the court of Great Britain, (in the year 1764, that 
for the convenience of trade and administration of justice, the 
inhabitants were desirous of being annexed to that govern-
ment,) obtained jurisdiction of those very identical lands ex 
parte; which ever was, and is, disagreeable to the inhabitants. 236 
The crown government of New York then "refused to make regrants of 
our lands to the original proprietors and occupants, unless at the exorbi-
tant rate of 2300 dollars fees for each township; and did enhance the 
quit-rent, three fold, and demanded an immediate delivery of the title 
derived before, from New-Hampshire."237 NewYorkjudges pronounced 
the New Hampshire land grants "utterly null and void."238 When 
Vermonters refused to comply with the terms necessary to secure 
regrants, the colonial New York Legislature passed an act providing for a 
fine and imprisonment for anyone who refused to assist the sheriff in 
ousting those who held land under New Hampshire grants in favor of 
new grantees, and a series of acts empowering judges "to award execution 
of death against those inhabitants in said district, that they should judge 
to be offenders, without trial. "239 
The preamble also reported that independence from Great Britain 
did not improve the situation in Vermont. The New York Convention of 
1776 demanded for the new state government of New York the quit-rents 
that the crown government had asserted Vermonters owed.240 "[T]he 
legislature of New-York ... still continue [sic] to disown the good people 
of this State," the preamble complained, noting section thirty-six of the 
New York constitution, which recognized the validity of the land grants 
235. See William Slade, Vermont State Papers xv, xvii (J.W. Copeland ed., 1823). 
236. Vt. Declaration of Rights pmbl. ( 1777), reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra note 14, at 
319, 320 [hereinafter Vt. Declaration]. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 321. 
240. See id. 
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from the New York crown government.241 The larger problem that New 
York's failure to recognize the land grants illustrated was that "the local 
situation of this State, from New-York, at the extreme part, is upward of 
four hundred and fifty miles from the seat of that government, which 
renders it extreme [sic] difficult to continue under the jurisdiction of 
said State."242 In other words, because Vermont was far removed from 
the capital where decisions were made, its claims could not be fairly con-
sidered. As a result, it was "absolutely necessary" for Vermont to split 
away from New York and to become a separate state.24S 
Their experience with the government of New York led Vermonters 
to include in their constitution a series of rights, many of which were 
either novel or at least uncommon in the first state constitutions. Clause 
IV set forth Vermonters' exclusive right to govern themselves: "That the 
people of this State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of gov-
erning and regulating the internal police of the same."244 Clause XIX 
had the effect of barring extradition to New York: "That no person shall 
be liable to be transported out of this State for trial, for any offence com-
mitted within this State."245 Clause XVII guaranteed the individual's and 
the community's right to exit from a polity: "That all people have a natu-
ral and inherent right to emigrate from one State to another, that will 
receive them; or to form a new State in vacant countries, or in such coun-
tries as they can purchase, whenever they think that thereby they can pro-
mote their own happiness."246 And Clause II provided: "That private 
property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires 
it; nevertheless, whenever any particular man's property is taken for the 
use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money."247 
Significantly, this last clause, the takings clause, was the only substan-
tive protection for property rights in the Vermont constitution (as well as 
the first substantive protection for property rights in any of the state con-
stitutions). In its historical context, this clause clearly does not not repre-
sent a belief that legislatures, as a general matter, would not respect prop-
241. Id. at 320; see also N.Y. Const. of 1777, § 36, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra note 
14, at 301, 3ll (recognizing validity of New York land grants). 
242. Vt. Declaration pmbl., supra note 236, at 321. 
243. Id.; see also Charles T. Morrissey, Vermont: A Bicentennial History 89 (1981) 
(noting that local convention voted in 1777 to establish a separate state). Vermont was 
not, however, admitted to the United States until1791. See id. at 100. The Vermonters' 
concern that distance made adequate representation impossible was one that others in the 
revolutionary era shared. In particular, Anti-federalists argued that, because the national 
government would be physically distant from most of its constituents, Congress would not 
be able to learn about what citizens at any given time wanted and the people would have 
difficulty monitoring Congress. Distance would therefore weaken faith in government. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131, 1137-45 
(1991). 
244. Vt. Declaration ch. I, cl. IV, supra note 236, at 322. 
245. Id. cl. XIX, at 324. 
246. Id. cl. XVII. 
247. ld. cl. II, at 322. 
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erty claims. Rather, it protects the one property interest that Vermonters' 
experience had showed them was peculiarly unlikely to receive fair con-
sideration in the political process: the real property interests of people 
who lived in a region distant from the state government and who were a 
small part of the polity's populace. Because Vermonters were a small and 
powerless minority in New York politics, their claims had been disre-
garded in revolutionary era majoritarian deliberations (as well as in colo-
nial legislative decisions). The property interest most at risk when the 
people of a region were a political minority was the property interest that 
defined them: their land claim in that region. As a result of their vulner-
ability, Vermonters' land claims had been invalidated and their land had 
reverted to the state, which had regranted it. The Vermont Takings 
Clause was thus designed to provide security against the type of process 
failure to which majoritarian decisionmaking processes were peculiarly 
prone. 
2. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787. - The process that led to the passage of the next just compensa-
tion clause, contained in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, is less 
clear. In 1778, a proposed state constitution had been rejected, largely 
on the grounds that it did not adequately safeguard the rights of prop-
erty. 248 The various Massachusetts town meetings that rejected the 1778 
Constitution called for protection of property rights through institutional 
mechanisms, such as property qualifications for voters and state office 
holders; apparently, none mentioned a desire for a just compensation 
requirement. 249 Responding to this concern, the framers of the 1780 
constitution established such property qualifications. 250 But they also in-
cluded a takings clause: "[W]henever the public exegencies require, that 
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he 
shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor."251 It is not clear why 
this takings clause was included, given the apparent lack of demand for 
such a clause. Perhaps, as the framers of the constitution cast about for 
devices to protect property, they decided to emulate the one substantive 
protection already recognized in a state constitution, the takings clause of 
neighboring Vermont.252 If this is the case, it is possible that the 
248. See The Popular Sources of Political Authority 22 (Oscar Handlin & Mary 
Handlin eds., 1966). 
249. For the texts of the various town responses, see id. at 202-379. 
250. For a comparison of the property qualifications in the draft 1778 constitution 
and the 1780 constitution, see Willi P. Adams, The First American Constitutions: 
Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 
295 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980). 
251. Mass. Const. of 1780, art. X, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra note 14, at 342. 
252. My research has uncovered only one other relevant piece of evidence. In 1784, 
one Massachusetts citizen complained that, both before and after the adoption of the 1780 
constitution, Massachusetts juries denied compensation to land owners whose property was 
taken for roads by determining that the benefits from the roads more than offset the value 
of the land taken; he claimed that such actions were invalid under the 1780 constitution. 
See Jonathan Parsons, A Consideration of Some Unconstitutional Measures, Adopted and 
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Massachusetts framers were simply copying someone else's handiwork 
without reconsidering the lines that the Vermont constitution established 
between the permissible and the impermissible. 
Consideration of the next compensation clause, the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, however, suggests an alternate understanding of the 
Massachusetts history. The Northwest Ordinance provides: "[S]hould 
the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to 
take any persons property, or to demand his particular services, full com-
pensation shall be made for the same .... "258 The language of the 
Northwest Ordinance-and in particular the words "public exigencies" 
and "common preservation"-suggests that the clause was designed to 
require compensation when goods were seized by the military. Both 
phrases seem to refer not to ordinary takings of property for roads and 
the like, but rather to seizures effected out of compelling need to pre-
serve the polity itself. One early Court interpreted the Northwest 
Ordinance in this fashion. "The words common preservation," the Loui-
siana Supreme Court declared in 1816, "imply that Congress had then in 
view those extraordinary cases, in time of war or danger, when the prop-
erty or services of an individual become accidentally necessary to the pres-
ervation of the country . . . . "254 
Uncompensated seizures by the military had been a source of con-
cern during the revolutionary era. John Jay in 1778, for example, pub-
licly denounced "the Practice of impressing Horses, Teems, and Carriages by the 
military, without the Intervention of a civil Magistrate, and without any Authority 
from the Law of the Land. "255 Similarly, as has already been noted, St. 
George Tucker, in explaining in 1803 why the Fifth Amendment's 
Takings Clause had been added to the federal Constitution, observed 
that the clause "was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and op-
Practiced in This State 17-22 (Newbury-port, Mass. 1784). If Parsons's view were widely 
held, the takings clause arguably reflected broad discontent with the way in which juries 
awarded compensation for lands used in road building. But if this were a broadly held 
concern, it would presumably have shown up in the town resolves responding to the 1778 
proposed constitution. Since it did not, it seems that the framers may simply have copied 
the Vermont constitution because it provided a model. 
Another possible and related explanation for the takings clause is that the framers of 
the Massachusetts constitution, seeking a model for protection of property, used either 
chapter 8 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties or Article 28 of Magna Carta. Both 
documents, however, only protected personal property, unlike the Vermont constitution 
and unlike the 1780 Massachusetts constitution. See supra note 12 and accompanying 
text. Thus, the Vermont constitution offered the more likely model. It may, however, be 
the case that the presence of similar clauses in Magna Carta and the Body of Liberties 
affected the framers of the Massachusetts constitution as they decided whether or not the 
presence of a takings clause was appropriate. 
253. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties, 
supra note 12, at 392, 395. 
254. Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. 97, 132 (1816). 
255. John Jay, A Freeholder, A Hint to the Legislature of the State of New York 
(Winter 1778), in 5 The Founders' Constitution 312, 312 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987). 
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pressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, 
by impressment, as was too frequently practised during the revolutionary 
war. "256 In at least one court case, an individual whose property was 
seized by military authorities sued, only to have the claim denied on the 
grounds that no right to compensation existed.257 
The Northwest Ordinance may provide a helpful gloss to the 
Massachusetts Constitution because one of the members of the congres-
sional committee that drafted the compensation clause of the Northwest 
Ordinance-indeed, the committee member who handwrote the draft of 
the ordinance in which the clause appeared for the first time-was 
Massachusetts Congressman Nathan Dane.258 In an 1830 letter Dane 
stated, "The Ordinance of '87 was framed mainly from the laws of 
Massachusetts. "259 This suggests that, if the Northwest Ordinance was 
concerned with requiring compensation when the military seized goods, 
as the language of the clause suggests, the same may have been true of 
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. If so, the Ordinance merely 
made explicit what was implicit in the state constitution. Under this read-
ing, both takings clauses addressed a particular problem beyond the di-
rect control of the political process-the seizure of goods by a military 
acting on its own authority and without the sanction of political deci-
sionmakers. This is a very different kind of process failure than the one 
the Vermont framers sought to redress, but it is nonetheless a process 
failure. If this reading is correct, none of the three revolutionary era 
takings clauses reflected a broad belief that legislatures would not fairly 
consider property rights. Rather, each embodied the belief that there 
was a small class of cases in which property concerns would not be fairly 
considered, and that a compensation rule was necessary for that class. 
There are two other possible explanations for the presence of a 
takings clause in the Northwest Ordinance, 260 and it is possible that all 
three played a part in the clause's inclusion in the document. The first is 
that the clause may have reflected a broad concern on the part of some 
congressmen that the territorial legislature would not adequately respect 
private property rights. Clearly, at least one congressman had such a con-
cern prior to the enactment of the Ordinance, and he was satisfied by the 
Ordinance. The congressman was Virginia's Richard Henry Lee, who 
wrote Washington about the Ordinance: "It seemed necessary, for the 
security of property among uninformed, and perhaps licentious people, 
as the greater part of those who go there are, that a strong toned govern-
256. 1 Tucker, supra note 41, at 305-06. 
257. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 362-63 (Pa. 1788). 
258. See 1 Schwartz, supra note 14, at 385. 
259. Id. at 386. 
260. These two explanations parallel Professor Benjamin Wright's explanation of the 
presence of a contract clause in the document. See Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., The Contract 
Clause of the Constitution 6-7 (1938). 
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ment should exist, and the rights of property be clearly defined."26I The 
Ordinance contained two provisions providing substantive protection for 
property rights; in addition to the takings clause, it contained the first 
contract clause.262 Clearly, Lee was referring to the contract clause,26S 
and he may have been referring to the takings clause as well. If (contrary 
to my previous argument) one sees the Northwest Ordinance's takings 
clause as applicable to all physical takings (rather than just seizures by the 
military), then, taken together, the contract clause and the takings clause 
limited an entire range oflegislative actions concerning property, not just 
one particular type oflegislative action. However, Lee's letter reflects not 
a generalized distrust of legislatures, but rather a distrust of territorial 
legislatures. He was anxious about the territorial legislature because "the 
greater part of those who go there [the territories]" are "uninformed, 
and perhaps licentious people." 
It is also possible that the clause was designed to prevent the territo-
rial legislature (rom revoking the Ohio Company's land grant. At the 
time that the Northwest Ordinance was enacted, the Ohio Company, an 
association composed of former soldiers and officers from Massachusetts, 
was seeking to obtain from Congress 1.5 million acres of the Northwest 
Territories on terms that were remarkably favorable to the company.264 
A number of historians have suggested that the company's lobbyist, 
Manasseh Cutler wrote and engineered the passage of the contract clause 
in order to protect the grant that the company received shortly thereaf-
ter.265 The takings clause appeared for the first time in the draft of the 
Northwest Ordinance that also introduced the contract clause.266 Con-
ceivably, Cutler might have also written the takings clause, and for the 
same reason. If this were the case, however, the clause would have been 
written to remedy another kind of process failure: a legislature's singling 
out an entity that was disadvantaged in the political process, since it was 
principally owned by stockholders who lived outside of the Northwest 
Territories and hence were unrepresented in its legislature. Article 4 of 
the Ordinance provides further support for the view that the document's 
framers were concerned about process failure. It provides that "in no 
261. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington Quly 15, 1787), in 2 The 
Letters of Richard Henry Lee 1779-1794, at 425, 425 Qames C. Ballagh ed., 1914). 
262. See Wright, supra note 260, at 6-7. 
263. See id. 
264. See Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 70 (1979); Merrill 
Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During The Confederation 
1781-1789, at 355-56 (1950). Mter the enactment of the Ordinance, the Ohio Company 
was able to obtain its grant at a cost in specie of approximately eight cents an acre. See 
Gates, supra, at 70. 
265. See Wright, supra note 260, at 7 n.lO (listing sources). 
266. See july 11, 1787, Draft of Northwest Ordinance, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra 
note 14, at 391, 395. 
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case shall non-resident proprietors be taxed higher than residents. "267 
This article illustrates the recognition of the vulnerability of those who 
lacked the vote and whose voice was weakened by distance. 
In short, the bulk of the evidence concerning the predecessor 
clauses to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause suggests that these 
clauses were not written out of a belief that legislatures could not be 
trusted to protect property rights. Rather, the evidence-with the excep-
tion of Lee's letter-reflects a belief that constitutionalization of the com-
pensation issue was seen as necessary to address those isolated instances 
in which the political process would not adequately protect property 
rights. The reasons for the failure of process varied, as did the type of 
physical property perceived to be at risk. But the overall purpose of the 
clauses and the perceived vulnerability of physical property remained 
constant. 
3. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. - The framing of the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause gives rise to similar observations. Aside 
from Madison, 268 there was remarkably little desire for any kind of sub-
stantive protection of property rights against the national government. 
Indeed, none of the state ratifying conventions requested a just compen-
sation clause or a contract clause binding on the federal government.269 
The Constitution already limited the national government's exercise of 
power concerning property rights: Export duties and taxation on inter-
state commerce were banned; the slave trade protected untill808; direct 
taxes restricted; preferential treatment of ports, bills of attainder, ex post 
facto laws, and corruption of the blood prohibited. 270 Some of the con-
stitutional protections of private property-like the bans on bills of at-
tainder and retrospective laws-can be understood as designed to ad-
dress the limited range of cases in which structural protections would not 
adequately protect against singling out.271 Nonetheless, the national gov-
ernment's power to act in ways that would affect the distribution of 
wealth was clear. Any taxes the national government imposed or trade 
policy it pursued would have enormous consequences. The Constitution 
explicitly barred the states not only from impairing contracts, but from 
coining money, issuing bills of credit, and making anything but gold or 
silver coin legal tender; the federal government was not so limited. 272 
267. Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. 4, reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties, supra 
note 12, at 392, 396. 
268. For a full discussion of Madison's views on this point, see infra Part III. C. 
269. For a compilation of the various proposals, see Dumbauld, supra note 51, at 
161-65. 
270. See U.S. Const. art. I,§ 9; id. art. III,§ 3; McDonald, supra note 18, at 268-70. 
271. See Steven G. Calabresi, Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 91 Yale LJ. 1403, 1425-26 8c n.87 (1982). Calabresi makes a similar 
suggestion concerning the Takings Clause. See id. at 1425-26. 
272. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; McDonald, supra note 18, at 270. 
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Those concerned with the protection of property presumably found 
convincing the argument that Madison advanced in Federalist Ten273 and 
believed that the structure of the national government that the 
Constitution established adequately protected property interests. Thus, 
there was no need for a clause barring the federal government from in-
terfering with contracts because the institutional structures adequately 
protected the underlying property interests. 
Indeed, the absence of demand for a takings clause indicates that 
other national political actors had greater faith than Madison that the 
national government would act in a way consistent with property rights. 
In fact, an Anti-federalist complaint was that the national government 
would likely treat property rights with too much respect. For example, an 
anonymous 1787 tract, written in the form of a catechism, contained the 
following lesson as part of its critique of the Constitution: 
Q. What ought to be the object of government? 
A. The welfare of the governed. 
Q. How is such a government to be obtained? 
A. By forming a constitution which regards men more than 
things.274 
Why, then, was Madison's takings clause ratified, if there was so little 
demand for it? Why not just trust the national government to pay com-
pensation when appropriate? Madison's rationale will be developed in 
the next section, and presumably others favored the clause for similar 
reasons. In addition, although they had not sought its inclusion as an 
amendment, some federalists thought that there was a natural right to 
compensation.275 It would appear likely that, for some Anti-federalists 
suspicious of the power of the central government, any limitation was 
desirable. 
But the best piece of evidence explaining why most people initially 
favored the clause is St. George Tucker's previously quoted statement 
that the clause was ratified in order to insure compensation when there 
was military impressment of personal property.276 Tucker's comment ap-
273. See infra Part III.C (discussing The Federalist No. 10). 
274. Michael Kammen, The Rights of Property, and the Property in Rights, in Liberty, 
Property, and the Foundations of the American Constitution 1, 10 (Ellen F. Paul & 
Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (quoting catechism). 
275. The strongest early statement of such a position is justice Patterson's decision in 
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). The case held that 
Pennsylvania could not take land from one citizen and vest it in another, but the language 
indicates that Patterson believed that natural law barred an uncompensated taking by the 
government of an individual's land. He observed: 
The legislature ... had no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his 
freehold, and vesting it in another, without a just compensation. It is inconsistent 
with the principles of reason, justice, and moral rectitude; it is incompatible with 
the comfon, peace and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the principles of 
social alliance in every free government . . .. 
Id. at 310. 
276. See supra text accompanying note 256. 
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pears to be the only more or less contemporaneous statement of why the 
clause was passed. Moreover, Tucker was in a good position to make such 
a judgment. He was a prominent Virginia jurist, politician, legal educator 
and lawyer, and a friend of jefferson. He was one of Virginia's represent-
atives at the Annapolis convention that issued the call for the federal con-
stitutional convention, and the author of the most prominent constitu-
tional law treatise in the early republic. 277 
Tucker suggested that the clause was ratified in order to insure com-
pensation when there was military impressment of personal property. As 
previously pointed out, concern with impressment without compensation 
is not the same thing as a general concern that government will not ade-
quately protect property rights. It reflects, instead, a belief that compen-
sation must be constitutionally mandated in a small category of cases in 
which the normal safeguards of the political process are absent. Here, 
safeguards were absent because the military was engaging in unsanc-
tioned and forcible acts of confiscation. Unchecked by political deci-
sionmakers who because of distance could not effectively monitor the 
military's actions, the military was free to single out individuals and take 
their property without providing redress.278 Presumably, few saw this as a 
critical problem. If the problem had been a source of widespread con-
cern, at least one state would have proposed a constitutional amendment 
to redress it. Nonetheless, once Madison had proposed an amendment 
that was seen as addressing this problem, it won support. 
In short, the proponents of the various compensation requirements 
for the most part acted from a desire to protect property in those particu-
lar cases in which majoritarian decisionmaking processes would not fairly 
consider the claims of the owner. The original understanding did not 
reflect a broad belief that majoritarian decisionmakers would subvert 
property. It reflected, instead, a narrower concern with process failure. 
C. James Madison and the Just Compensation Requirement 
This section explores Madison's conception of the Takings Clause, 
which is significant because of his prominent role in its promulgation. 
Moreover, his extensive writings reflect a sophisticated view of the poten-
tial threats of majoritarian decisionmaking and the appropriate protec-
tions for private property. The republican and liberal elements evident 
in Madison's political philosophy help to explain his view of the appropri-
ate scope of protection for certain property interests. Properly under-
stood, Madison's views support an originalist reading of the Takings 
277. See Charles T. Cullen, St. George Tucker and Law in Virginia, 1772-1804, at 
186-89 (1987); William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of 
Judicial Review, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 491, 520-21 (1994). 
278. See McConnell, supra note 153, at 292 (suggesting that because of high 
monitoring costs, a self-interested military had been free to seize goods during the 
Revolutionary War and that the Takings Clause responded to this problem). 
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Clause that recognizes strong concern with protecting against failures in 
the political process. 
1. The Two-Tiered Protection of Madison's Takings Clause.- Madison's 
speech proposing the Bill of Rights offers the first guide to understand-
ing why he crafted the clause in the way he did. In this speech, he offered 
two separate arguments for the Bill of Rights. First, it would establish 
enforceable rules: "[I]ndependent tribunals ofjustice," he declared, "will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner guardians of those 
rights .... "279 Second, it would serve an educative role: "[P]aper barri-
ers have a tendency to impress some degree of·respect for them, to estalr 
lish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the 
whole community .... "280 The Bill of Rights would therefore advance 
both the liberal end of protecting certain interests from the political pro-
cess and the republican end of informing majoritarian deliberations. In 
presenting his Bill of Rights to Congress, Madison did not detail what the 
Takings Clause meant. But the way in which he understood the clause 
accords with these two general ends. 
The liberal end of the clause established a rule of law barring the 
federal government from physically taking real or chattel property, in-
cluding slaves, without compensation. Madison's statements that directly 
concern the meaning of the Takings Clause are limited in number, but 
they consistently reflect the view that the clause only mandated compen-
sation when property was physically taken from the owner. When he pro-
posed his draft Bill of Rights to Congress, the Takings Clause he offered 
was clearly limited in this way: "No person shall be ... obliged to relin-
quish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a 
just compensation."2BI 
Moreover, Madison's 1792 essay Property, in which he criticized the 
economic program proposed by Secretary of Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton, indicates that he also understood the legal import of the 
clause as adopted to be that compensation was required only for physical 
takings. Hamilton had proposed a series of measures designed to pro-
mote manufacturing and investment interests, and Madison had opposed 
them. In 1790, for example, Hamilton had successfully urged that when 
the federal government paid off debts incurred by the Continental Con-
gress, it should pay the current holders of the notes. Madison opposed 
the plan because it aided speculators; he preferred to split the federal 
government's payments between the original and current note hold-
ers.282 Shortly before Madison wrote Property, Hamilton issued his Report 
279. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 The 
Papers of James Madison 197, 207 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter 
Madison Papers]; see also Bernard Schwartz, Great Rights of Mankind 200 (1977) (arguing 
that Madison intended rights embodied in Bill of Rights to be enforceable in the courts). 
280. Madison, supra note 279, at 204-05. 
281. I d. at 20 l. 
282. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 194, at 143-44. 
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on the Subject of Manufactures, which called for a series of tariffs and 
bounties to encourage the manufacture of certain products; Madison was 
sharply critical.283 Property was one of the series of essays that Madison 
published in the National Gazette newspaper in response to Hamilton's 
economic program,284 and the essay should be understood against that 
background. The essay criticizes restrictive economic regulations: 
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under 
it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies 
deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and 
free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their 
property in the gen~ral sense of the word; but are the means of 
acquiring property strictly so called. 285 
It then criticizes "unequal taxes": 
A just security to property is not afforded by that govern-
ment, under which unequal taxes oppress one species of prop-
erty and reward another species: where arbitrary taxes invade 
the domestic sanctuaries of the rich, and excessive taxes grind 
the faces of the poor; where the keenness and competitions of 
want are deemed an insufficient spur to labor, and taxes are 
again applied, by an unfeeling policy, as another spur; in viola-
tion of that sacred property, which Heaven, in decreeing man to 
earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, kindly reserved to him, 
in the small repose that could be spared from the supply of his 
necessities.286 
To combat these evils Madison then invokes the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment: 
If there be a government then which prides itself in main-
taining the inviolability of property; which provides that none 
shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnifica-
tion to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which 
individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their persons, 
and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their prop-
erty, in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their 
daily subsistence, and in the hallowed remnant of time which 
ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares, the influ-
ence will have been anticipated, that such a government is not a 
pattern for the United States.287 
The quoted language indicates that, as a rule of law, the Takings Clause 
has a narrow meaning. The reference to the governmental provision 
"that none shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnifica-
tion to the owner" is a clear reference to the language of the clause. By 
283. See id. at 258-66. 
284. See id. at 266; Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, A Biography 330 (1971). 
285. James Madison, Property, Nat' I Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 The Papers of james 
Madison 266, 267 (Robert A Rutland et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Madison, Property]. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 267-68. 
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contrasting these governmental actions with those that follow, Madison 
clarified by process of exclusion the class of governmental actions for 
which he believed that compensation was required. In other words, com-
pensation is not mandated for "indirect[] violations" of property. The 
contrast suggests that compensation is mandated for physical takings-
"direct[ ]" violations-not regulations-"indirect[ ]" violations. To put 
this quote in context: Madison is arguing that Hamilton's program is not 
barred by the rule of law established by the Takings Clause, but that it is 
inconsistent with the principle for which the clause stands.288 
Madison's other significant discussion of the compensation require-
ment occurred in 1819, after he had retired from the presidency, in a 
private letter to slavery opponent Robert Evans. This letter, in which 
Madison laid out his plan for the United States government to purchase 
all slaves, using the proceeds from the sale of public lands, and then 
transport the freed slaves to Mrica, also reflects the view that the clause 
mandated compensation when property was physically taken from the 
owner. Madison wrote that any program for emancipation would have to 
include "a provision in the plan for compensating a loss of what [the 
slaveowner] held as property guaranteed by the laws, and recognised by 
the Constitution. "289 Expanding on this point, he argued that, because 
of the Takings Clause, the "portion of the nation which ... has no inter-
est in slave property" would not oppose compensation:290 
They [the non-owning part of the nation] are too just to wish 
that a partial sacrifice should be made for the general good; and 
too well aware that whatever may be the intrinsic character of 
that description of property [slaves], it is one known to the con-
stitution, and, as such could not be constitutionally taken away 
without just compensation. 291 
Thus, because the clause mandated compensation when the government 
physically took property from the owner, it required compensation for 
abolition. 292 
288. The interpretation of Property advanced here elaborates on that in Treanor, 
supra note 19, at 712-13. 
289. Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1819), in The Mind of the 
Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 315 (Marvin Meyers ed., 
1981) [hereinafter Mind of the Founder]. 
290. Id. at 318. 
291. Id. 
292. Madison's belief that the Takings Clause required compensation in the event of 
abolition was the consensus view prior to 1830 and the dominant view throughout the 
antebellum era. See United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14, 
445); In re Perkins, 2 Cal. 424, 429, 443 (1852) (Anderson, J.); Gary Nash, Race and 
Revolution 36 (1990). One aspect of this view of the Takings Clause worth noting is that 
compensation is owed even though the "property" "taken" is not thereafter used by the 
government. In other words, compensation is owed even though slaves are freed, rather 
than impressed into government service. This conception of the meaning of the Takings 
Clause is of particular significance to current debates about its meaning because it is at 
odd& with Professor Jed Rubenfeld's recent suggestion, which he defends in part on 
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The republican end of the clause was that it embodied a broader 
principle of governmental respect for private property, a principle that 
could be appealed to in majoritarian debates. Property is an example of 
such an appeal. Madison attacked Hamilton's economic program by ar-
guing that "unequal taxes [that] oppress one species of property and re-
ward another species"293 and "arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and mo-
nopolies"294 were inconsistent with the principle underlying the Takings 
Clause: A nation that enacted a Takings Clause should also shun govern-
mental actions that "indirectly violate[] [citizens'] property." Implicit in 
the fact that Madison did not claim direct constitutional violations is his 
belief that the Takings Clause did not prevent the national government 
from using its taxing and regulatory powers to affect the distribution of 
wealth, as he believed Hamilton's policies would do. The only protection 
against such policies lay in the political process. At the same time, he 
believed that the Takings Clause, despite its narrow legal significance, 
could influence that process by educating citizens about the sanctity of 
property. It was a statement of national principle. 
It should be added that the Takings Clause proved immensely influ-
ential in this regard. In particular, it influenced state court decisions to 
impose a compensation requirement on state actions in the absence of 
state takings provisions.295 By 1868, every state but North Carolina had a 
takings clause in its state constitution.296 And, although there were obvi-
ously other factors at work, Madison's goal in writing Property was 
achieved: Congress did not adopt the proposals set forth in Hamilton's 
Report on Manufactures. 297 
2. The Limited Protection of Property Interests in General. - If Madison 
understood the clause to apply only to physical takings, the question 
again becomes: Why did he go this far and no further? Madison's con-
cern with the protection of private property interests is well known and 
one of the central tenets of his political theory. The republican appeal of 
historical grounds, that "a taking for public use ... can occur only when some productive 
attribute or capacity of private property is exploited for state-dictated service." Jed 
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale LJ. 1077, 1114-15 (1993). 
293. Madison, Property, supra note 285, at 267. 
294. Id. 
295. This point is developed in Treanor, supra note 19, at 714-15; see also Grant, 
supra note 178, at 71 ("federal bill of rights [not] without value as authority" for state 
courts establishing compensation requirement in absence of constitutional provision). 
296. See Julius L. Sackman, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain 1.80-83 (3d ed. 
1995) (listing state constitutional provision). 
297. See Elkins &. McKitrick, supra note 194, at 270-71. Among the other factors 
were the defeat of St. Clair's army by Native Americans and the panic of 1792. See id. 
For a discussion of the instructional aspect of the Takings Clause, see Treanor, supra 
note 19, at 714-16; Harry N. Scheiber, The "Takings" Clause and the Fifth Amendment: 
Original Intent and Significance in American Legal Development, in The Bill of Rights: 
Original Meaning and Current Understanding 233, 235 (Eugene W. Hicock,Jr. ed., 1991); 
see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale LJ. 
1193, 1205-12 (1992) (describing educative function of constitutional provisions). 
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Property signifies his commitment to that principle. Why, then, did he not 
write the clause more broadly or propose some other means to protect 
private property from the federal government? Why did he satisfy himself 
with a clause that, with respect to many property interests, was merely 
hortatory? The answer here is very clearly not that Madison failed to see 
the close relations between the physical seizure of property (which re-
quired compensation) and other state actions that affected property 
(where the only remedy was political). With a very broad sense of prop-
erty, Madison was acutely aware of that connection and, in fact, made it 
explicitly. Property illustrates this point, arguing against Hamilton's eco-
nomic program on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the principle 
embedded in the Takings Clause.298 Similarly, in 1786, he argued in the 
Virginia Legislature against the issuance of paper money on the grounds 
that it "affects rights of property as much as taking away equal value in 
land. "299 As Professor Nedelsky has written: 
Madison did not ... have a simple conception of property 
as land or even material goods. The "faculties of acquiring 
property" [the protection of which was, according to Federalist 
Ten, the first object of government] emphasized a subtle, non-
material dimension of property. And the legislative injustice he 
feared was not straightforward confiscation, but the more indi-
rect infringements inherent in paper money and debtor relief 
law .... Madison's concept of property thus had a modern, so-
phisticated quality that went far beyond the focus on land that 
we associate with the traditional image of the yeoman farmer. 3oo 
While Madison never explained why he believed the limited scope of 
the Takings Clause was appropriate, his overall governmental philosophy 
suggests several reasons. Madison believed that governmental actions 
could properly (and in fact inevitably) affect the value of people's prop-
erty, and that, as a general matter, the checks and balances provided by 
298. In fact, Property reflects a view of property that is broader than the notion of 
property as value. Madison explicitly contrasted a notion of property as dominion, 
pursuant to which "a man's land, or merchandize, or money is called his property," with a 
"larger andjuster [definition that] embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value 
and have a right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage." Madison, Property, 
supra note 285, at 266. He summarized the distinction as follows: "In a word, as a man is 
said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights." 
Id. For further discussion, see Kammen, supra note 274, at 10-13; see also Underkuffler, 
supra note 229, at 135-38 (discussing implications of essay's conception of property in 
rights); supra note 234 (quoting Nedelsky on different ways in which Madison and other 
Federalists used the word "property," including "in the modern sense of a bundle of 
rights"); see generally notes 227-234 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of 
property available to framers). 
299. James Madison, Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 
The Papers of James Madison 158 (Robert A Rudand eta!. eds., 1975). 
300. Nedelsky, supra note 209, at 30. While I agree with Professor Nedelsky's 
statement that Madison feared "indirect infringements" by the legislature of property 
rights, I disagree with her belief that he was not concerned about direction confiscation. 
See infra text accompanying notes 331-355. 
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the federal system's political process adequately protected property 
interests. 
Federalist Ten directly evidences these themes. Madison wrote: 
[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been 
the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of property. Those 
who hold and those who are without property have ever formed 
distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those 
who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed in-
terest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a mon-
eyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in 
civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated 
by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various 
and interfering interests forms the principal task of modem legislation 
and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and 
ordinary operations of government. so1 
Thus, divisions based on competing property interests are the principal 
cause of faction, and civilization inevitably produces new divisions. The 
legislative process necessarily involves determinations that aid the inter-
ests of one group and hurt those of another. Laws "concerning private 
debts" will either help creditors or debtors. 302 The "manufacturing 
classes" will seek governmental subsidies for themselves and "restrictions 
on foreign manufacturers"; the landed interest will oppose both types of 
measures. sos The nature of government is to create winners and losers. 
Self-interested people will disagree about who should win and who 
should lose. "Yet," Madison observed, "the parties are, and must be, 
themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or in other words, 
the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. "S04 
Moreover, Federalist Ten argues that the system of governance set 
forth in the Constitution will allow for wise selection between competing 
interests. Property will be better protected at the national level than at 
the state level. The size of the country served to protect the rights of 
property, because "[l]arge districts are manifestly favorable to the elec-
tion of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to 
the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solici-
tations practicable on a contracted theatre. "305 The size of the country 
also served to protect property rights because it affected coalition 
building: 
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
301. The Federalist No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
302. Id. at 79-80. 
303. Id. at 80. 
304. ld. 
305. James Madison, Note to his Speech on the Right of Suffrage (1821), in 3 
Farrand, supra note 197, at 450, 454 [hereinafter Madison, Right of Suffrage]. 
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citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more diffi-
cult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act 
in unison with each other. 306 
843 
Because national representatives would be more respectable than state 
representatives and because of the "exten[sion] of the sphere," protec-
tions that were necessary against the state were not required for the fed-
eral government. To make his point, Madison offered hypothetical inva-
sions of property interests: 
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal 
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked pro-
ject, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union 
than a particular member of it, in the same proportion as such a 
malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district than 
an entire State. 307 
Implicitly, the last point is Madison's explanation of why a contract clause 
may be needed against the states (where a campaign for "the abolition of 
debts" might succeed), but not against the national government. Because 
the small size of a state permits domination by a faction, a contract clause 
might be necessary to bar state governments from unjustly interfering 
with private contracts. But the same was not true of the nation. The 
institutional structure established by the federal constitution meant that 
property rights were safeguarded. 3os 
In short, for our purposes Federalist Ten makes two points. The first 
is that there is no way to escape the fact that governing involves choice, 
and as a result benefits some and hurts others. The second is that there is 
no need for special heightened protection of property interests against 
the federal government because there are already adequate structural 
protections for those interests. 
Federalist Ten's acceptance of the fact that the governmental actions 
affect-and in some cases diminish-private property interests, was not 
anomalous. Professor Jennifer Nedelsky has recently summarized 
306. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 301, at 83. 
307. I d. at 84. 
308. See McConnell, supra note 153, at 288-93. All of these arguments, of course, 
also suggest that Madison would have liked the Takings Clause to have regulated state, as 
well as federal, actions. As a practical matter, however, Madison could not achieve this end 
directly. The movement to secure a bill of rights came from Anti-federalists who wanted to 
limit the national government's power. Madison's proposal to include in the Bill of Rights 
an amendment preventing the states from infringing freedom of the press and freedom of 
conscience and from denying jury trials was defeated by the Senate. See Editor's Note, in 2 
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1053. Presumably, an attempt to make a takings requirement-
a fairly novel right-binding against the states would have met with a similar fate. Since 
Madison only proposed amendments that he thought the Anti-federalists would not 
oppose, see Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in 12 The 
Papers of James Madison, supra note 279, at 249, 250, it seems that for political reasons he 
did not try to extend the Takings Clause to the states and trusted that the educative aspect 
of the clause would ultimately serve the same end. See Treanor, supra note 19, at 710-11 
n.92. 
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Madisonian thought on the relation between property and governance in 
the following way: "Tax policies and economic regulation might have 
some redistributive consequences, but it should not be their objective to 
benefit some at the expense of others. "809 Thus, Madison did not want a 
compensation requirement that would extend to any government action 
that affected the value of property. He believed that government, in pur-
suit of the commonweal, necessarily employed tax policies and regula-
tions that consequentially hurt some economic interests. For example, 
he favored protective tariffs that fostered infant industries, even though 
such tariffs increased the costs of goods.810 Indeed, while he believed it 
necessary as a restraint on factionalism in the states, Madison saw that 
even the Contract Clause, with its flat prohibition on iJ}terference with 
contracts, would sometimes have undesirable consequences. As he in-
formed the convention, "[l]nconveniences might arise from such a 
prohibition .... "311 
At times in his career, however, Madison appears to have moved be-
yond the position that redistributive consequences were a normal conse-
quence of governmental actions, and to have favored government actions 
that had redistributive objects, if that redistribution accorded with republi-
can ends. These positions suggest an alternative view of Madison's philos-
ophy, one even more strongly opposed to the creation of a compensation 
requirement for regulations. 
One example is his 1786 response to a letter he received from 
Thomas Jefferson during the latter's tenure as minister to France. 
Jefferson's letter was probably the most radical document of his career, 
and certainly his most radical statement about property.812 The tremen-
dous wealth of the nobility and the poverty of the French peasantry led 
Jefferson to conclude that redistributive taxes were appropriate under 
certain circumstances, and he suggested that even confiscation might be 
appropriate if it were necessary to furnish all citizens with a minimum 
level of property. He wrote: 
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impractica-
ble. But the consequences of this enormous inequality produc-
ing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot 
invent too many devices for subdividing property, only taking 
309. Nedelsky, supra note 209, at 31. 
310. See James Madison, Import and Tonnage Duties (Apr. 9, 1789), in 12 The 
Papers of james Madison, supra note 277, at 69, 71-72 (observing that "commercial 
shackles are generally unjust, oppressive and impolitic," but that imposition of protective 
tariffs is appropriate in some cases because "[t]here may be some manufactures, which ... 
for want of the fostering hand of government will be unable to go on at all"); Ketcham, 
supra note 284, at 280, 602-03 (noting Madison's support for protective tariffs as Secretary 
of Stale and President). 
311. Remarks of james Madison (debate of Aug. 28, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 437, 440. 
312. See Katz, supra note 228, at 480-81. 
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care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural 
affections of the human mind. The descent of property of every 
kind therefore to all the children, or to all the brothers and sis-
ters, or other relations in equal degree is a politic measure, and 
a practicable one. Another means of silently lessening the ine-
quality of property is to exempt all from taxation below a certain 
point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical 
progression as they rise. . . . It is too soon yet in our country to 
say that every man who cannot find employment but who can 
find uncultivated land, shall be at liberty to cultivate it, paying a 
moderate rent. But it is not too soon to provide by every possi-
ble means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion 
of land. The small landholders are the most precious part of a 
state.313 
845 
Madison did not take issue with Jefferson's progressive taxation 
scheme, showing that, on the eve of the constitutional convention, "(h]e 
saw no violation of property rights in taxation rising geometrically upon 
great fortunes,"314 to quote Irving Brant, Madison's preeminent biogra-
pher. He did express practical concerns with Jefferson's redistributive 
proposals. In particular, he suggested that redistribution of wealth was 
not a complete answer to the problem of European poverty: In Europe, 
there was not enough land for everyone, and more equitable distribution 
of agricultural property would hurt those who were engaged in nonagri-
cultural occupations.315 Overall, however, his response was positive: "I 
have no doubt that the misery of the lower classes will be found to abate 
wherever the Government assumes a freer aspect, & the laws favor a sub-
division of property."316 
Even more striking is Madison's essay Parties, another one of the es-
says that he published in the National Gazette in 1791 and 1792 as part of 
his campaign of opposition to Alexander Hamilton's economic program. 
Madison offered, among others, the following methods for combatting 
party strife: 
1. By establishing a political equality among all. 2. By withhold-
ing unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the inequal-
ity of property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, 
313. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson 681, 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953). 
314. 3 Irving Brant, James Madison, Father of the Constitution: 1787-1800, at 175 
(1950). 
315. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19, 1786), in 9 The 
Papers of James Madison, supra note 299, at 76, 76-77. He also indicated, however, that 
those occupations were not, as a general matter, societally desirable: 
I d. 
From a more equal partition of property, must result a greater simplicity of 
manners, consequendy a less consumption of manufactured superfluities, and a 
less proportion of idle proprietors & domestics. From a juster Government must 
result less need of soldiers either for defence agst. dangers from without or 
disturbances from within. 
316. Id. at 76. 
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accumulation of riches. 3. By the silent operation of laws, 
which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme 
wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indi-
gence towards a state of comfort.!l17 
Madison's essay recalls Jefferson's earlier letter. Not only do both call for 
redistribution, but they do so in similar language: Jefferson's "silently les-
sening the inequality of property" is echoed by Madison's "silent opera-
tion of laws. "818 Commenting on this essay, Brant observed: "Madison 
lived a century and a half too soon to be hauled before congressional 
committees as a subversive radical for talking like that, but one can only 
marvel at the historians who present him to modern generations as a con-
servative guarantor of the status quo. "819 More broadly, Brant stated: 
Madison was well aware that in a competitive society, with public 
order and private rights maintained, property would flow cease-
lessly into the hands of those most able to gain and hold it .... 
[For Madison,] one of the first objects of government was to 
protect the poor and near-poor by laws restraining concentra-
tion of wealth and the power of its holders. s2o 
These statements date from 1950, and Brant has been criticized with 
some justice as seeking to make Madison into a proto-New Dealer. 321 But 
at the same time, Brant recognized what leading scholars have often de-
nied: Madison's acceptance of state ordering of the economy in ways 
designed to equalize wealth. 822 As Lance Banning has pointed out, 
Madison had a profound ideological "commitment to a social order char-
acterized by comparative equality, honest industry, frugality and simple 
manners."828 In other words, he remained committed to certain funda-
mental tenets of republicanism and a republican vision of property. This 
commitment caused him at certain points in his career to favor govern-
mental actions-such as in tax policy and economic policy-that were 
intended to have redistributive consequences. 824 
317. James Madison, Parties, Nat'! Gazette, Jan. 23, 1792, in 14 The Papers of James 
Madison, supra note 285, at 197, 197. 
318. See Nedelsky, supra note 209, at 45-46. 
319. 3 Brant, supra note 314, at 175. 
320. Id. at 174. 
321. See Lance Banning, The Hamiltonian Madison, 92 Va. Mag. Hist. & Biography 3, 
10 (1984). 
322. See, e.g., Nedelsky, supra note 209, at 30-35 (1990) (Madison "opposed laws 
with redistributive consequences"); Alexander, supra note 226, at 329 n.230 (Madison 
unequivocally opposed government redistribution); Michelman, supra note 153, at 135; 
Frank I. Michelman, Possession Versus Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 
72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1331 (1987) ("Madison ... upheld the sanctity of property as against 
political redistribution"). 
323. Banning, supra note 321, at 21. 
324. For other examples, see Madison, Right of Suffrage, supra note 305, at 450, 452 
(discussing with approval "equalizing tendency of laws" as way of preventing wealthy from 
getting too wealthy and too powerful); James Madison, Note During the Convention for 
Amending the Constitution of Virginia, in Mind of the Founder, supra note 289, at 406, 
408 (salute to republican laws that regulate inheritance as operating to equalize wealth). 
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There are, then, two competing views of Madison and his conception 
of the relationship between government and private property. According 
to Nedelsky, Madison recognized the necessity of government regulation 
and accepted that it would sometimes have redistributive consequences. 
According to the thesis presented here, at certain times in his career, 
Madison actually favored the use of governmental power to redistribute 
wealth. Despite their differences, both theses recognize Madison's belief 
that government had to be free to advance some economic interests at 
the expense of others without incurring the obligation to make whole 
those who were injured. Given that conviction, he would not have 
drafted the Takings Clause to require compensation for government ac-
tions that diminished the value of property. 
3. The Absolute Protection of Physical Possession. - Thus far, the discus-
sion has highlighted what might be considered the limiting principle of 
the Takings Clause. Madison's view of government, property, and their 
places in society explains why he did not go further in limiting the federal 
government's power to affect property rights. But why he did he think 
that a takings clause was needed in the first place? Although Madison 
nowhere directly addressed this question, an examination of his writings 
and speeches indicates that he believed that physical property needed 
greater protection than other forms of property because its owners were 
peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian decisionmaking. Specifically, he be-
lieved that the majoritarian decisionmaking process was least likely to 
protect the interests of landowners and slaveowners. 
Madison frequently distinguished what he called the rights of prop-
erty from what he called the rights of persons, and he argued that the 
history of the revolutionary era demonstrated that there was enormous 
tension between the two. Thus, in 1788 in criticizing Jefferson's pro-
posed constitution for Kentucky and arguing for property qualifications 
for voting, he wrote: 
The necessity of thus guarding the rights of property was for 
obvious reasons unattended to in the commencement of the 
Revolution. In all the Governments which were considered as 
beacons to republican patriots & lawgivers, the rights of persons 
were subjected to those of property. The poor were sacrificed to 
the rich. In the existing state of the American population, & 
American property[,] the two classes of rights were so little dis-
criminated that a provision for the rights of persons was sup-
posed to include of itself those of property, and it was natural to 
infer from the tendency of republican laws, that these different 
interests would be more and more identified. Experience and 
investigation have however produced more correct ideas on the 
subject. 325 
325. James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (ca. 
Oct. 15, 1788), in 11 The Papers of james Madison 285, 287 (Robert A Rutland et al. eds., 
1977) (alteration in original). 
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He added: "It is well understood that interest leads to injustice as well 
when the opportunity is presented to bodies of men, as to individuals."326 
The interests of the rich and poor were opposed, and therefore neither 
could be trusted to protect the other: "Give all power to property; and 
the indigent [will] be oppressed. Give it to the latter and the effect may 
be transposed. "327 At the same time, Madison felt that the propertied 
were less likely to undermine the rights of persons than the majority were 
to undermine the rights of property. Thus, he wrote in 1821: "As the 
holders of property have at stake all the other rights common to those 
without property, they may be the more restrained from infringing, as 
well as the less tempted to infringe the rights of the latter. "328 As previ-
ously indicated, Madison saw the Constitution and the structure of the 
federal government as a response to the problem of competing 
interests. 329 
Even as he was concerned that the Constitution should protect "the 
rights of property," Madison also recognized that conflicts about property 
were not limited to tension between the propertied and the propertyless. 
The interests of different categories of property holders were also in con-
flict. "The three principle classes into which our citizens were divisible," 
he told the federal convention, 
were the landed the commercial, & the manufacturing. The 2d. 
& 3rd. class, bear as yet a small proportion to the first. The pro-
portion however will daily increase. We see in the populous 
Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter. These 
classes understand much less of each others interests & affairs, 
than men of the same class inhabiting different districts. It is 
particularly requisite therefore that the interests of one or two 
of them should not be left entirely to the care, or the impartial-
ity of the third. 330 
326. Id. 
327. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
328. Madison, Right to Suffrage, supra note 305, at 450, 450-51. 
329. See supra Part III.C.2. 
330. Remarks ofjames Madison (debate of july 26, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 118, 123, 124 (arguing that "[l]anded possessions were no certain evidence of real 
wealth" and that "some other [voting] criterion than the mere possession of land should 
be devised"). While arguing for direct election of one branch of the legislature, he 
advanced similar claims: 
All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests, 
as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed the 
manufacturing, the commercial interests . . . . What has been the source of those 
unjust laws complained of among ourselves? Has it not been the real or supposed 
interest of the major number? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The 
landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one 
species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of 
another species. The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a 
rruyority are united by a common sentiment and have an opportunity, the rights 
of the minor party become insecure. . . . The only remedy is to enlarge the 
sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests & 
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Of the three types of property identified by Madison-landed, com-
mercial, and manufacturing-he believed landed property was the type 
that in the long run was most threatened by majoritarian rule. This belief 
stemmed from Madison's anticipation that this country would experience 
enormous population growth. As the passage quoted above indicates, in 
the 1780s, and indeed throughout his career, Madison predicted a popu-
lation explosion in the United States and he believed that landowners 
would soon become a minority.33I 
The increase in population was problematic for several reasons. 
First, it meant that, because fewer citizens would be freehold owners, 
fewer would have the independence that citizens should have. Second, 
the greater the number of the unpropertied, the more likely would they 
be to pass redistributive legislation. "An increase of population," Madison 
stated, 
will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour 
under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal 
distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber 
those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. Accord-
ing to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the 
hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made 
in this Country, but symptoms of a leveling spirit, as we have 
understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to 
give notice of the future danger.332 
The ideal solution to these problems was to limit suffrage to freeholders. 
Commenting on a proposal to impose a property requirement for voters 
for the House of Representatives, Madison told the Philadelphia conven-
tion: ''Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the 
Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty."333 
parties, that in the 1st. place a m~ority will not be likely at the same moment to 
have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and 
in the 2d. place, that in the case they shd. have such an interest, they may not be 
apt to unite in the pursuit of it. 
Remarks ofjames Madison (debate ofjune 6, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 197, at 132, 
135-36. 
331. See, e.g., Madison, Right of Suffrage, supra note 305, at 451 (editorial note 
written in 1821); James Madison, Speech on the Power to Levy Direct Taxes (June 12, 
1788), in 11 The Papers of james Madison, supra note 325, at 121, 125 (comments at 
Virginia ratifying convention); see also McCoy, supra note 198, at 121-32 (noting 
Madison's post-war vision of American westward expansion); McCoy, supra note 211, at 
192-93 (noting Madison's fear that "unfavored" landless class would become m~ority of 
population). 
332. Remarks ofjames Madison (debate ofjune 26, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 421, 422-23. Madison's comments regarding "symptoms of a leveling spirit" 
referred to Shays' Rebellion. See McCoy, supra note 198, at 129. 
333. Remarks of james Madison (debate of Aug. 7, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 196, 203. Although Madison continued to fear the propertyless m~ority, by the 
1820s he concluded that it would be unfair and, given that the majority would eventually 
be propertyless, impracticable to limit the right to suffrage to the propertied. See 
Madison, Right to Suffrage, supra note 305, at 450-55 (written in 1821). For discussions of 
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Although the Constitution did not restrict suffrage to freeholders, 
Madison ultimately decided that through the "expansion of the 
sphere" -the central argument of Federalist Ten334_the Constitution 
adequately protected property rights in general. Expansion of the sphere, 
however, did not adequately protect the particular class of landed prop-
erty. In preparing his notes of the convention for publication, Madison 
wrote: 
[W]henever the Majority shall be without landed or other 
equivalent property and without the means or hope of acquiring 
it, what is to secure the rights of property agst. the danger from 
an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power 
over property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a 
danger in the mean time from a dependence of an increasing 
number on the wealth of a few? In other Countries this depen-
dence results in some from the relations between Landlords & 
Tenants in other both from that source, & from the relations 
between wealthy capitalists & indigent labourers. In the U.S. the 
occurrence must happen from the last source; from the connec-
tion between the great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce 
and the members employed by them. 335 
In writing this, Madison was simply applying conventional republican wis-
dom. Lacking financial independence, the propertyless also lacked polit-
ical independence and would vote as their employers instructed them. As 
Madison's note indicates, there was no logic that compelled the conclu-
sion that universal suffrage would favor one particular propertied interest 
over the other. The question of which interest would prevail would turn 
simply on which interest, when combined with those it employed, had the 
most votes. The landed interest was at risk simply because demographic 
trends in the United States ran against it; the future belonged not to 
"Landlords & Tenants," but to "the great Capitalists in Manufactures & 
Commerce and the members employed by them." Indeed, the massive 
confiscations ofloyalist property, which Madison as a state legislator acted 
to end,336 provided a concrete contemporary demonstration of the risks 
faced by landowners. 
Thus, the landed interest was peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian 
decisionmaking. The propertyless, who would eventually become a ma-
jority in this country, would have the votes to secure their ends. "[T]he 
great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce" would be easily able to 
gain majority support by combining with their employees. For this rea-
Madison's views on the importance of providing protection for property interests, see 
McCoy, supra note 211, at 192-97;Jack R. Pole, Political Representation in England and 
the Origins of the American Republic 325-26, 374-75 (1966). 
334. This argument is discussed supra at notes 305-308 and accompanying text. 
335. Madison, Right of Suffrage, supra note 302, at 452. 
336. See, e.g., Bill Prohibiting Further Confiscation of British Property (introduced 
Dec. 3, 1784}, in 8 The Papers of james Madison, 173 (Robert A Rutland eta!. eds., 1973) 
(Madison's proposal to Virginia legislature on ending confiscation). 
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son, only the owners of land were endangered by majority rule. Against 
this background, it becomes clear why Madison thought a takings clause 
that established a rule of compensation when physical property was seized 
was necessary. Landed property owners could not rely on the political 
process for their protection and needed some extra measure of protec-
tion. At the same time, other types of property owners could rely on the 
political process to protect their interests; thus, for property interests 
other than those threatened with possible physical seizure by the govern-
ment, it was enough for the takings clause to be hortatory. 
Madison recognized that slaveowners were similarly threatened by 
the majoritarian process, and he imagined that the clause would protect 
them in the same way that it protected landowners. Madison believed 
that the Takings Clause established an absolute requirement that the gov-
ernment owed the slaveowner compensation whenever it freed a slave. 
Indeed, despite his anguish on the subject of slavery, 337 Madison seems to 
have regarded slavery as perhaps the paradigmatic form of property sub-
ject to threat from the majority. Strikingly, although Federalist Ten is 
now considered Madison's central exposition of his views on property, he 
used the word "property" only eight times in that paper.338 His most fre-
quent use of the word "property"-seventeen times339-was in Federalist 
Fifty-Four, where he defended Article I, Section Two of the Constitution 
(which counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of taxation 
and representation) on the grounds that "[g]overnment is instituted no 
less for protection of the property, than of the persons of individuals. "340 
Madison's conviction that the Constitution should protect all inter-
ests not only extended to slaveowners, but also applied to them with 
unique force. Slaveowners' "property" was jeopardized by the possibility 
that opposing interests would combine against them. Thus, in opposing 
giving each state equal representation in the Senate, Madison argued: 
[E]very peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any 
description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. 
Wherever there is danger of attack there ought to be given a 
constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the 
States were divided into different interests not by their differ-
ence of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of 
which resulted pardy from climate, but principally from <the ef-
fects of> their having or not having slaves. These two causes 
concurred in forming the great division of interests in the U. 
States. It did not lie between the large & small States: it lay 
between the Northern & Southern. and if any defensive power 
337. See Ketcham, supra note 284, at 625. 
338. See The Federalist Concordance 493 (Thomas Engeman et al. eds., 1988). 
339. See id. at 494. 
340. The Federalist No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two 
interests. 341 
In short, slaveowners were the most vulnerable interest group. 
To solve this problem, Madison considered giving slaveholders 
greater representation in one house of the legislature by apportioning 
representation in that house on the basis of the entire number of inhabit-
ants, both slave and free.342 He finally endorsed basing representation in 
both houses of the legislature on the number of free inhabitants. He 
defended this position on the grounds that it would protect slaveowning 
interests better than a system in which states were equally represented in 
the Senate: 
[T]he perpetuity [equal representation of the states in the 
Senate] would give to the [preponderance of the] Northn. agst. 
the Southn. . .. was a serious consideration. It seemed now to 
be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests 
lay, not between the large & small but between the N. & Southn. 
States. The institution of slavery & its consequences formed the 
line of discrimination. There were 5 States on the South, 8 on 
the Northn. side of this line. Should a proportl. representation 
take place it was true, the N. side would still outnumber the 
other: but not in the same degree, at this time; and every day 
would tend towards an equilibrium. 343 
For Madison, the failure of his proposal meant that slaveowning 
states were disadvantaged under the Constitution. The majority of the 
Senate and, at least in the short term, the majority of the House would be 
selected from free states. Thus, because interests hostile to those of the 
slaveowners would control both houses under the Constitution as ratified, 
Southern states would lack the "defensive power" needed to protect their 
interests. Moreover, slaveowners were particularly disadvantaged as a 
group because, even within the slaveowning states, a majority of people 
were not slaveowners and would thus lack sympathy for their cause. 
Thus, Madison told the Virginia state convention of 1829: "It is appre-
hended, if the power of the Commonwealth shall be in the hands of a 
majority, who have no interest in this species of property [i.e., slaves], 
that, ... injustice may be done to its owners."344 
341. Remarks ofjames Madison (debate ofjune 30, 1787) in 1 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 481, 486. 
342. See id. at 486. 
343. Remarks of james Madison (debate ofjuly 14, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 2, 9-10. The quoted language reflects Madison's assumption that the current 
trends in population growth would continue and that the South would, in time, become 
more populous than the North. This assumption, in turn, accorded with the common view 
that, by the 1780s, much of the Northeast was already overpopulated. See McCoy, supra 
note 198, at 114, 114-17 ("[T]he pressure of population growth on a limited supply of 
land in some eastern areas of the United States, especially in New England, seems actually 
to have created by the 1780s a situation of 'crowding' .... "). 
344. James Madison, Speech at Virginia Convention (December 2, 1829), in Mind of 
the Founder, supra note 289, at 402, 404. 
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This disadvantage was potentially critical because of the possibility 
that the national government would eventually move to abolish slavery.345 
As Madison was aware,346 during the state ratification debates, James 
Wilson-with Madison, one of the primary authors of the Constitution-
contended that under the Constitution, "Congress will have the power to 
exterminate slavery within our borders."347 In the Virginia ratifying con-
vention Anti-federalists Patrick Henry and George Mason asserted, as a 
reason to oppose ratification, that Congress would have the power to end 
slavery.348 Madison's response during the Virginia ratifying convention, 
and throughout his career, was that the Constitution did not delegate 
that power to the national government.349 While Madison's view doubt-
less reflected the implicit understanding of the framers,350 the possibility 
remained that, in the absence of a constitutional clause explicitly barring 
such action, the majority would seek to abolish slavery under the 
Constitution, or, alternatively, that they would seek a constitutional 
345. The national government would not, however, have been able to do so before 
1808, since the Constitution protected the slave trade until twenty years after ratification. 
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
346. See Letter from james Madison to Robert Walsh (Nov. 27, 1819), in Mind of the 
Founder, supra note 289, at 320, 321-22 & nn.1-2 (discussing published reports of 
Wilson's speeches in the Pennsylvania ratifYing convention concerning Congress's power 
under the Constitution to abolish slavery and Henry's and Mason's statements at the 
Virginia ratifYing convention on the same subject). 
347. Remarks of james Wilson at the Pensylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 469, 499 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Salding eds., 1993) [hereinafter Documentary History]. Madison in 1819 
argued that the "fairest construction" of Wilson's meaning was not that Congress had the 
power to abolish slavery, but that its power after 1808 to end the importation of slaves 
would set an example which would eventually cause all states to "yield[ ] to the general way 
of thinking & feeling" and abolish slavery. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, 
supra note 342, at 321 n.l. 
348. See Remarks of Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 
Documentary History, supra note 347, at 1473, 1477 ("The majority of Congress is to the 
North, and the slaves are to the South."); Remarks of George Mason at the Virginia 
Convention (June 11, 1788), in 9 Documentary History, supra note 347, at 1142, 1161 
("[T]here is no clause in the Constitution that will prevent the Northern and Eastern 
States from meddling with our whole property.") 
349. See Remarks of james Madison at the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1786), in 10 
Documentary History, supra note 347, at 1473, 1503; Letter from james Madison to Robert 
Evans, supra note 289, at 318-19; see also David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The 
Federalist 104 (1984) (noting Madison's insistence that federal government lacked 
authority to abolish slavery). 
350. There is relatively little evidence here on one side or the other. The fact, 
however, that Southern defenders of slavery-who fought so bitterly against restrictions on 
the slave trade-did not demand a textual provision explicitly guaranteeing that Congress 
would not be able to abolish slavery compellingly indicates that it was assumed that 
Congress did not have such a power. See Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, 
Federalism, and Comity 28-30 (1981). 
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amendment banning slavery. Indeed, at the end of his career, Madison 
privately favored the latter course of action.ss1 
By providing that abolition required compensation, the Takings 
Clause gave the slaveowners the "power of defence"852 that they lacked 
under the unamended Constitution. The Takings Clause therefore 
served a similar function with respect to landowners and slaveowners. 
Without Madison's proposed structural remedy, the Constitution would 
have placed both groups at a distinct disadvantage. Madison thus saw 
that the balance between competing interests would generally ensure that 
government under the Constitution would ultimately produce a just re-
sult. But that balance did not exist in the case of slaveowners and prop-
erty owners. For different reasons, the core property claim of each group 
was in opposition to that of the majority. Madison's comments during 
the ratification debate and at the Constitutional Convention did not indi-
cate that any other interests faced a similar threat. Prior to the passage of 
the Takings Clause, neither slaveowners nor landowners were able to 
check majority factions from compromising their property rights. 
For Madison, then, the Takings Clause protected against political 
process failures. It mandated a remedy-compensation-in those classes 
of cases in which the political process was unlikely to consider property 
claims fairly. It should be added that Madison would have recognized 
that a rule mandating compensation for all physical seizures, but nothing 
else, was both overinclusive and underinclusive as a remedy for the kinds 
of process failure with which he was concerned.858 For Madison, then, 
the takings principle represented an attempt to frame an intelligible legal 
rule that mediated between his competing concerns. He saw property 
interests in land and slaves as particularly vulnerable in the political pro-
cess. 354 At the same time, he knew that a rule that required compensa-
tion whenever a governmental action diminished the value of property 
(or even the value of some particular kind of property, such as land or 
slaves) would be inconsistent with the fact that governmental operations 
inevitably created winners and losers; to require that all losers be com-
pensated would be inconsistent with the functioning of government. 855 
351. See Letter from james Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1819), supra note 289, 
at 318-19. 
352. Remarks of james Madison (debate ofJune 30, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 
197, at 481, 486. 
353. For example, it would not mandate compensation for regulations (such as 
certain tariffs) that disproportionately affected landed interests (or that disproportionately 
affected slaveowners); if, as Madison believed, landed interests (and slaveowning interests) 
were politically vulnerable and if that political vulnerability lay behind the adoption of 
some tariff, the rule was therefore underinclusive. At the same time, the clause uniformly 
mandated compensation when physical property was seized, and to the extent that in some 
particular situation owners of seized property had fully participated in the political process 
and, despite the fact that their claims were fairly considered, had simply lost, as any faction 
loses at some times, then the rule was overinclusive. 
354. See supra text accompanying notes 331-352. 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 298-324. 
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A requirement of compensation for physical takings would allow govern-
ment to go on because it was limited in scope; at the same time, it would 
create a remedy where there was a particularly high likelihood of process 
failure (because landowners and slaveowners were disadvantaged), where 
the consequences of that failure were particularly dramatic and threaten-
ing to the economic well-being of the property owner (i.e., where there 
was physical seizure of land or slaves), and where (because of the history 
of Loyalist land confiscations and because of ratification debates state-
ments about abolition) there was reason to fear that the majority would 
act against private property interests. Moreover, the compensation re-
quirement, although limited, would provide the basis for political appeals 
in a broader range of cases. 
Other proponents of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and its 
predecessor clauses would not have had similar grounds for concern 
about overinclusivity and underinclusivity. Seizures of goods by the mili-
tary and confiscation of land grants by legislatures in which the affected 
landowners were either unrepresented or imperfectly represented are in-
stances in which the process failure directly undermines possessory inter-
ests in physical property (rather than other interests in physical 
property) . 356 
In sum, the background understanding (i.e., almost all of the con-
cerns that led to the adoption of previous takings clauses), the framers' 
intent (i.e., Madison's intent), and the ratifiers' intent (to the extent that 
we have evidence of it through Tucker's obsen"ation) all indicate that the 
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause should be understood as concerned 
with redressing political process failure. There was, admittedly, not a 
consensus motive for all the particulars. Madison was worried about 
majoritarian confiscation of land and slaves. The Vermont farmers op-
posed invalidation of their land grants by a legislature in which they were 
the minority. Some proponents of the Northwest Ordinance may have 
feared that the territorial legislature would revoke the land grants of the 
unrepresented. There was a widespread reaction against military confis-
cation of personal property. However, these various understandings of 
why a takings clause was needed shared the same basic themes: Physical 
property was vulnerable in the political process and the Takings Clause 
sought to redress that problem. 
IV. A PoLITICAL PRoCEss-BASED THEORY oF THE 
JusT CoMPENSATION CuusE 
The previous Part provided historical evidence indicating that the 
Takings Clause was originally intended to remedy certain types of process 
failure. The relevance of this original understanding to current takings 
jurisprudence remains for discussion. There are several plausible re-
356. See supra text accompanying notes 226-278 (discussing non-Madisonian support 
for takings clauses). 
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sponses to the historical evidence presented in this Article. One might 
follow a traditional originalist approach and return to the practice that 
existed before Pennsylvania Coal; that is, compensation only for physical 
appropriations of property. Alternatively, one might acknowledge the 
original understanding and yet treat it as irrelevant to modern adjudica-
tion. This Part rejects these approaches and argues for a political pro-
cess-based theory of the Takings Clause, inspired by its original meaning 
and purpose, yet modified to reflect the changes in economic and polit-
ical circumstances since the late eighteenth century. 
This theory draws on a model recently developed by Professor 
Lawrence Lessig357 showing how the original understanding can be 
"translated" into a modern context. This Part argues that translating the 
original understanding into a contemporary takings jurisprudence means 
that courts today should protect those whose property interests are, given 
modern political realities, particularly unlikely to receive fair considera-
tion from majoritarian decisionmakers. Thus, the translation of the origi-
nal understanding outlined here would interpret the Takings Clause to 
provide heightened protection to the property interests of those who 
have been singled out and the property interests of discrete and insular 
minorities. 
This Part begins by explaining why a translation model is superior to 
traditional originalism and to non-originalist methods of interpretation. 
It then describes how a translation of the original understanding would 
work in practice. Finally, this Part demonstrates why the resulting pro-
cess-based model of takings adjudication would be preferable to the cur-
rent state of takings jurisprudence. 
A. 'Why Translate? 
An originalist model of constitutional interpretation is attractive for 
two related reasons. First, it constrains judicial decisionmaking to a sig-
nificant degree. Rather than deciding independently what factors are rel-
evant to a case, originalistjudges defer to already established choices. As 
a result, originalism accords with the belief that the rule of law requires 
judges to follow externally imposed rules, rather than resolve cases in ac-
cordance with their own personal views. Second, originalism connects 
constitutional decisionmaking with majoritarian decisionmaking. 
Originalistjudges are implementing the considered choices made by "We 
the People" under circumstances that fostered careful deliberation and 
that "We the People" have not subsequently altered.35B 
357. See Lessig, supra note 10. 
358. See The Federalist No. 39, at 241 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) 
("[W]e may define a republic to be ... a government which derives all its powers directly 
or indirectly from the great body of the people .... ) ; 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: 
Foundations 285-87 (1991) (discussing "mobilized deliberation" and American higher 
lawmaking); 
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Under the traditional originalist approach to constitutional interpre-
tation, judges construe a text as it was construed at the time of its ratifica-
tion. Robert Bork, the leading advocate of this approach, has described it 
as follows: "What is the meaning of a rule that judges should not change? 
It is the meaning understood at the time of the law's enactment. "ll59 
The translator is also an originalist, but she looks not to the concrete 
constitutional understandings of "We the People," but to the underlying 
values that "We the People" embraced. According to Professor Lessig, a 
translator seeks to identify the ends that the Constitution's framers 
sought to advance and then interprets a constitutional provision in a way 
that best advances those ends in today's world. The translator begins by 
studying the historical context in which constitutional text was written 
and examining what the constitutional text meant in that context. She 
then determines what factual presuppositions underlying the original in-
terpretation are no longer accurate. Finally, she reinterprets the text in 
light of changed circumstances, altering the original reading as little as 
possible while seeking its modern "equivalent. "860 
From an originalist standpoint, translation is a better model than 
traditional originalism because the available evidence suggests that it bet-
ter reflects the original approach to constitutional interpretation. The 
framers were not traditional originalists. They created a terse, open-
ended constitution whose meaning would change in response to changed 
circumstances. In the debates about ratification, the Anti-federalists re-
peatedly claimed that a constitution should be more explicit and detailed 
in its grants of power and limitations.861 The Federalists, in contrast, 
made clear that they had intended to draft a flexible document. As histo-
rian Michael Lienesch has written, "[T]he Federalist founders seemed 
surprisingly at ease in making the case for experimentation and flexibil-
ity. . . . Although Federalists did not assume automatic progress, they did 
believe that their politics could be adapted to future circumstances."362 
This notion of an adaptable Constitution is represented perhaps 
most famously by Chief Justice Marshall's statement in McCulloch v. 
Maryland;ll6ll "We must never forget it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding. "864 Such a conception of the Constitution as flexible was the 
norm. Drawing on his analysis of common law interpretive techniques 
and early discussions of constitutional meaning, Professor H. Jefferson 
Powell contends that the framers did not intend their specific subjective 
359. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 144 (1990). 
360. Lessig, supra note 10, at 1263. Lessig summarizes his model at id. For 
precursors to his approach, see id. at 1171 n.32. In developing his model, he does not 
argue for it; rather, his end is simply to outline what a translation model would look like. 
See id. at 1173. 
361. See Uenesch, supra note 209, at 147-50. 
362. ld at 151. 
363. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
364. ld. at 407. 
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intentions to bind future generations and that they believed that constitu-
tional meaning would evolve over time.ss5 Indeed, there is evidence that 
many in the framing generation employed an approach to constitutional 
interpretation that was anti-literalist366 and thus even more flexible than 
Powell's work suggests. For example, in the one American case prior to 
ratification of the Constitution in which we have evidence of substantial 
discussions of constitutional interpretation, Virginia's 1782 Case of the 
Prisoners,367 both the presiding judge and the members of the bar who 
argued the case repeatedly invoked the spirit of the state constitution as a 
guide to interpretation.368 In short, serious deference to original intent 
requires deference to the framers' conception of constitutional construc-
tion, and the information that we have about that conception supports a 
translation model because it allows for the interpretive flexibility that the 
framers desired. 
At the same time, a translation model is superior on non-originalist 
grounds. It aspires to be faithful to the text, history, and structure of the 
Constitution, while avoiding the problems of a narrow, inflexible original-
ism that offers an inadequate account of continuity and change in consti-
tutional interpretation. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than with 
the Takings Clause. As this Article has shown, there was a reason why the 
Bill of Rights recognized the principle that the government must always 
pay when it physically takes the individual's property, but that it is never 
under an obligation to pay when government actions diminish the value 
of property. Yet the world has changed so much that to modern thinkers 
this line between when compensation is mandatory and when it is not 
appears incoherent and unintelligible, and an effort in recovery has been 
needed to make the underlying rationale comprehensible. A traditional 
originalism yields a reading of the Takings Clause that is clearly unper-
suasive to almost everyone today-so even originalists such as Black and 
Scalia are not originalists when it comes to the Takings Clause. More-
over, traditional originalism is at odds with seventy years of Supreme 
Court precedent, which has held that some regulations can give rise to a 
compensation requirement. A translation model, unlike traditional 
originalism, allows the adaption to changed circumstances that is needed 
for a reading of the clause to have any non-originalist appeal. 
365. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 902-04 (1985). 
366. The term is Professor Morton Horwitz's. See Morton]. Horwitz, Foreword: The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentalitywithout Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
30, 49-51 (1993) ("a distinct anti-literalism seems to have been present among some of the 
Virginia founders"). 
367. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 634 (1782) (case was contemporaneously 
known as Case of the Prisoners). 
368. See Treanor, supra note 277, at 544-52 (discussing opinion of Chancellor 
Pendleton and arguments of Tucker and Randolph); see also id. at 554-56 (discussing 
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793)). 
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Finally, a translation model, unlike a traditional originalist model, 
allows us to benefit from the insights of the framing generation. The indi-
viduals who drafted and then defended the Constitution were a remarka-
ble group. Madison, Wilson, and Hamilton, to take the most prominent 
examples, were subtle and powerful thinkers and experienced leaders. In 
a serious and considered way, they drew on what they had seen in the 
revolutionary era, a time of fundamental political transformation, and 
participated in the re-conceptualization of government. More broadly, 
the process of shaping the state constitutions, the federal constitution, 
and the Bill of Rights produced widespread sustained and thoughtful de-
liberation about the nature of government. This conjunction of factors-
accomplished politicians with remarkable intellectual gifts participating 
in the constitution making of "We the People"-is unique in American 
history. We can therefore learn from the framers even if we view their 
work simply as political philosophy, rather than as the creation of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights that still bind us. But if we do what 
traditional originalism calls for and focus on the concrete formulations 
that the framers adopted, we necessarily miss what they were trying to do. 
In contrast, the translator asks what the purpose of the concrete formula-
tion was, and thereby allows us to learn, for example, what motivated the 
framers to protect certain property interests from the majority. In other 
words, the translator uncovers the framers' insights and enables us to 
profit from them today. 
B. Translating the Original Understanding 
Having discussed the general benefits of the translation model, this 
section now applies that model to a concrete problem-the original un-
derstanding of the Takings Clause. It begins by isolating the intended 
purpose of the clause at the framing and then examines the way in which 
society has changed since then. Taking these factors into account, it pro-
poses a theory of takings adjudication that is true to the origins of the 
clause, yet adapted to the political, social, and economic realities of con-
temporary society. 
1. The Original Understanding. - As we have seen, the federal 
Takings Clause and its predecessor clauses, as they were originally under-
stood, divided governmental actions affecting property into two groups. 
When the government physically took property, it owed compensation. 
Any other governmental action, no matter how severely it affected the 
value of property, did not give rise to a compensation requirement. This 
requirement applied to physical takings because the framers believed that 
majoritarian decisionmaking processes would not give fair consideration 
to the individual's interest in not having her property physically seized by 
the government. 
The clause sought to remedy failures in the political process. But the 
underlying idea was not that all majoritarian decisions should be reviewed 
to determine whether the process behind any particular decision was fair 
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or unfair. Rather, heightened constitutional protection was provided 
only for the limited category of decisions in which unfairness was most 
likely. At the same time, while the clause only mandated compensation 
in a limited sphere, it had a broader significance: It was also designed to 
teach the people that governmental actions that arbitrarily affected prop-
erty interests (including the value of property) were illegitimate. 
One might argue, however, that in takings cases involving state and 
local governments, the relevant intent is not that of the framers of the 
Fifth Amendment, but rather that of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Under this view, the critical period for the translator would 
not be 1789 to 1791, when the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was 
proposed and ratified, but 1866 to 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment-which has been held to incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause against the states369-was proposed and 
ratified.370 Under closer scrutiny, however, the selection of the relevant 
period becomes more complicated. 
In interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the threshold question 
for the translator is whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
sought to incorporate the provisions of the Bill of Rights. If they did not, 
then incorporation is simply the handiwork of the judiciary and there is 
no governing original intent concerning what incorporation of the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause meant.371 Thus, "the People" considered 
which property interests to protect from the government only once-at 
369. It is clear that the Takings Clause is now deemed applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 
(1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Penn. Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). Because the line between 
substantive due process and incorporation was not always a clear one, the precise case that 
incorporated the Takings Clause is a matter of dispute. The standard citation is to 
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 
2316; Bosselman et al., supra note 12, at 115 & n.27; Scheiber, supra note 297, at 243. 
Justice Stevens, however, has argued that this was a substantive due process case. See 
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Siegel has stated that 
incorporation occurred in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). See 
Siegel, supra note 98, at 216 n.130. In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 
399 ( 1894), the Court appears to hold that the Takings Clause is incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 
370. For the relevant dates of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael Kent Curtis, 
No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 57, 154-55 
(1986). 
371. The classic formulation of the anti-incorporationist historical argument is 
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. 
L. Rev. 5 (1949). The leading current proponent of this position is Raoul Berger. See, 
e.g., Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1989); Raoul 
Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
134-56 (1977); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 435 (1981); Raoul Berger, Incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 Ohio St. LJ. 1 (1983); see 
also William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial 
Doctrine 123 (1988) ("Historical analysis of the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth 
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the time of the proposal and ratification of the Fifth Amendment's 
Takings Clause. Even in construing the Fourteenth Amendment, a trans-
lator should therefore look to the earlier time period to discover original 
intent because the principle underlying the translation model is that the 
judiciary should defer to considered majoritarian decisionmaking em-
bodied in constitutional law and the earlier period is the only one in 
which such decisionmaking occurred. 3 72 
The weight of recent scholarship, however, supports the view that 
incorporation (through the Privileges and Immunities Clause) was part 
of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 73 To the 
extent that there was a particular desire to apply the Takings Clause 
Amendment cannot, by itself, resolve the dilemma created by the conflicting commitments 
of those who participated in the process."). 
372. Additionally, if one believes that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not intend to incorporate the protections of the Bill of Rights against the states, one might 
argue that a modern translation should not apply the Takings Clause against the states at 
all. Thus, the process failure concerns of the framers and ratifiers of the Takings Clause 
would be irrelevant to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the Takings 
Clause would not bind the states. 
Such an approach might work as a pure example of translation. But it would run 
counter to a fundamental (and precedentially-established) principle of modern 
constitutional structure, which is that some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, including 
the Takings Clause, are applicable against the states. See supra note 369 (discussing cases 
holding Takings Clause incorporated against the states). As Professor Lessig has 
suggested, the translator may ultimately conclude that, because of other concerns, the 
translation may not be the best reading of a constitutional text. See Lessig, supra note 10, 
at 1263. Thus, in view of larger concerns of constitutional structure, even if the translator 
believes that incorporation was not part of the original intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, she should still hold that the Takings Clause applies against the states. The 
question then becomes how to interpret the Takings Clause. If a principle goal of the 
translation model is to promote deference to the considered judgments of the majority 
acting as "We the People," that goal would again suggest that, even in interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the translator should look to the ends that animated those who 
framed and ratified the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 
At a deeper level, however, as indicated in the text, see infra text accompanying notes 
374-378, the weight of historical evidence favors incorporation. Thus, in his leading work, 
Professor Curtis has found 30 statements of Republicans in the 38th and 39th Congresses 
indicating that at least some Bill of Rights liberties limited the states; he found none to the 
contrary. See Curtis, supra note 370, at 112. As a result, the translator should interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment in light of incorporation, and such a view would lead her to look 
at the ends of the framers and ratifiers of the Takings Clause, for reasons set forth in the 
text. See supra text accompanying note 360. 
373. The leading work (and one that convincingly presents the case for 
incorporation) is Michael Kent Curtis's No State Shall Abridge (discussed supra notes 370, 
372). For other accounts developing the evidence of incorporation, see Amar, supra note 
297; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
103 Yale LJ. 57 (1993); Robert]. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 Conn. L. Rev. 368 (1972-1973). The discussion in the text 
concerns a translator's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If one posits that 
incorporation was intended, and if one wanted to provide a traditional original intent 
reading of the takings protections encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the 
Fourteenth Amendment should be read to provide compensation only for physical 
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against the states, it was driven by the same impulse that animated the 
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause: protecting the property interests of a · 
group that was isolated from the normal give and take of the political 
process. Congressman John Bingham, the principal author of what be-
came Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, feared that former 
Confederate states would seize the property of Unionists. He declared: 
[T] he rebels will be found in a majority of three to one or four 
to one in every one of the States that have been engaged in re-
bellion, except in Tennessee. 
How will you prevent that overpowering majority from tak-
ing possession of those reconstructed governments? . . . Where 
is the power in Congress, unless this or some similar 
amendment be adopted, to prevent the reenactment of those 
infernal statutes of banishment and confiscation and imprison-
ment and murder under which ~eople have suffered in those 
States during the last four years? 74 
During the course of the committee meetings about the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Bingham proposed imposing on the states just compensa-
tion and equal protection requirements (and not due process or privi-
leges and immunities),375 and the support for this unsuccessful proposal 
reflected this perceived need to safeguard Unionist property after former 
rebels returned to power. 376 But, of course, this version was not passed. 
It was rejected by a vote of seven to five, and the committee opted instead 
for the broader language of Section One. 377 Incorporationist scholarship 
indicates the framers adopted this language in order to subject the states 
to the same restraints as the federal government.378 Thus, passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not reflect a separate consideration of what 
specific property interests needed protection from the government. In-
corporationist scholarship therefore leads to the same conclusion as non-
incorporationist scholarship: The period in which the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause was proposed and ratified is the only time 
at which the nation considered which property rights needed protection 
from the government. The translator should therefore focus on the con-
seizures. Extension of takings doctrine beyond physical takings did not occur until after 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See note 94 and text accompanying notes 93-94. 
374. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lstSess. 1093 (1866) (statementofCongressmanJohn 
Bingham) (emphasis added). 
375. See Benjamin Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on 
Reconstruction 85 (1914) ("nor shall any state deny any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for public use without just 
compensation"). 
376. See Earl Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as a Political Compromise-Section 
One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 Ohio St. LJ. 933, 959 (1985). 
377. See Curtis, supra note 361, at 84. 
378. See id. at 91; Aynes, supra note 373, at 66-94; see also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2765-66 (1864) (statement of Senator Jacob Howard, chair of the Senate 
delegation to the joint committee, enumerating the right to compensation among the 
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment). 
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cern with process failure animating the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause. Having determined that the Takings Clause was originally in-
tended to remedy certain kinds of process failure, she should offer a read-
ing of the clause that serves the same ends in today's society. 
2. The Takings Clause and Changed Circumstances - At the time of the 
framing and ratification of the Takings Clause and its predecessor 
clauses, different people were concerned with risks to different possessory 
interests, but there was nonetheless a close match between the end served 
by the clause-remedying process failure-and the means adopted-re-
quiring compensation for physical takings. Today, protection of physical 
possession no longer advances the broader end of remedying process 
failure. 
Slaveownership obviously no longer falls within the ambit of the 
clause. Madison believed that slaveowners were particularly politically 
vulnerable because those who did not own slaves would be unlikely to 
enter into political combinations with them. However, the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments rendered this aspect of the clause moot by 
requiring uncompensated emancipation of all slaves. 379 
The situation with respect to landownership is more complex, but 
the essential point-that the affected property interest no longer needs 
heightened protection-is also applicable here. Critical factual presup-
positions that animated Madison are inconsistent with contemporary real-
ities. Madison anticipated that in the near future most Americans would 
not own land. Moreover, in accordance with republican theory, he 
thought landowners would be particularly weak because employees, de-
pendent on their employers for support, would follow their employers' 
wishes and most employers would be engaged in trade or industry, rather 
than farming. Neither assumption is accurate today. According to the 
most recent census report, sixty-four percent of Americans own their own 
homes.3so In addition, voter studies indicate that voting behavior reflects 
variables like class, gender, ethnicity, region, and age, not the voting ori-
entation of one's employer.381 
Indeed, a group of landowners faced with seizure of their land for a 
public use are particularly well situated to secure compensation from 
m~oritarian decisionmakers. As Professor Daniel Farber has observed, 
"[I]f public choice theory has any one key finding, it is that small groups 
with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political 
379. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... 
shall exist within the United States"); id. amend. XIV, § 4 ("[N]either the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay ... any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave"). 
380. See Andrea Stone & Mindy Fetterman, Home Owning Takes First Dip Since '30s, 
USA Today, June 11, 1991, at 1A. 
381. See, e.g., Angus Campbell eta!., The American Voter 90-93, 193-94 (1964); 
John A Crittenden, Parties and Elections in the United States 88-100 (1982); William H. 
Flanigan & Nancy H. Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate 87-91 (4th ed. 
1979). 
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process. Thus, landowners have some political advantages in seeking 
compensation."382 Because the stakes are typically high and the bearers 
of the loss are easily identifiable, affected property owners can organize 
to demand compensation with relative ease. United by one issue of com-
pelling interest, landowners are in a position to engage in legislative log-
rolling that will enable them either to obtain compensation or to block 
the project, trading off votes on other matters for support on the confis-
cation issue. Moreover, in a society of property owners, even in the ab-
sence of logrolling on any particular project, the political majority has an 
interest in compensating for this particular type of property loss. As a 
group that may one day face confiscation of its own land, a uniform prac-
tice of compensation is clearly in its own interest. Finally, people com-
monly place a higher subjective value on forms of property with which 
they have a strong personal relationship than on property of equivalent 
dollar value that lacks such association. 383 For this reason, people seem 
likely to fight particularly hard to block a proposed government activity 
that would take away their homes or, alternatively, for psychic as well as 
economic reasons, to fight particularly hard for compensation. 384 
As previously noted, landowners were routinely awarded compensa-
tion before it became a constitutional requirement. 385 In fact, as 
Professor Farber has pointed out, "compensation for physical invasions is 
almost universal in democracies."386 That compensation is the norm 
even in the absence of a constitutional compensation requirement shows 
that the political process generally protects landowners from the risk of 
uncompensated confiscation. While Madison thought that for demo-
graphic reasons this protection would disappear (and that is part of the 
reason why he proposed the Takings Clause), he proved a poor prophet. 
None of this is to say that today there would never be situations when, 
382. Daniel A Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 125, 130 (1992). It should be added that the advantages that landowners currently 
possess, see infra text accompanying notes 382-84, were also possessed by them in 
Madison's day. The critical point is that the offsetting disadvantages that he feared did not 
materialize. 
383. For example, the family home is seen as more important than stock of equivalent 
economic value. See Margaret]. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 
1003-08 (1982) (discussing personhood perspective and takings). 
384. On the reasons why landowners are in a good position to obtain compensation, 
see Farber, supra note 6, at 289-90, 298-99. Professor Levmore has argued that, when a 
government project threatens a large number of landowners (as is the case with a large 
road project), they are well able to secure compensation, but that a small number of 
landowners are at a relative disadvantage in securing redress from the political process. 
See Levmore, supra note 6, at 320; Levmore, supra note 154, at 1352-53. This point, 
however, is consistent with the overall theory of this piece. Landowners do not deserve 
special protection; they, like other property owners, deserve special protection only when 
they have been singled out. 
385. See Treanor, supra note 19, at 696 n.6; supra note 28, text accompanying notes 
18-19. 
386. Farber, supra note 6, at 290 n.37. 
1995] TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 865 
without a rule requiring compensation, landowners would not be com-
pensated. Nor is it to say that a translated law of takings will never re-
quire compensation when land is taken. In fact, the takings doctrine de-
veloped in the next Section requires compensation in some 
circumstances when land is taken. But landownership is not now a partic-
ularly vulnerable kind of property interest. Therefore, as we begin to 
translate the original understanding and to determine which property in-
terests by their very nature are particularly at risk of being victimized by 
the political process, we should conclude that landowners do not need 
special protection. 
Similarly, the regional minority issue that lay behind Vermont's just 
compensation clause is no longer a problem today. As Vermonters real-
ized, their distance from the state government made them powerless as a 
practical matter. 387 Given improvements in communication and trans-
portation, distance no longer impedes participation in the political 
process. 388 
The situation in the Northwest Territories, where one company from 
outside of the political entity owned much of the land within yet was at 
risk because of its lack of representation in the legislature, has its closest 
modem analogue in Professor William Fischel's suggestion that, while 
discrimination against outsiders does not exist at the state or federal level, 
it may exist at the local level, where those in charge of land use regulation 
may seek to impose burdens on property owners who are unrepresented 
in the electoral process. 389 But as Professor Vicki Been has convincingly 
argued, the mobility of modem capital means that, if one community 
overregulates, investors will simply take their money elsewhere. Thus, 
there is currently no need to provide special protection for investors who 
live olltside of the polity. 39o 
The need for special protection with respect to confiscation by the 
military persists. Now, as in the late eighteenth century, when the mili-
tary seizes an individual's goods without statutory authorization or provi-
sion for compensation, that person has been singled out without any 
sanction of the political process. Unless she can join others who are simi-
387. See supra notes 241-243 and accompanying text. 
388. See Amar, supra note 297, at 1212-15 (discussing how technological change has 
made the concerns that were raised at the time of the Constitution about the distance 
between constituents and the capitol irrelevant by the end of the Civil War). 
389. See William A Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in 
Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1581, 1582-84. 
390. See generally Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: 
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473 (1991) 
(arguing that the exit option affects local governments' exaction policies). Fischel and 
Been debate their conflicting views in William A Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: 
Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 865, 897-98 
(1991); Vicki Been, The Perils of Paradoxes-Comment on William A Fischel, "Exploring 
the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?", 67 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 913, 920-21 (1991). 
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larly situated, she is poorly positioned to obtain subsequent redress from 
that process. Thus, the Supreme Court has focused on the "extraordi-
nary and unforeseen" circumstances that give rise to such seizures as both 
the reason why the seizures are legitimate and the reason why compensa-
tion is mandated: 
Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond 
all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of im-
mediate and impending public danger, in which private prop-
erty may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized 
and appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed 
without the consent of the owner. . . . Exigencies of the kind do 
arise in time of war or impending public danger, but it is the 
emergency, as was said by a great magistrate, that gives the right, 
and it is clear that the emergency must be shown to exist before 
the taking can be justified. Such a justification may be shown, 
and when shown the rule is well settled that the officer taking 
private property for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully 
proved, is not a trespasser, and that the government is bound to 
make full compensation to the owner.!19I 
In sum, because of changes that have occurred over time, many 
(although not all) of the property interests that in the late eighteenth 
century were considered to be inadequately protected by the political 
process either no longer exist or are now adequately protected by that 
process. Thus, special protection for possessory property interests no 
longer serves the principle underlying the Takings Clause. The job of the 
translator, therefore, is to determine what property interests must now be 
protected if we are to be consistent with the original purposes of the 
clause. 
3. The Translation. - Public choice theorists have offered a range of 
ideas about when process failure affects property interests. The constitu-
tional jurisprudence of Professor John Hart Ely indicates that discrete 
and insular minorities suffer from heightened disadvantages in the polit-
ical process. This Section draws on these different insights as the basis for 
its translation of when the Takings Clause currently requires compensa-
tion. In addition to mandating compensation in certain situations, a 
translated Takings Clause, like the original, will also serve an educative 
function that will be discussed in this Section as well. 
a. Public Choice Theory. - In recent years, Professors Farber,392 
Fischel, 393 and Levmore394 have offered public choice theories of the 
Takings Clause. Like the original understanding of the Takings Clause, 
391. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627-28 (1871); see also United 
States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 152 n.3 (1952) (citing IWssell as binding precedent and 
quoting language quoted in text of this Article, although holding that the case did not 
require compensation when goods were destroyed to keep them from the enemy). 
392. See Farber, supra note 6; Farber, supra note 382. 
393. See Fischel, supra note 390. 
394. See Levmore, supra note 6; Levmore, supra note 154. 
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these theories treat the central concern of the Takings Clause as protect-
ing those who suffer property losses because of process failure. These 
public choice theories, however, offer different accounts of what type of 
process failure needs to be averted. Because of their different focuses, 
the theories provide useful bases for consideration of how a translated 
Takings Clause would guard against process failure. 395 
Fischel's model offers the broadest protection to property owners. 
He argues that courts construing the Takings Clause should direct com-
pensation when property owners are ''victims of democratic excess. "396 
Fischel provides the following test for the identification of such ''victims:" 
"[T]hey are a minority in a jurisdiction in which the usual minoritarian 
political processes are attenuated-that is, they are subject to local gov-
ernments or to politically insulated special commissions, and they possess 
assets whose regulation cannot be escaped by moving them to other juris-
dictions or other employments. "397 The governmental entity making the 
decision is of critical significance in Fischel's theory: "[C]ourts can save 
some of their scarce political capital by ignoring all but the most extreme 
regulations enacted by larger units of governments, such as the United 
States Congress, most states, and some large cities and counties. "398 In 
our system, larger units of government are characterized by pluralist poli-
tics-with logrolling and the opportunity for deal-making-and this gives 
property owners "a realistic opportunity to politically protect them-
selves."399 In contrast, empirical studies indicate that local government 
decisionmaking is characterized by majoritarian politics, rather than by 
deal-making. Because local governments typically have one legislative 
chamber, rather than two, and because their legislative agenda has a rela-
tively limited number of items, there are fewer opportunities for logroll-
ing. As a result, special interests are likely to lose consistently.400 Such 
interests will not be able to bargain in order to protect themselves, and 
therefore need judicial protection. When a larger unit of government is 
involved, such protection is generally unnecessary. In a case like Lucas, 
for example, where regulation issues at the state level, "there would seem 
to be little process-theory justification for judicial intervention."401 Judi-
395. There are, it should be added, other works that explore the relationship between 
public choice theory and the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, 
Narratives and Power, 88 Colum. L Rev. 1752 (1988); Lunney, supra note 100; Marc R. 
Poirer, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the Beachfront, 46 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 243 (1993); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and just Compensation: 
A Question of Federalism, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829 (1989). The works discussed here have 
been selected because their insights are particularly useful in illuminating what a 
translated Takings Clause should be. 
396. Fischel, supra note 390, at 890. 
397. ld. 
398. ld. at 911. 
399. ld 
400. See id. at 886. 
401. ld. at 910. 
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cial action directing compensation for decisions made by higher level 
governmental entities is appropriate only when there has been unfair-
ness-as there was in Lucas: "[T]he fairness infirmity of the state legisla-
tion challenged in Lucas is the disproportionate impact on an owner in a 
subdivision in which all neighboring lots had been developed and were 
thus grandfathered by the state legislature."402 
Although Fischel does not claim to offer an originalist vision of any 
type, his concern with process failure initially appears a good translation 
of the original understanding. However, his account is ultimately an in-
adequate translation because it fails to accord enough respect to the 
Takings Clause's limiting principle-the principle of deference to the 
political process, except where it is most prone to failure. Fischel's theory 
imposes a high level of judicial scrutiny on decisions made by most locali-
ties and states. While scrutiny is less rigorous when larger governmental 
entities are involved, even decisions by such entities receive only a limited 
degree of deference, as Fischel's suggestion that Lucas was correctly de-
cided indicates. 
The framers, in contrast, recognized that they were establishing a 
rule that did not bar the government from making incorrect decisions. 
For example, Madison wrote in Federalist Ten that any "improper or 
wicked project[s] will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union 
than a particular member of it. 403 By using the phrase "less apt," 
Madison implicitly acknowledged that such "improper or wicked pro-
ject[s]" would sometimes occur, even at the national level. Nonetheless, 
the Bill of Rights did not seek to combat such potential intrusions on 
economic interests. There were substantive constitutional protections 
only in cases of physical confiscation, where failure was particularly likely. 
Given that the framers of the Takings Clause intended it to apply 
only against the national government, Fischel's theory might nonetheless 
be a convincing translation if the majoritarian politics that he sees operat-
ing at the local level were completely shielded from the operations of 
pluralist politics. In other words, one might argue that extension of the 
Takings Clause to the local governments means that, because of the 
unique nature of local politics, such governments should be subject to a 
different (and higher) level of scrutiny. The weakness of this argument, 
however, is that our system affords those who lose local struggles an op-
portunity for political redress; they can challenge adverse decisions at the 
state level. 404 
402. Id. 
403. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 301, at 84. For the full quotation, see supra 
text accompanying note 307. 
404. As Professor Michael Schill has observed, "A black letter principle of local 
government law holds that local governments derive their authority from states .... " 
Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 795, 838 
n.196 (1991). See generally Chester J. Antieau, Muncipal Corporation Law§ 2.00 (1994) 
(cities creatures of states). 
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The recent fate of rent control in Massachusetts is illustrative. Land-
lords in Boston, Brookline, and Cambridge, Massachusetts were unable to 
get these municipalities to lift rent control. Rent control was a politically 
pivotal issue, and landlords were unable to enter into bargains with inter-
est groups to secure the end of rent control. In the most recent state 
election, however, there was a question on the ballot directing that the 
rent control restrictions in Boston, Brookline, and Cambridge be lifted. 
It won.405 Thus, recourse to state-level political processes obviated the 
need for special judicial protection. 406 
While Fischel's theory is too broad for the translator, it is nonethe-
less valuable for the task of translation. It shows why special interests, 
although a minority, will often be able to protect themselves and there-
fore do not need heightened protection. 
Farber's narrower theory of the Takings Clause is a more plausible 
translation of the original understanding.407 Farber argues that the prin-
cipal purpose of the Takings Clause is "horizontal equity."408 Public 
choice theory shows that even in the absence of a constitutional require-
ment, democratic legislatures would normally compensate when they 
physically took property.409 Only the politically unprotected will not be 
compensated: "[I]n a world where government compensation is often 
available, it is unacceptable that some groups are denied compensation 
because of their unusual political vulnerability."410 This principle re-
405. See The Massachusetts Rent Control Prohibition Act, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 400 
(Law. C()-()p. Supp. 1995); Pamela Ferdinand, Rent Vote Divides Landlords, Tenants, 
Boston Globe, Nov. 10, 1994, at 33. After the referendum, the state legislature modified its 
effects by creating a safety-net for certain categories of rent control tenants; after two years, 
however, even the apartments of these tenants will no longer be under rent control. See 
An Act Providing for the Alleviation of Hardship of Certain Tenants, 1994 Mass. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 282 (approved Jan. 4, 1995). For news coverage, see Thomas Coakley, 
Small Landlords Considering Options Under New State Law, Boston Globe, Jan. 9, 1995, at 
13. 
406. In addition, because of the multitude of interests confronting a municipality, 
property owners can prevail, even when they are a distinct minority. The recent elections 
provide an illustrative example of this phenomenon. In Santa Monica, California, 
although renters make up 72% of the electorate and although rent control has long been 
firmly established in the city, an incumbent city councillor lost to a little known opponent 
who was opposed to rent control and ran on a law-and-order platform; concerns about 
public safety proved more compelling than concerns about retaining rent control. See 
Nancy Hill-Holtzman, Up Against the Wall, L.A. Times, Dec. 29, 1994 (special "Home 
Edition," available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumews File). 
407. Farber's theory is not originalist, although he briefly invokes the history of the 
clause. He observes that the presence of a takings clause in the Northwest Ordinance 
suggests that the framers "may have been concerned about protecting non-resident 
investors," Farber, supra note 6, at 281 & n.8 (citing Treanor, supra note 19), but adds that 
analysis of the takings problem is changed by the fact that, in the modem context, the 
property owner is typically a resident. See id. at 281-82. 
408. Id. at 308. 
409. Farber's argument on why legislatures would normally compensate is discussed 
supra text accompanying notes 382-384. 
410. Farber, supra note 6, at 206. 
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quires compensation whenever the government physically takes property. 
In order to ensure that government will not strategically evade the 
Takings Clause, the principle must be extended to situations in which the 
government seeks to transfer property from one private citizen to an-
other. For the same reason, it must also extend to "regulations that are 
functionally equivalent to government acquisitions."411 Lucas falls within 
the last category. Because the government compensates when land is in-
corporated into national parks, and because the preservation ban chal-
lenged in Lucas was effectively the same as if his land had been seized for 
preservation purposes, Lucas should have been compensated. 412 
Farber's approach parallels the original understanding in that both 
reflect a view of the Takings Clause as concerned with process failure 
and, at the same time, both recognize only a limited area in which 
majoritarian decisions will be overturned. Because of these parallels, 
Farber's theory provides a fairly good translation of the original under-
standing. Its weakness as translation is that its conception of process fail-
ure is too broad, for reasons suggested by Fischel's explanation of how 
special interests are able to use pluralist politics to protect their property 
claims.413 The original interpretation of the Takings Clause (under 
which physical takings were compensated for) closely matched the under-
lying end. Farber's theory embodies a looser match, since the regulations 
for which he would require compensation will often not be the product 
of process failure. Lucas is a prime example of this situation. 
As discussed, Lucas challenged the Beachfront Management Act, 
which prevented him from building on his property. However, he was 
not alone in suffering under the Act, which affected all South Carolina 
beachfront landowners. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent: 
The Act does not target particular landowners, but rather regu-
lates the use of the coastline of the entire State. . . . Moreover, 
the Act did not single out owners of undeveloped land. The Act 
also prohibited owners of developed land from rebuilding if 
their structures were destroyed, and what is equally significant, 
from repairing erosion control devices, such as seawalls. . . . In 
short, the South Carolina Act imposed substantial burdens on 
owners of developed and undeveloped land alike.414 
411. Id. at 304. 
412. See id. at 304-05. The result favored by Farber thus parallels the result reached 
by the majority, although his rationale is different. See id. (criticizing majority rationale). 
Farber also follows Justice Kennedy's concurrence in concluding that "the common law of 
nuisance provides only a partial description of behavior that is considered socially harmful, 
and hence appropriately banned without compensation." ld. 
413. Fischel's claim that Lucas was not a case of process failure has previously been 
noted. See supra text accompanying note 401. This is not a point, however, that Fischel 
develops in his article. See FISchel, supra note 390, at 910 (observing, without elaboration, 
that Lucas was not a case of process failure). 
414. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2924 (1992) (Stevens, 
]., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Lucas was part of a large (and powerful) group affected by the legislation: 
beachfront property owners. This is a classic example of a group well-
positioned to engage in legislative logrolling. Obviously, that group 
lost-but that will by definition occur when a takings claim is brought, 
since only losers will have grounds to complain. There is no evidence of 
process failure, and yet Farber would compensate Lucas. Farber would 
provide compensation for regulatory takings that are similar to physical 
takings, even though this class of regulatory takings as a whole is not one 
in which process failure is particularly likely. 
Professor Levmore has advanced a third public choice approach to 
the Takings Clause, one that focuses on singling out. He argues that pro-
cess failure is likely when an individual or small group of people has been 
singled out and that compensation is particularly appropriate in such sit-
uations. When a proposed statute or regulation affects a great many peo-
ple, they can protect themselves through the political process, engaging 
in logrolling to ensure that they do not receive an unfair share of the 
public's burden. But the situation is very different when a proposed gov-
ernmental action affects only a few people or, worse, a single person. 
Professor Levmore writes: "It is unlikely that such individuals can com-
pete effectively in the political arena and it would be undesirable for 
them to try; the transaction cost of individual involvement in politics is, 
after all, quite great. "415 For example, if the government were to take my 
home, in the absence of a just compensation clause I would be poorly 
positioned to go to the legislature or Congress and obtain redress. Thus, 
Levmore argues that takings law properly protects individual actors and 
small groups of actors who are affected by governmental actions but can-
not effectively engage in interest group politics because they are not re-
peat players and because they are a tiny part of the polity.416 
Again, this theory, like Farber's, is an adequate translation of original 
intent (although it is not offered as such) ,417 and for the same reasons: It 
recognizes that the Takings Clause is concerned with process failure, and 
it limits the area in which majoritarian decisions involving property will 
be overturned. However, Levmore's theory represents an imperfect 
translation because it provides for compensation of a small group whose 
property interests are affected, even when a larger group would not be 
compensated. For example, a court will order compensation in the case 
of an individual whose property suffers a particularly sharp decrease in 
415. Levmore, supra note 6, at 307. 
416. See id. at 306-07; Levmore, supra note 154, at 1344-45; see also Farber, supra 
note 156 (public choice view of takings); Farber, supra note 156 (same). As previously 
noted, Justice Stevens's dissent in Lucas also embraces the notion of singling out as one 
factor to be considered in determining whether a taking has occurred. See supra text 
accompanying note 414. 
417. Levmore explicitly does not base his theory on original intent. See Levmore, 
supra note 6, at 307. Although he also finds it normatively appealing, he offers his theory 
principally on the grounds that it is descriptive of current case law, and he says it is simply 
one of several factors considered by courts. See Levmore, supra note 154, at 1367. 
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value because of airplane overflights, but not when overflights affect a 
larger group.418 In contrast, the original understanding did not involve 
making the individuals who were likely to suffer process failure better off 
than those protected by the political process. Rather, the Takings Clause 
was intended to put everyone who suffered the same injury on the same 
footing: Everyone whose property was physically taken received 
compensation. 
Individually, the theories of Farber and Levmore do not accurately 
translate the original understanding of the Takings Clause. However, by 
synthesizing the two theories, one can arrive at an appropriate transla-
tion. Compensation is due when a governmental action affects only the 
property interests of an individual or a small group of people and when, 
in the absence of compensation, there would be a lack of horizontal eq-
uity (i.e., when compensation is the norm in similar circumstances). 
Such a theory does what the Takings Clause was initially interpreted to 
do; it defers to majoritarian decisionmaking in most instances but de-
fends those most likely to be the victims of process failure. 
The Supreme Court's most recent prominent takings cases can illus-
trate the way in which this test would operate. For reasons suggested in 
critiquing Farber's theory, Lucas would be an easy case. The challenged 
statute affected a large group of people that could certainly protect itself 
through the political process. The Court therefore should have found 
that there was no taking in that case. 
Dolan is a closer case, but the result should have been the same. 
Tigard had passed a comprehensive zoning plan. When Dolan sought 
permission from the City Planning Commission to expand her store, the 
Commission conditioned its approval with standard terms previously 
codified in the Community Development Code and imposed on anyone 
who sought to expand in the Central Business District.419 There was no 
evidence that Dolan was treated differently than anyone else. As Justice 
Souter noted in dissent: 
The adjudication here was of Dolan's requested variance from 
the permit conditions otherwise required to be imposed by the 
Code. This case raises no question about discriminatory, or "re-
verse spot" zoning, which "singles out a particular parcel for dif-
ferent, less favorable treatment than the nejghboring ones. "420 
Thus, the ordinance uniformly affected all owners in Tigard's Central 
Business District. Again, this group is sizable enough to protect itself 
through the political process. Contrary to the Court's decision, there was 
no need for judicial intervention. 
b: Discrete and Insular Minorities. - Public choice theory offers one 
approach to process failure. However, modem legal theory also suggests 
418. See Levmore, supra note 6, at 315-16 (citing cases to this effect). 
419. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313-14 (1994). 
420. Id. at 2331 n.* (Souter,]., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978)). 
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that process failure is particularly likely in cases involving discrete and 
insular minorities. Recognition of the need for special judicial protection 
in view of the disadvantages faced by such groups in the political process 
can be traced back to footnote four of Carotene Products, where Justice 
Stone suggested that heightened scrutiny might be appropriate in "the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or 
racial minorities."421 Professor John Hart Ely, the leading champion of 
footnote four jurisprudence, has persuasively argued that because other 
groups are unwilling, for reasons of prejudice, to enter into political co-
alitions with these groups, judicial aggressiveness is appropriate and con-
sistent with the general principle that courts should defer to majoritarian 
decisionmaking as long as it proceeds with due regard to those 
affected. 422 
In footnote four, Justice Stone advanced the claim that (contrary to 
previous Supreme Court decisions) economic rights deserve no special 
judicial protection, so there is a certain irony in advancing a reading of 
the Takings Clause that embraces footnote four. Nonetheless, the 
Takings Clause and the claims of discrete and insular minorities intersect 
in one area: environmental racism, or, as it is also called, environmental 
justice. 423 The idea underlying the environmental racism movement is 
that because minority communities are not full participants in the polit-
ical process, they are likely to receive more than their share of hazardous 
waste siting. Professor Vicki Been has recently written: 
Because local protest can be costly, time--consuming, and politi-
cally damaging, siting decision makers often take the path of 
least resistance-choosing sites in neighborhoods that are least 
likely to protest effectively. Not surprisingly, many of the neigh-
borhoods selected are populated disproportionately by the poor 
and by people of color. Indeed, many representatives of low in-
come and predominantly Mrican American, Latino, or other 
minority neighborhoods charge that industry and governmental 
siting officials have adopted a PffiBY-"put it in blacks' backy-
ards" -strategy for siting LULUs [locally undesirable land 
uses].424 
421. United States v. Carolene Prods., 804 U.S. 144, 152-58 n.4 (1988) (citations 
omitted). 
422. See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 75-77 
(1980). 
428. On environmental racism, see Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in 
Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, lOS Yale L.J. 1888 
(1994) [hereinafter Been, Undesirable Land Uses]; Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do 
With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 
Cornell L. Rev. 1001 (1998) [hereinafter Been, Fairness]; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 787 (1998). 
424. Been, Fairness, supra note 428, at 1002-"S; see also Lazarus, supra note 428, at 
808 (explaining environmental racism in terms of political process failure). 
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Professors Regina Austin and Michael Schill have offered a number of 
reasons why minority communities are at a political disadvantage: 
[P] oor minority communities face some fairly high barriers to 
effective mobilization against toxic threats, such as limited time 
and money; lack of access to technical, medical, or legal exper-
tise; relatively weak influence in political or media circles; and 
cultural and ideological indifference or hostility to environmen-
tal issues. Limited fluency in English and fear of immigration 
authorities will keep some of those affected, especially 
Hispanics, quiescent.425 
Although these factors suggest that process failure is particularly 
likely in cases involving minorities, one possible counterargument should 
be anticipated. The notion that discrete and insular minorities are politi-
cally disadvantaged does not command universal assent among academ-
ics. Some scholars have argued that minority interest groups in fact have 
disproportionate influence in the political process. Bruce Ackerman, for 
example, has observed: "Other things being equal, 'discreteness and in-
sularity' will normally be a source of enormous bargaining advantage, not 
disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics. "426 
Whatever the logical force of such arguments, discrete and insular 
minorities have not been able to reap the political benefits suggested by 
Ackerman. The organizational benefits of being "discrete and insular" 
are more than offset by the fact that, because of racial prejudice, other 
groups are less willing to enter into political bargains with discrete and 
insular minorities.427 Minority groups are dramatically underrepresented 
in legislative bodies.428 In addition, with respect to land use siting deci-
sions, any organizational benefits that discrete and insular minorities 
might normally have are substantially (if not completely) offset by the fact 
that competing groups will be able to organize easily because of the high 
stakes and the ease of determining who is potentially affected. In other 
words, if two sites are under consideration for LULUs and one is in a 
minority neighborhood and the other is in the non-minority neighbor-
hood, the minority neighborhood would not have any obvious organiza-
tional advantages but likely would have organizational disadvantages of 
the types identified by Professors Austin and Schill. 
425. Regina Austin &: Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor &: Poisoned: Minority 
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 Kan. J.L. &: Pub. Pol'y, 
Summer 1991, at 69, 71. 
426. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 723-24 
(1985). For similar arguments, see Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene 
Products, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397, 428; Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the 
Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modem 
Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 74 (1989). 
427. See Daniel A Farber&: PhilipP. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections 
on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 685, 
701-02 (1991). 
428. See id. at 705-06. 
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Professor Ackerman's argument is even weaker in the environmental 
justice context because, as Professor Fischel has pointed out, it presup-
poses pluralist politics, with its opportunities for logrolling among inter-
est groups, not majoritarian politics. 429 As previously discussed, analyses 
of local government decisionmaking indicate that they are typically gov-
erned by majority rule.450 Thus, discrete and insular minorities face par-
ticularly significant disadvantages at the local level, while, because of ra-
cial discrimination, they are not well-positioned to secure redress at the 
state or national level. 
The limited body of empirical work now available is consistent with 
these theories and indicates that minority communities bear more than 
their share of locally undesirable land uses. Professor Been has recently 
completed a preliminary study to determine whether existing data sug-
gested that the disproportionate amount of locally undesirable land use 
sites in minority communities reflected the initial siting decision or the 
fact that, after the siting occurred and land dropped in value, minorities 
moved into the area. She concluded that this evidence indicated that the 
original siting decision disproportionately located such sites in minority 
communities. 451 The only previous study of this issue, conducted by 
Professor James T. Hamilton, reached similar conclusions.4s2 
Thus, empirical work and legal theories about the political process 
and discrete and insular minorities suggest that a translation of the origi-
nal understanding of the Takings Clause should encompass a second cat-
egory of cases: environmental justice cases. Like individuals or small 
groups affected by governmental decisions, discrete and insular minori-
ties are unusually likely to be the victims of process failure. One could 
conceivably argue for a translation under which all governmental actions 
that have a disparate impact on the property interests of discrete and 
insular minorities would be subject to heightened scrutiny under the 
Takings Clause. Decisions changing government benefits or taxing poli-
cies might then be reviewed under the clause. But that would not be a 
good translation. It would miss the limiting principle of the original un-
derstanding-the principle of general deference to majoritarian deci-
429. Fischel, supra note 381, at 893. 
430. See supra text accompanying notes 399-400; see also Fischel, supra note 381, at 
893 (developing this point). 
431. See Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 423, at 1405. Been's analysis uses 
and expands on data previously obtained by the United States General Accounting Office 
and Professor Robert Bullard. She also concludes that in the communities studied the 
percentage of minorities in the affected areas increased after the initial siting decision. 
See id. Such an increase did not occur, however, in the communities analyzed in the GAO 
report. See id.; Roben D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 
53 Soc. Inquiry 273 (1983). 
432. See James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of 
Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RandJ. Econ. 101, 120-22 (1993); see 
also Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 423, at 1396-97 (discussing Professor 
Hamilton's study as the only previous work analyzing the "which came first" question). 
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sionmaking. Limitation of heightened Takings Clause scrutiny of govern-
mental actions that affect discrete and insular minorities to 
environmental justice cases cabins the judiciary's ability to overturn 
majoritarian decisions, just as the initial limitation of the Takings Clause 
to cases of physical seizure meant that majoritarian decisions concerning 
property were subject to constraint only in a limited category of cases. 
Moreover, application of the Takings Clause in environmental justice 
cases, but not in other cases involving discrete and insular minorities, is 
consistent with the aim of the translation model of "making the smallest 
change possible in the outcome or reading to preserve the most possible 
from the original context. "433 Environmental justice cases involve physi-
cal threats to tangible property and are thus closer in nature to physical 
seizures than, for example, governmental acts affecting benefits 
programs. 
Previously, administrative siting decisions have been challenged on 
equal protection grounds, with a uniform lack of success.434 Under the 
approach suggested in this Article, they should be brought instead as 
takings claims. The possibility of process failure permits courts to be ag-
gressive in evaluating environmental justice claims. Because the claims of 
minority groups are particularly unlikely to receive a fair hearing in the 
majoritarian process, it falls to courts to consider individual cases, weigh 
public need against private harm, and determine what remedy, if any, is 
appropriate. 
The teeth in a political process-based takings analysis would lie in the 
fact that courts, applying such an approach, should begin by looking at 
whether there has been disparate impact. In contrast, under current 
caselaw, equal protection analysis turns on whether there has been dis-
criminatory purpose.435 Disparate impact is appropriate in the takings 
context because the kinds of process failures at issue in environmental 
justice claims are not simply that overtly-bigoted decisionmakers will fail 
to consider fairly the claims of minority communities. Rather, the polit-
ical process failures giving rise to these claims also reflect the organiza-
tional difficulties that minority communities face (as well as more subtle 
biases of decisionmakers).436 That said, an anomaly that would be cre-
ated should courts adopt this approach should be acknowledged: It 
would mean that, in a limited subset of property cases, minority groups 
would receive greater protection under the Takings Clause (which was 
not drafted to protect them) than under the Equal Protection Clause 
433. Lessig, supra note 10, at 1263. 
434. See Lazarus, supra note 423, at 829-34 (discussing cases). 
435. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 
(1977) (for equal protection violation, race must have been a motivating factor in decision 
and decisionmaker must have chosen course of action "because of" adverse effect on the 
group); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (discriminatory intent or 
purpose must be shown to make out an equal protection violation). 
436. See text accompanying note 417 (enumerating reasons why minority 
communities are at a political disadvantage). 
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(which was). This, in tum, suggests a larger point about constitutional 
law. The argument set forth in this Article suggests that, at least in the 
takings context, concerns about protecting those who are disadvantaged 
in the political process have informed our constitutional system from the 
time of the framing and that courts have not adequately accounted for 
that concern. Proper regard for it would work a dramatic change in 
takings law. Although this point is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
same may be true of equal protection law: concerns about process fail-
ure, reflected in constitutional structure as a whole and the specific his-
tory of the Equal Protection Clause, may warrant use of a disparate im-
pact test in the equal protection area as we11.4 S7 
A modem translation of the Takings Clause must also address what 
standard of review courts should apply in those cases that fall within the 
ambit of the clause. In other words, once there has been a threshold 
showing that minority communities in an area are bearing a dispropor-
tionate share of locally undesirable land uses, when is a remedy appropri-
ate? In resolving these issues, courts should apply the approach set forth 
in Armstrong v. United States488-an approach that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist,489 Justice Scalia,440 and Justice Stevens441 have applied in 
takings cases.442 Courts should read the Takings Clause "to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."448 This 
approach puts the Court in the position that the majoritarian deci-
sionmaker would occupy if it were not for process failure. The 
majoritarian decisionmaker normally balances public need against pri-
vate harm. It decides whether to act against property interests and, if its 
actions affect property interests, whether to compensate. Under the ap-
proach proposed here, the court will have the responsibility for making 
these judgments in those situations in which the majoritarian deci-
sionmaker is unlikely to consider property claims fairly. 
437. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(invoking Ely article in suppon of argument that motivational analysis is not appropriate 
when applied to distribution of constitutionally protected interest). 
438. 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holders of liens on boats and materials entitled to 
compensation when government seized boats and materials). 
439. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Pennell v. San jose, 485 
U.S. 1, 9 (1988); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
318-19 (1987). 
440. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 n.4 (1987). 
441. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2922 (1992) 
(Stevens,]., dissenting); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987). 
442. On the significance of A1'711St1o11g in recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, 
see Frank Michelman, Construing Old Constitutional Texts: Regulation of Use as "Taking" 
of Property in United States Constitutional Jurisprudence 7-16 (Sept. 9, 1994) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Columbia Law Review). 
443. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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Obviously, the Armstrong approach does not significantly constrain 
judicial decisionmaking-except that, in the model developed here, 
courts will only be able to apply the Armstrong approach when there has 
been evidence of environmental racism. 444 Nonetheless, use of the 
Armstrong approach in modem cases of process failure reflects a good 
translation in that it directly parallels the takings approach employed by 
the framers. Because they feared process failure with respect to 
majoritarian judgments in cases involving confiscation, the framers im-
posed a rule that made mandatory what majoritarian decisionmakers typi-
cally did when there was no process failure: compensate. Under the 
modern translation, because we fear process failure in certain situations, 
we require courts to do what, in the absence of process failure, 
majoritarian decisionmakers would do: decide the matter in a way that 
does not reflect bias. It should be added that, apart from the fact that the 
Armstrong test affords the best approach under a translation model, given 
the complexity of takings issues and the range of concerns implicated, 
use of the Armstrong standard or something like it is almost inevitable 
when courts attempt to balance. Thus, Professor Peterson, in her exhaus-
tive study of takings law, has concluded that while the Court has advanced 
a wealth of different takings tests, "the Justices evidently are deciding 
these cases according to their sense of when it is fair for the government 
to take something of economic value from a private party without paying 
for it."445 
c. Education. - The fidelity of my model to original intent depends 
on strict limits on the kinds of cases that are potentially occasions for 
judicially mandated compensation. This model does not give courts 
broad discretion to award compensation whenever there is political pro-
cess failure. Instead, courts can award compensation only if there is polit-
ical process failure in categories of cases in which such failure is most 
likely. As it was originally, the Takings Clause is interpreted to mandate 
compensation in only a limited category of cases. 
At the same time, the clause, as drafted by Madison, had an educa-
tive element. Although its only literal legal effect was to require the fed-
eral government to compensate when it physically took property, the 
Takings Clause also stood as a statement of the principle that both the 
state and federal government should refrain from acting in a way that 
arbitrarily redistributed wealth. A translation of the original understand-
ing should reflect this broader aim as well. Although the translated 
clause will empower courts to direct compensation in only a limited 
range of cases, it will also stand in political discourse as a statement of 
444. Use of the Armstrong approach also does not resolve the question of whom to 
compensate, if a court were to decide that compensation, rather than an injunction, was 
the appropriate remedy. For a discussion of different ways to compensate for locally 
undesirable land uses, see Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay 
Attention?, 21 Fordham Urb. LJ. 787 (1994). 
445. Peterson II, supra note 154, at 162. 
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principle against arbitrary redistribution. Outside of a limited category of 
cases, then, protection of the takings principle should be entrusted to the 
political process, rather than to the judicial process. 
Recent political developments highlight the extent to which the 
political process can be a forum for the resolution of takings issues. The 
"property rights" movement has obtained the imposition of requirements 
at the state and national level that would-be regulators perform takings 
impact analyses.446 The movement has also sought to require compensa-
tion for regulations that do not give rise to a judicially enforceable right 
to compensation. In thirty-two states, bills have been introduced requir-
ing compensation when a regulation diminishes the value of property by 
some specified figure (commonly fifty percent).447 Mississippi has en-
acted the first statute of this kind, requiring compensation for timber har-
vesting regulations that diminish the value of property by forty per-
cent.448 Most significantly, the Contract with America requires that the 
federal government compensate any property owner whose property is 
diminished in value by ten percent as a result of a government regula-
tion,449 and a range of recent proposals in Congress would, if enacted, 
mandate compensation when regulations affect value.450 
446. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A § 601 
(1995) (federal takings impact analysis required). For state legislation, see Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 29, § 605 (Supp. 1994); Idaho Code§§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Supp. 1994); Ind. Code Ann. 
§ 4-22-2-32 (Burns Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 12-1-201 to -206 (Supp. 1994); Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-90-1 to -4, §§ 63-90a-1 to -4 (Supp. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 36.70A370 (West Supp. 1995); W.Va. Code§§ 22-1A-1 to -6 (1994). For a discussion of 
such legislation, see Recent Legislation, Property-Constitutional Law-Takings-Utah 
Requires Agencies and Localities to Conduct Takings Impact Analyses, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 
519 (1994). 
447. See Nancy Levinson, Give and Takings: When Do Land-Use Rules Trample 
Property Rights?, Architectural Rec., Oct. 1994, at 50; Property Rights Put Heat on 
Regulations, Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 6, 1993, § 2, at 33. 
448. See Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-7, -9 (Supp. 1994); see also John Tibbetts, 
Everybody's Taking the Fifth, Planning, Jan. 1995, at 4, 6 (Mississippi legislation first to 
require compensation). 
449. See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act in House Republican Conference, 
Legislative Digest: Contract with America 33, 36 (Sept. 27, 1994). For news accounts, see 
e.g., Christopher Georges, Wider Property-Owner Compensation May Prove a Costly 
Clause in the 'Contract with America,' Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at AS; Timothy Noah & 
Phil Kuntz, Gingrich Blasts Environmental Policies of Past 20 Years as 'Absurdly 
Expensive,' Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1995, at A5. 
450. For examples of such legislation introduced in the 104th Congress, see H.R. 790, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (compensation when property value declines by 50% as a 
result of ESA or federal wetlands protection program); H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (compensation when land value diminished by 10% as a result of federal agency 
action). For examples from the 103rd Congress, see H.R. 1330, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993) (compensation options for owners of wetlands placed into most use-restrictive 
category); H.R. 1388, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (compensation for property owner who 
suffers "any diminution in value" because of certain federal actions); H.R. 3875, 103rd 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1993) (compensation when land value declines by 50% because ofESA 
or federal wetlands program). See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The 
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The point here is not that such statutes are needed to avoid govern-
ment arbitrariness with respect to private property. That is a matter for 
political debate. But the point is that the statement of principle embod-
ied in the Takings Clause-the statement that we as a people are op-
posed to the arbitrary redistribution of property rights-properly informs 
the political debate. Just as Madison invoked the clause to criticize 
Hamilton's economic program, so can an opponent of uncompensated 
wetlands regulation invoke the clause and argue that the legislation is 
redistributive. And just as a supporter of Hamilton's could argue that the 
Secretary of the Treasury's program was not arbitrary or did not involve 
redistribution, so could a proponent of wetlands regulation argue, for 
example, that the principle underlying the clause is not violated because 
the property owner does not have an entitlement to hurt the environ-
ment or because the price a property owner pays for wetlands reflects the 
possibility of future legislation. Moreover, it will also be possible to argue 
that other constitutional principles trump this constitutional principle in 
particular circumstances. But in a society that reveres the Constitution, 
the existence of a relevant statement of constitutional principle 
powerfully, and appropriately, shapes political debate. Thus, the educa-
tive function of the Takings Clause is of critical significance.451 
C. ~y a Translated Takings Clause Is Superior to Current Supreme Court 
Takings jurisprudence on Non-Originalist Grounds 
This Article has shown why a translated Takings Clause is superior to 
a traditional originalist reading of the clause on both originalist and non-
originalist grounds. In this Section, it shows why it is superior to the non-
originalist modem Supreme Court jurisprudence on non-originalist 
grounds. A political process-based reading of the Takings Clause affords 
a more coherent reading of the text. It is consistent with dominant 
themes in constitutional law. It is easier to apply, and it accords appropri-
ate deference to majoritarian decisionmakers where they are better 
equipped to evaluate competing claims. 
1. Modern Supreme Court Caselaw. - Modem Supreme Court takings 
jurisprudence is famous for its incoherence.452 As Professor Peterson has 
Endangered Secies Act and Private Property, 24 Envtl. L. 369, 713 (1994) (discussing 
property rights movement and legislative proposals for compensation). 
451. On public perceptions of the Takings Clause (and the need for further study of 
the topic), see William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings 
Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1792 (1988). For discussions of the educative role of 
constitutional text, see supra note 297. For discussions of the parallel topic of the 
educative role of courts, see, e.g., Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle 
and Practice in the New Republic 91-136 (1987); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme 
Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961 (1992); Eugene V. Rostow, The 
Democratic Character of judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 208 (1952). 
452. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of 
Property, 9 Const. Commentary 259, 259 (1992) (noting that Supreme Court has been 
"confused and confusing"); Farber, supra note 6, at 279 (describing takings law as a 
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obseiVed, "[I] t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctri-
nal and conceptual disarray."455 The Supreme Court in recent years has 
employed a remarkable number of tests. It held in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp. 454 that, where the government has physically in-
vaded an individual's land or authorized a third party to do so, compensa-
tion is required, even if the harm suffered is trivial. 455 As previously dis-
cussed, it held in Lucas4f>6 that the government can regulate an activity 
that is a common law nuisance without providing compensation, even if 
such regulation strips the affected property of all value.457 At the same 
time, the Court also held that, if a regulation strips property of all value 
in cases where the activity is not a common law nuisance, then the regula-
tion gives rise to a requirement of compensation, unless the regulation is 
pursuant to a background principle of state property law.458 
Although these tests each have an element of manipulability, they 
are designed to be bright-line tests. The Court has also employed balanc-
ing tests. In some cases, it has applied the test it first advanced in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,459 which requires it to look at 
the "character of the governmental action," the extent of interference 
with "investment-backed expectations," and the economic impact of the 
governmental action on the property owner.460 In other cases, it has fol-
lowed the test established in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 461 and examined 
whether the challenged governmental action either "substantially ad-
vance[d] legitimate state interests ... or denie[d] an owner economically 
viable use of [her property]."462 Another takings hurdle, initially im-
posed in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission465 and refined in Dolan, 464 
arises when the government imposes a condition concerning the use of 
property in return for granting a property owner permission to use her 
property in a previously prohibited way. In the absence of compensation, 
there must be an "essential nexus" between that condition and a legiti-
mate state interest and "rough proportionality" between the harm caused 
by the new use of the property and the condition imposed.465 
No unified theory underlies these various tests. Moreover, it is un-
clear when each of these tests should be applied and what each test 
"mess"); Levmore, supra note 6, at 287 (same); Rose, supra note 85, at 561 (describing 
takings law as a "muddle"). 
453. Peterson I, supra note 154, at 1304. 
454. 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
455. See id. (compensation owed because cable ran across apartment building). 
456. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
457. See id. at 2900-01. 
458. See id. 
459. 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
460. Id. at 124. 
461. 447 u.s. 255 (1980). 
462. ld. at 260. 
463. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
464. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
465. Id. at 2317, 2319. 
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means. For example, it is unclear when one or the other of the compet-
ing balancing tests of Penn Central and Agins is applicable-the Court has 
even applied both of them in the same decision466-and, with both tests, 
the factors identified by the Court have been interpreted in dramatically 
different ways in different opinions. 467 
2. The Text. - The most natural reading of the Takings Clause-
"[N]or shall private property be taken for a public use, without just com-
pensation"-is the one that the framers gave it. Compensation was re-
quired for physical seizure. Property is defined in its physical sense. The 
reading suggested in this Article is somewhat less obvious, but still makes 
sense of the text. Property is defined in terms of value. The government 
cannot take it for its own purposes unless it compensates. At the same 
time, the clause has a dual nature. In part, the prohibition is judicially 
enforceable: Compensation is mandated for certain types of takings. In 
part, the clause is hortatory. But the takings principle extends to all 
property. 
The various tests developed by the modern Court do not, in contrast, 
make sense of the text. All reflect a view of property as value. None di-
rects compensation in all cases in which value is diminished. The Court 
has not offered a convincing textual explanation of why only some ac-
tions diminishing the value of property give rise to a compensation re-
quirement. For example, in Lucas, Justice Scalia observes that "the text of 
the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical depri-
vations. "468 But he does not mount a textual defense for why some regu-
latory deprivations are takings, while others are not. Thus, from a textual 
viewpoint, the translation advanced here is superior to current tests; it 
provides a coherent way to understand the text. 
3. Consistency with Larger Themes in Constitutional Law. -Because of 
its confused character, current takings law fails to reflect consistent 
themes. In contrast, the political process theory of the Takings Clause-
with its special protection for discrete and insular minorities, general def-
erence to majoritarian will, and concern for process failure-reflects 
dominant themes in modem constitutional law. 
The relationship of the translation offered here to footnote four of 
Carolene Products and the constitutional jurisprudence of John Hart Ely 
has already been discussed.469 More broadly, the modern Court has 
closely scrutinized discriminatory regulations and legislation,470 while 
subjecting economic regulation to a low level of scrutiny.471 Thus, my 
466. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). 
467. See Peterson I, supra note 154, at 1816-40. 
468. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.15 (1992). 
469. See supra text accompanying notes 421-480. 
470. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 488 U.S. 265, 291 (1978); Loving 
v. Virginia, 888 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 828 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
471. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 848 U.S. 488, 488-89 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New 
York, 886 U.S. 106, 109 (1949). 
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approach makes interpretation of the Takings Clause consistent with 
broader commitments present in our constitutional structure.472 It de-
fers to the political process in the types of cases where our constitutional 
system defers to it-those cases in which the political process generally 
works fairly. It does not defer to the political process in the types of cases 
in which our constitutional system considers it suspect. 
Moreover, the idea that the clause is hortatory accords with key in-
sights of modern constitutional theorists such as Larry Sager and Cass 
Sunstein. Professor Sager has argued that the Constitution embodies a 
commitment to welfare rights, but that that commitment is judicially un-
derenforced.47~ In making this argument, Sager draws on a line of polit-
ical and constitutional theory that begins with James Bradley Thayer and 
contends that judicial enforcement of constitutional rights can be 
counterproductive for two reasons. First, by giving them partial success, it 
weakens the political forces sympathetic to those rights. Second, the judi-
cial action provokes the ire of political forces hostile to the constitutional 
right and thus triggers a counterreaction.474 For these reasons, Sager 
suggests that "judicial enforcement of economic justice [i.e., welfare 
rights] would ... inappropriately congest popular political choice. "475 
Judicial deference to majoritarian deliberations about the provision of 
economic support to the poor reflects a recognition of "the substantial 
virtues of ongoing popular participation in the process by which we as-
pire to identify and achieve the elements of a just politics. "476 
Similarly, Sunstein has argued that certain constitutional rights are 
not wholly judicially enforceable. He has thus taken the position that 
"Congress, rather than the courts, should be the principal vehicle for en-
forcement of the Fourteenth Amendment."477 Like Sager, Sunstein con-
472. On the importance of structure in constitutional interpretation, see generally 
Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 67-77, 94-98 
(1969). 
473. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1219-20 & n.24 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, 
Fair Measure]; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Qothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410, 429 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, justice]. 
474. For Thayer's theory, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 ( 1893). For recent analyses of Thayer's 
work, see One Hundred Years of judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
475. Sager, Justice, supra note 473, at 417. For a recent empirical study that reaches 
similar conclusions about the limited efficacy of judicial decisionmaking to effect socital 
change, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? 336-43, 339 (1991) (M[N]ot only does litigation steer activists to an institution 
that is constrained from helping them, but it also siphons off crucial resources and talent, 
and runs the risk of weakening political efforts."); see also William Michael Treanor and 
Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of MUnconstitutional" Statutes, 
93 Colum. L. Rev. 1902, 1918-24 (1993) (discussing political consequences of judicial 
holdings of unconstitutionality). 
476. Sager, Justice, supra note 473, at 417-18. 
477. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 152 (1993). 
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tends that broad judicial enforcement of the Constitution can be counter-
productive: "Reliance on the courts may impair democratic channels for 
seeking changes, and in two ways. It might divert energy and resources 
from politics, and the eventual judicial decision may foreclose a political 
outcome. "478 Courts therefore should be aggressive in protecting consti-
tutional rights only in two categories of cases. They need to protect "the 
background conditions for political deliberation," such as the right to 
vote, the right to speak, or "the provision of roughly equal educational 
opportunity. "479 They also need to protect "groups or interests that are 
unlikely to receive a fair hearing in the legislative process."480 Thus, 
Sunstein's theory in this regard parallels Ely's Carotene Products 
jurisprudence. 481 
In advancing the claim that the Constitution recognizes rights that 
are not judicially enforceable, Sager and Sunstein do not focus on pro-
tecting the political vitality of the takings principle.482 Indeed, the entire 
current debate about the existence of judicially nonenforceable rights 
largely ignores property rights. And yet, if one is concerned, as Sager and 
Sunstein are, with the possibility that judicial aggressiveness saps the 
strength of political movements, there is no apparent reason why prop-
erty rights should be different from other rights. Indeed, the Takings 
Clause may offer the paradigmatic case. Judicial aggressiveness in this 
realm has, after all, provided only a limited check. Lucas was the first case 
since Pennsylvania Coal in which the Supreme Court invalidated a regula-
tory taking, a passage of over seventy years.483 Although the final answer 
to the question would require detailed analysis of empirical data, it seems 
likely that Pennsylvania Coal did not ultimately prove beneficial for cham-
pions of property interests. The best evidence of this is that in England, 
where there is no constitutional compensation requirement, property 
owners have been better protected from regulations than they have been 
in the United States. As one commentator has observed, 
[C]ompensation has been and is paid in England for regula-
tions which would have been or are upheld as valid in the 
United States without payment of compensation. In other 
words, over the years, the statutes in England have been more 
478. Id. at 145. 
479. Id. at 142-43. 
480. Id. at 143. 
481. This point is instructively developed in James E. Fleming, Constructing the 
Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 245 (1993). 
482. Sager does, however, offer the Takings Clause as a possible example of an 
underenforced right. See Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 473, at 1219 & n.22. For 
Sunstein's view of the clause, see Sunstein, supra note 477, at 128-29 (best reading of 
Takings Clause comports with historical understanding of its meaning as protecting 
existing property holdings). 
483. See Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society: Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 Md. L. Rev. 162, 187 (1993). 
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generous to the property owners than have the American 
courts.484 
885 
If Sager and Sunstein are right that judicial victories can perversely 
gut the political movements they sought to advance, defenders of prop-
erty interests would have been better off relying only on the political pro-
cess for vindication of their claims. This would seem particularly true 
since their judicial victories were so few and far between. In other words, 
defenders of a broad conception of the takings principle would be better 
off joining the political "property rights" movement than placing their 
faith in courts. 
4. judicial Competence and Ease and Predictability of Administration. -
The model presented here also makes sense because courts are not well 
equipped to engage in the kind of balancing that current caselaw re-
quires in regulatory takings claims. In a case like Pennsylvania Coal, the 
loser in a political battle comes to court, says that a government action 
hurt her severely, and the court weighs the harm to her from that particu-
lar governmental act against the societal benefits from that act. What this 
analysis misses is that interests are repeat players in the political process. 
That a repeat player has lost a particular game signifies relatively little. 
The coal companies in Pennsylvania Coal may have used their clout to get 
anti-union legislation or lower taxes. In short, if affected parties have had 
a realistic opportunity to enter into political deals on a range of issues, 
that they lose on one piece of legislation may simply indicate that this was 
not a particularly salient issue for them or that other issues were more 
salient. Because they focus on one specific governmental act, traditional 
balancing tests can lead to a remedy where the loss was merely the prod-
uct of political give and take.485 They give the loser an unwarranted sec-
ond bite at the apple. 
In addition, current takings law is unpredictable. It is unpredictable 
both because of the variety of tests employed and because balancing tests 
are unpredictable in their results. In contrast, the tests proposed here 
will generate largely predictable results because they create clearly de-
fined and limited spheres in which courts will be able to order 
compensation. 
The translation proposed here has one weakness: It involves a depar-
ture from precedent. For example, if it were adopted, not all physical 
takings would give rise to a judicially enforceable right to compensation. 
484. Donald G. Hagman, Compensable Regulation, in Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land 
Value Capture and Compensation 256, 289 (Donald G. Hagman & DeanJ. Misczynski eds., 
1978). 
485. Courts consistently act as if every political actor fully and vigorously fights every 
political battle. In fact, political actors invest their political capital where they think it will 
yield the greatest return. As stated in the text, what this means in the takings context is 
that parties can lose an individual battle on a regulation or statute, not because they are 
the victims of majoritarian processes, but because they thought it more appropriate to 
focus their attention elsewhere. See Treanor & Sperling, supra note 475, at 1917, 1937 
(discussing allocation of political capital). 
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More generally, courts would be employing new tests that reflect an at-
tempt to recapture the original purposes of the Takings Clause, rather 
than building on the way the clause has evolved. Given the general dissat-
isfaction with takings doctrine and the advantages offered by the transla-
tion, such a departure is justified. 
In addition, despite its departure from recent precedent, the propo-
sal advanced here is consistent with a venerable tradition in takings juris-
prudence. The early, narrow readings of the state and federal takings 
clauses reflected a notion of deference to other actors in the political 
process. Courts did not deny that an injury had occurred, but nonethe-
less concluded that, outside the very limited area of physical takings, 
other actors should weigh private harm against public need and decide 
whether compensation was appropriate. For the Supreme Court, with re-
spect to state governmental actions, the critical concerns necessitating 
deference were those of federalism. Thus, in an 1850 case in which a 
state had awarded clearly inadequate compensation in a just compensa-
tion proceeding, the Court acknowledged both that a wrong had been 
done and that it was not the Supreme Court's province to rectify that 
wrong: "It rests with State legislatures and State courts to protect their 
citizens from injustice and oppression of this description. "486 Outside of 
the context of federalism, federal courts deferred when they believed the 
decision whether to compensate was political, not judicial. As Chief 
Justice Taney said in refusing compensation, "[I]t is a question for the 
decision of the political department of the government, and not for the 
judicial; and, consequently, is one upon which this court forbears to ex-
press an opinion. "487 
State courts reached similar conclusions. Thus, in Callendar v. 
Marsh,488 the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed that the just com-
pensation clause "has ever been confined, in judicial application, to the 
case of property actually taken and appropriated by the government."489 
It further stated that 
[t]here are cases, without doubt, where an individual may suffer 
by the exercise of this [governmental] power, and thus must be 
made involuntarily to contribute much more than his propor-
tion to the public convenience; but such cases seem not to be 
provided for, and must be left to that sense of justice which 
every community is supposed to be governed by.490 
The court observed that the legislature could and should compensate 
where the harm was disproportionate, but that compensation was 
discretionary. 49 1 
486. Mills v. St. Clair County, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 569, 585 (1850). 
487. United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14, 445). 
488. 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823). 
489. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). 
490. ld. at 431. 
491. See id. at 433-35. 
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Such statements indicate that deference to majoritarian deci-
sionmakers in part explains the limited reach of the early judicial deci-
sions concerning takings. Courts consciously read the takings clauses nar-
rowly because they believed that there was a sphere in which the 
legislature, rather than the courts, bore responsibility for balancing harm 
to the individual against advancing the commonweal. 492 A process-based 
theory of the Takings Clause appropriately restores this tradition of judi-
cial deference to majoritarian decisionmakers in those categories of cases 
in which those decisionmakers can be trusted to consider property claims 
fairly. 
CoNCLUSION 
As virtually every one of the legion of commentators to discuss 
takings law has observed, takings law today is incoherent. It lacks a unify-
ing principle, and the Supreme Court's most recent forays into the 
takings realm-Lucas and Dolan-only highlight the extent to which 
takings law is plagued by fundamental disagreements. 
This Article has proposed a revival of the principle that animated the 
advocates of the first takings clauses and that informed early interpreta-
tions of the Takings Clause and its state counterparts: Compensation 
should be mandated only in those types of cases where the political pro-
cess is particularly unlikely to consider property claims fairly and, in gen-
eral, the question of when the government can affect property interests 
should be resolved by the political process. Madison believed that the 
political process was most suspect when dealing with slaveowners and 
landowners. Others who supported either the federal Takings Clause or 
its predecessor clauses acted because they saw process failure in, among 
other things, military seizure of goods or invalidation of a regional minor-
ity's land grants. 
Today, the cases in which process failure is most likely involve minor-
ity groups (as in the area of environmental racism) and the singling out 
of individuals or small groups of people. This Article has built on that 
insight to propose a modern translation of the original understanding of 
the Takings Clause under which courts would protect only those most 
vulnerable to political process failure. At the same time, it has argued 
that the clause was intended to serve a broad educative function and that 
it should inform today, as it did originally, political debate about govern-
ment actions that affect property interests. This approach is easier to ap-
ply than current doctrine. It accords with original intent. It is more con-
sistent with the text of the clause. Finally, it reflects deference to 
majoritarian decisionmakers where it is appropriate and a judicial check 
on them where it is necessary. 
492. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 27-31 (history of police power in nineteenth 
century exemplifies jurists' belief that "there could be a form of neutral legal reasoning 
that was fundamentally different from political reasoning"). 
